Reversed ethnographic approach to U.S. fans' reception of Korean popular culture by Jung, Hyeri
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
by 
Hyeri Jung 
2017 
 
 
  
The Dissertation Committee for Hyeri Jung Certifies that this is the approved 
version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
Transcultural Media and the Soft Power of the Korean Wave:  
A Reversed Ethnographic Approach to U.S. Fans’ Reception of Korean 
Popular Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee: 
 
Thomas Johnson, Co-Supervisor 
Joseph Straubhaar, Co-Supervisor 
Stephen Reese 
Mary Bock 
Suzanne Scott 
 
Transcultural Media and the Soft Power of the Korean Wave:  
A Reversed Ethnographic Approach to U.S. Fans’ Reception of Korean 
Popular Culture 
 
 
by 
Hyeri Jung 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
December 2017 
Dedication 
 
To God, my families, and the loved ones 
 
 
 v 
Acknowledgements 
 
I dedicate my dissertation to God, my families, and the loved ones. I would not be 
where I am now without the endless support and love from my family: Mom, dad, and 
my older brother. I love you from the bottom of my heart. I also would like to express my 
sincere gratitude for Dr. Joe Straubhaar and Dr. Tom Johnson for their continuous help 
and guidance on my dissertation. My beloved friends in Korea and the US: Thank you for 
always being there for me. My dearest informants: You have given me countless ideas, 
challenged me, and most of all, shown me the values I was not aware of. Salloong: Your 
love and understanding have made me go through even the darkest and toughest days. 
You are the sunshine and the apple of my eye. I am grateful for a lot of things, and I hope 
my journey to better understand communication in pursuit of social betterment does not 
stop here. 
 vi 
Transcultural Media and the Soft Power of the Korean Wave:  
A Reversed Ethnographic Approach to U.S. Fans’ Reception of Korean 
Popular Culture 
 
Hyeri Jung, Ph. D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisors: Thomas Johnson and Joseph Straubhaar 
 
This dissertation unravels dynamic interactions between Korean popular culture 
and its fans in the United States, how cultural hybridity of the Korean Wave 
un/consciously facilitates soft power, and what sociocultural implications it might yield 
in global/international contexts. Employing various theoretical frameworks of 
globalization, critical/cultural media studies, hybridity, soft power, and fan studies, I 
conduct a qualitative methodological approach of what I call “reversed media 
ethnography”—examining the contraflow of Korean media culture—on U.S. fans. I 
employ various qualitative and interpretive techniques including grounded theory to 
analyze the rich corpus of data—participant observation and qualitative interviews—I 
collected over a period of two years to examine the nature of transcultural media and fans 
of the Korean Wave in the United States.  
Overall, the findings of this dissertation suggest that the complex layers of 
hybridity embedded in Korean popular culture creates complicated webs of 
transculturality, such as alternative forms of gender representation, cute culture, and 
honorific culture. When popular culture is circulated transnationally, the local context of 
its origin is often erased and instead it is projected through the lens of the receiving local 
 vii 
context. Understanding transcultural media texts—K-pop’s appropriation of Hip Hop—as 
well as the perception of ethnicity surrounding the practice is bound to have differences 
and difficulties based on varying degrees of social and historical contexts. Cultural 
appropriation can enhance diversity and multiculturalism, however, one should be 
sensitive to a culture that has a history of being colonized or oppressed. I suggest a 
mutual understanding of each other’s culture and history in order to appreciate and 
respect the Otherness of each culture as well as subcultures.  
Global social media, as a main conduit to interact with foreign cultures, facilitates 
the spread and popularity of Korean popular culture, yet simultaneously creates cross-
cultural misunderstanding and disjunctures. The Korean Wave exemplifies strategically 
well-balanced cultural hybridity that arouses a certain feeling of affinity—what I call 
emotional proximity. Korean popular culture evokes continuous negotiations of identities 
and generates nonthreatening wholesome content that comfortably appeals to American 
fans with varying degrees of ethnic, racial, social, and cultural backgrounds. The notion 
of woori-ness (we-ness in English)—collective unity and solidarity—embedded in 
Korean popular culture and its fandom culture works as one of the multifaceted soft 
power in the eyes of U.S. fans that leads to an alternative post-Western soft power. This 
study contends that it is not the so-called hybridized Korean popular culture per se that 
makes it transcultural—and global to some extent—but the often under-recognized vital 
agents in the global sphere: the regions of fans. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “Are you the one about soft power?” she said, seemed to have read my online 
profile about being a researcher interested in soft power and excited to have me as a new 
member of a group. A group of people was gathered in a dimly lit room to watch a 
Korean TV drama together. Some of them were wearing a T-shirt with K-pop (Korean 
pop music) written on it, and one of them had an EXO1 keychain. It was early 2015 when 
I first met them who enjoy consuming and interacting with Korean popular culture in the 
US. That was the moment my journey to a reversed ethnographic approach to U.S. fans’ 
reception of Korean popular culture started.  
With the development of digital technologies along with the rapid globalization 
process in the 1990s, there has been a surge of transnational cultural flow of South 
Korean media content in the domain of global media culture. South Korea (hereafter 
Korea)’s media market expansion facilitated the export of its popular culture, which has 
received worldwide attention and popularity. Rigorously supported by the Korean 
government and entrepreneurs as an official national policy, productions and content of 
Korean popular culture, mainly television drama (K-drama) and pop music (K-pop), have 
become a giant cultural industry, and have been widely consumed by and enchanted other 
countries (KOCIS, 2012; Shim, 2006). This successful reception of Korean popular 
culture overseas is known as the Korean Wave (or Hallyu in Korean).  
The globalization paradigm (Appadurai, 1996; Giddens, 2002; Kraidy, 2002; 
Shim, 2006; Straubhaar, 1991; Tomlinson, 1999), as opposed to imperialist theses (Boyd-
Barrett, 1977; Schiller, 1970; 1976; 1991), provides more flexible and complex 
theoretical accounts, which help to explicate the dynamic consequences derived by 
                                                 
1 EXO is one of the most popular K-pop groups. 
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technological developments and the prominent emergence of hitherto non-center2 and 
so-called non-dominant-Western countries as major cultural producers and exporters. In 
the midst of an increasingly complex interdependence among countries in international 
settings, the flow of media culture, particularly popular culture, has become more 
multipolar (having different centers of power in a world) and multidirectional (Chua & 
Iwabuchi, 2008; Straubhaar, 1991).  
A handful of previous studies (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008; Jung & Shim, 2014; Kim, 
2009a; Ryoo, 2009; Shim, 2006; Yang, 2012a) looked at how individuals in different 
countries, primarily in Asia, engage with the Korean Wave, which has become a regional 
global culture. However, very few investigations have explored it empirically with first-
hand accounts in Western contexts, particularly the United States. This is mainly because 
the reverse cultural flow from the Asian sphere to the Western sphere has been relatively 
limited (Iwabuchi, 2002), at least until now, which led most Korean Wave scholars to 
focus only on the analysis of intraregional cultural flows within the Asian/Pacific region. 
However, the increasing prominence of the Korean Wave, especially K-pop among the 
young digital generation in the United States, compels scholars to reexamine the 
phenomenon much further.   
According to Zubernis and Larsen (2012), we are hardly immune to the pleasures 
of the fan object and yet there remains a level of shame attached to the notion of being a 
fan, particularly if one is female. Scholars with intentions to explore fandom studies have 
often met with trepidation and numerous declarations that fandom is little more than the 
realm of ‘Japanese otakus (obsessive fans)’ and ‘Western fangirls,’ and thus, by 
extension, emotional and uncontrollable. Furthermore, this hegemonic perspective 
                                                 
2 In the realm of global cultural studies, “non-center” refers to countries that are not traditionally 
considered as powerful in international settings. 
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implies that consideration of the U.S. fans of the Korean Wave phenomenon from a fan 
cultural perspective taints the seriousness of transcultural critical cultural studies, 
depoliticizing it to an unacceptable degree. This shame extends to acafan (academics who 
self-identifies as a fan of, usually, popular culture) subjectivity, compelling them to 
apologize for attempting to engage intellectually with a subject matter that is seen to be 
trivial and frivolous. “We theorise and politicize our pleasures in order to make them 
more palatable to a cultural elite that does not need any more encouragement to dismiss 
what we study as frivolous and meaningless. The very act of justification is of course an 
indication that we are uncomfortable with the position” (Zubernis & Larsen, 2012, p. 46).  
It is in this vein that I use the term ‘fan’ instead of ‘audience’ throughout my 
dissertation. One of the traits that distinguish fans from general audiences is the level of 
investment—how much one is willing to invest (Bourdieu, 1984). The level of 
investment—the level of fandom—the people I have interacted with and studied are 
much deeper and richer than general audiences to an extent that they become the 
participants of the whole ecology of transcultural media and fandom. Instead of just 
viewing and consuming media texts, some of them create their own content, learn the 
language, and even move to Korea to live. My dissertation employs what I call a reversed 
media ethnographic approach to examine multiple aspects of the Korean Wave as 
transcultural media and its fans in the United States. In other words, in addition to 
examining the contraflow of media culture, having an outsider scholar like myself, from a 
country that had been more peripheral, study the impact of its cultural exports on people 
in one of the central countries like the United States. This reverses the usual dynamic in 
which scholars from central countries study the periphery, hence reversed media 
ethnography. I have closely participated and interacted with American fans of the Korean 
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Wave for more than two years to explore beyond what has already been studied and 
below the surface of their expressed interpretations.  
My reversed media ethnography over a period of two years includes participant 
observations and various structures and types of interview methods. Between early 2015 
and early 2017, I regularly engaged in qualitative interviews and participatory 
observation of meetings, events, and activities that are related to Korean popular culture. 
These events and activities are organized and held by a local group called a Korean 
Interest Group (a pseudonym, hereafter KIG) in Texas. There are about 14 key 
informants with whom I have closely interacted on a regular basis and conducted in-
depth qualitative interviews periodically for the past two years. The rich corpus of data 
includes both citations from my field notes on participatory observations and quotes from 
interviews. I do not attempt to provide generalizations about American fans’ reception of 
Korean popular culture. But rather, by providing an in-depth, fragmented moment of the 
whole ecology, I attempt to provide unexpected discoveries through detailed analyses and 
possible conceptualizations of recurring patterns, a major strength of qualitative media 
ethnographic research (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). 
I revisit some of the relevant theoretical concepts and frameworks of globalization 
in light of the Korean Wave in order to address the following inquiries: What motivates 
Americans to interact with Korean popular culture? What are the cross-cultural 
similarities and differences they see in Korean popular culture versus American popular 
culture? How do they consume, interpret, and reproduce—encode/decode—with Korean 
popular culture? What aspects of soft power can be found within American fans’ 
reception of Korean popular culture? What implications does Korean Wave’s soft power 
have on American fans’ identity? How does cultural hybridity of Korean popular culture 
un/consciously facilitate socio-political implications of soft power in the United States, 
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which has one of the strongest cultural industries in the world? And what cultural, social, 
and political implications does the Korean Wave yield in global/international contexts? 
The theoretical approach of cultural hybridity to the Korean Wave phenomenon 
has undermined the multiple processes and practices international fans generate 
(Anderson & Shim, 2015). Hybridity should not be used as an easy tool to explain any 
national, regional, international, or global media culture; its complicated in-between 
space is never power-neutral but demands constant struggles and negotiations over 
cultural meanings and symbols. The theoretical challenge of hybridity lies in what 
context transnational hybridity creates ideological twists in global contexts and fulfills (or 
does not) its progressive potential in a local context (Kraidy, 2002). It is important to 
remark that although soft power can only be made possible with substantial hard 
economic power and the political economic aspect of the Korean Wave should not be 
undermined. Yet, spread of and exposure to foreign popular culture does not always 
guarantee its popularity overseas (Shim, 2013). The transnational and transcultural 
reception of media texts is neither fully controllable nor predictable by media producers 
and policymakers because media texts are never self-sufficient structures of meanings 
themselves. 
I argue that the intricate layers of hybridity well manifested in Korean popular 
culture is not just a mere influence on U.S. fans of the Korean Wave, but a part of the 
creation of the ecology of transcultural media and fandom. This is where the soft power 
of the Korean Wave, as an alternative post-Western soft power in international settings, 
comes in: Korea’s woori-ness (we-ness in English, which signifies a sense of unity and 
collective mindset), a significant yet under-recognized facet of soft power, and its 
historical position of in-between ‘semi-periphery’ to the power structure in the world. 
One of the purposes for studying the reception of the Korean Wave among fans in the 
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United States is not to impose the idea of the great soft power of Korean-ness as a neo-
colonial global cultural power, but to reexamine globalization theories that recognize the 
dynamic formations of identity and hybridity at the local level while not dismissing the 
power hierarchy in international settings. As Oh (2017) suggests, I attempt to direct our 
attention not so much to how to preserve the Korean Wave, but how the movement of 
Korean Wave across global circuits can contribute to the hybridity that helps to level 
global power.  
I consider pertinent arguments—globalization, hybridity, popular culture, identity, 
transcultural fan studies—as pieces of a broader theoretical argument and recognize their 
aggregate power in the hope that we can better understand the complex webs of 
international communication and global/transnational media culture, albeit provisional. 
One of the ways to do so is when we start to take fans’ reception of transcultural popular 
culture more seriously, and closely interact with them with a trans-local ethnographic 
approach at the heart of globalization. The structure and format of my dissertation is fluid 
as is the nature of cultural studies’ way of writing. I will first examine contexts relevant 
to the cultural industry in Korea and historical formation of the Korean Wave. In the next 
chapter, I will examine theoretical concepts and previous research in the realms of 
globalization, hybridity, soft power, popular culture, and fan studies. Next, I will 
elaborate on methodology, findings, and conclusion, respectively. However, my 
arguments on theoretical concepts and ideas would be elaborated throughout the 
dissertation in a more fluid and flexible structure to explicate multiple aspects of 
transcultural media and fans of the Korean Wave in the United States. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
1. THE KOREAN WAVE IN GLOBALIZATION 
1.1. Cultural Industry in Korea 
 Scholars of the globalization theories argue that the composition, the global flow 
and the audience’s use of media products are far more complex than Lerner’s, Schiller’s 
and Boyd-Barrett’s naïve argument of cultural imperialism. The core characteristic of 
globalization theories thus lies in the “necessary complexity” (Sparks, 2007, p. 130). 
Appadurai (1996) supports this notion by stating that there is no undefeatable single 
leader of a world system of images, but instead the world system is consisted of multiple 
nodes of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes. In the midst of 
these arguments, the unexpected emergence of the Korean Wave (or Hallyu in Korean) 
since the 1990s serves as a good example of the often unpredictable and unsymmetrical 
transnational flows of media culture (Shim, 2006). The Korean Wave denotes not Korean 
popular culture per se, but the popularity of Korean popular culture in non-Korean 
territories. 
 It was not long ago that Korea started to emerge as one of the major centers for 
the production of transnational popular culture. Since the 1990s, the Korean cultural 
industries have developed many of their cultural products and expanded the export of 
these products to mainly East and Southeast Asia. The sudden rise of Korean popular 
culture and its dissemination in Asian countries took many people in Asia by surprise, as 
foreign or transnational popular culture in Asia had often been associated with the United 
States, Japan or Hong Kong (Kim, 2013). A few media outlets and scholars argued that 
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the Korean Wave is a passing fad due to both protective cultural policies in some Asian 
countries and the emergence of China and India as new powerhouses in the realm of 
popular culture (Jin, 2016). However, despite these concerns, the Korean Wave has 
further developed from a regional reception to that of a global, albeit not yet full-fledged. 
Many policy makers, cultural practitioners, media scholars, and most of all, popular 
culture fans around the world are amazed by this unexpected global popularity of Korean 
popular culture originating from the small, once semi-peripheral, country.  
 The spread of the Korean Wave can be categorized roughly into two major 
historical developments: the Korean Wave 1.0 era between 1997 and 2007 and the 
Korean Wave 2.0 era since 2008 to the present (Jin, 2016). They differ in their major 
characteristics, such as major cultural exports, technological developments, fan bases and 
government’s cultural policies.   
 9 
 Korean Wave 1.0 Korean Wave 2.0 
Time Period 1997-2007 2008-present 
Primary Genres TV dramas, films K-pop, video games, 
animation 
Technologies Online games Social media, digital games 
Major Regions East Asia Asia, Europe, North America, 
South America 
Primary Fans 30s-40s Teens-20s included 
Major Cultural Policies Governments’ hands-off 
neoliberal policies 
Governments’ hands-on 
policies mixed with neoliberal 
policies 
Table1: Two Major Time Periods of the Korean Wave (Note: Reprinted from Dal 
Yong Jin, New Korean Wave. University of Illinois Press: 2016) 
 There are several reasons to demarcate the Korean Wave into these two time 
periods. First, the trend in the global cultural trade for the Korean cultural industries has 
changed since 2008, when the export of cultural products surpassed those of imported 
products. Second, Korea has become one of the top non-Western countries that 
meaningfully exports almost all of its cultural forms (Jin, 2016), such as television 
programs, film, popular music, animation, digital technologies including online gaming 
and smartphones—not only as technology but also as culture—to both Western and non-
Western countries. There have been several countries that have penetrated the global 
markets with their cultural products, but they primarily export limited cultural forms. For 
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example, Mexico and Brazil have exported television programs, known as telenovelas, 
Hong Kong was famous for its Kung-Fu movies in the 1970s and 1980s, and Japan has 
been a global leader with its manga (comic books) and animation. However, Japan’s 
popular music and television programs have not been well received in the Western 
markets, albeit successful in the Asian region. The contemporary global presence of 
diverse Korean cultural forms cannot be seen with other non-Western countries (Jin, 
2016). 
 Third is perhaps one of the most significant aspects when considering the Korean 
Wave: political economic perspective. Government policy has shifted from hands-off, 
indirect support, intervention, and deregulation to the global trade of cultural products in 
the early years of the Korean Wace 1.0 to hands-on, direct support in the new era of the 
Korean Wave as a result of changing political ideologies and political relations to other 
countries. The successful growth of Korean cultural industries and their expansion 
overseas has been closely linked to the government’s cultural policies, either directly or 
indirectly in the midst of neo-liberal reform. The Korean government has cultivated its 
cultural policies in the face of globalization, such as export promotion, direct and indirect 
export subsidies and supports, and the promotion of the nation’s cultural image abroad 
(Jin, 2014).  
Since 2008, the latest two administrations of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and 
Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) have changed their emphasis on cultural policy toward a 
creative content policy and have begun to be actively involved in the cultural sector. 
They have focused on the creative industries, previously known as the cultural industries, 
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as a significant part of the national economy, with one of the emphases on intellectual 
properties. The Lee administration (2008-2013) actively supported and controlled the 
Korean contents industries followed by the Park administration (2013-2017) that has 
continued and even intensified its hands-on policy in the cultural sector. The Park 
administration allocated 2 percent of the national budget to culture, up from 0.9 percent 
in 2010 when the average budget for OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) countries was 1.9 percent during the same period (Presidential 
Transition Team, 2013). In the era of Korean Wave 2, the last two governments have 
taken a distinctive position in the sector of cultural industries. They attempted to deal 
with almost every cultural sector in the midst of the rapid growth of digital/social media 
in the name of national economy. Since 2010, the cultural penetration of Korean popular 
culture, including online gaming and K-pop, has exponentially increased across the globe 
when the government initiated a systematic export strategy that works closely with 
private firms and cultural industries.  
The premise of globalization is that the power of nation-states have diminished in 
the realm of economy and culture, and the national boundary does not function to shape 
people’s cultural identities and cultural sovereignty. However, as explicated in the 
Korean Wave case, the power of the nation-state does is reformed and redeveloped 
through the government’s engagement in international relations. While neoliberal norms 
call for small involvement of government in the cultural sector, the Korean government 
has taken a major role because the cultural industries acknowledge that active 
governmental intervention is needed to grow as commodities. Under neo-liberal reform, 
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the primary role of the Korean government has been somewhat decreased, however, the 
nation-state remains and intensifies its role in popular culture (Jin, 2014).  
Fourth, the advance of social media and digital technologies has changed the 
trend of the Korean Wave, making it much more global and transcultural both in scope 
and scale. The new media such as social media are a vital element creating an 
unfathomable spread of information in both speed and scope, known as spreadable media 
(Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013; Jin & Yoon, 2014). Fans around the world heavily access 
social media to enjoy K-pop, K-drama, television programs, films, and Korea-based-
video-and-smartphone games rather than via traditional one-way communication 
technologies and mainstream media (Jin, 2012). The scope and scale of fans (rather than 
general audiences) and their participatory activities across the globe have exponentially 
increased for the Korean Wave 2.0. One noticeable example is K-pop. As Psy’s 
“Gangnam Style,” featuring a buffoonish horse dance, has been the most watched video 
on YouTube in the world since 2013, social media has been a powerful conduit for 
Korean Wave, facilitating their popularity beyond the Asian region. This implies that the 
Korean Wave 2.0 has been made possible because Korea has advanced its digital 
technologies in conjunction with social media (Jin, 2014).  
Around the world, transcultural fans are increasingly assessing foreign popular 
cultural content through social media. Since the early 2010s, K-pop, considered as the 
strongest element of the Korean Wave 2.0, and its music videos have garnered a massive 
fan base worldwide through its skillfully hybridized form. K-pop fans around the world 
have transculturally collaborated together and circulated K-pop-related content through 
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social media such as Facebook and Twitter. For example, regional fans of K-pop in 
Indonesia have been identified as the major contributor in ranking Super Junior, a K-pop 
idol group, as the number one worldwide trending topic on Twitter in October 2010 
(Jung, 2011a). Worldwide K-pop phenomenon illustrates how social media empower 
transcultural fandoms, enhance cultural flow, and affect the dynamics of transcultural 
circulation (Jung, 2011a). Nevertheless, it is important to address that the transcultural 
phenomenon of the Korean Wave is boosted in conjunction with political economic 
strategy, such as the Korean government purposefully relaxing copyright issues in order 
to make the content of Korean popular culture more accessible and spreadable.  
It is hard to define what K-pop is due to some regarding it as a larger world 
rather than just a musical genre of popular culture (Y. Kim, 2015). In this dissertation, I 
use the term K-pop to refer to those systematically trained idols and their music that often 
emphasize on their choreography-driven performance. K-pop’s emphasis on performers’ 
aesthetically pleasing attractiveness and versatility are some of the elements that have 
attracted worldwide fandoms (Lie, 2012; Oh, 2015). For instance, the increasing presence 
of K-pop in the United States, a country with the world’s largest music market, is 
evidenced by the fact that the Billboard has been providing its own section dedicated to 
K-pop since 2011 and YouTube provides a category solely dedicated to K-pop (Song, 
2015). More recently, a K-pop boy group called BTS (BangTan Sonyeondan, meaning 
bulletproof boy scout) won the Top Social Artist Award at Billboard Music Awards on 
May 21
st
, 2017, receiving more than 300 million votes, which broke the world record for 
having the most votes in a fan-voted award at the Billboard Music Awards.  
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The Korean Wave phenomenon provides a unique case study because of the 
ways in which it has achieved its own mode of cultural hybridity, modernity, and most 
importantly, international fans’ active role in the era of social media. The Korean Wave is 
more than just popular culture because of its entertainment-diplomatic complexity3 (Choi 
& Maliangkay, 2015), a national-institutional policy initiative with clear ambitions 
reaching beyond the cultural domain (Choi, 2015), and most of all, its appeal to widely 
varying degrees of audiences and fans across the globe.  
1.2. Media Culture from Transnational to Transcultural  
Increasingly complex interdependences among countries and the development of 
technologies have signaled the demise of the cultural imperialism theses and elicited 
substantial attention for multilayered transnational media culture in a postcolonial 
context. In contrast to the imperialism theories, the globalization paradigm views media 
culture as more dynamic, multilayered, multi-polar and multi-central in which the key 
distinctive characteristic of the contemporary global world from earlier periods lies in this 
“necessary complexity” (Sparks, 2007, p. 130). 
Globalization is often tied up with modernity. Many would agree with the 
proposition that if globalization means anything, it means the incorporation of societies 
into a capitalist modernity (Sparks, 2007). But they differ as to what that entails. Whereas 
Giddens (1990) and Appadurai (1996) viewed globalization as constituted in and through 
the spread of modernity, Robertson (1992) saw it as a distinctive process from modernity. 
Tomlinson (2003) saw globalization as engendering cultural identity, instead of 
                                                 
3For example, people often refer to K-pop idols as the most treasured ‘national assets’ 
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destroying nation-states and homogenizing (Americanizing) the entire world, as we live 
through publicly institutionalized and discursively organized world. “Globalization is 
really the globalization of modernity, and modernity is the harbinger of identity” 
(Tomlinson, 2003, p. 271). Modernity is the harbinger of identity, not destroyer, because 
it institutionalizes and regulates cultural practices (e.g., gender, class, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, various capitals, etc.). Also, deterritorialization, enabled by communication 
technologies, is not destroying localities and demolishing traditions. Tomlinson (2003) 
rather views cultural experience as being expanded in various ways out of its traditional 
particular localities.  
Our places are increasingly penetrated both in tangible and intangible ways by 
the connectivity of globalization, and location becomes less of an issue in modern 
culture. We mundanely experience global media via the Internet and social media: 
Enabling ‘action(s) at a distance’ (Giddens, 1990) and creating imagined communities 
that share experiences/memories in a ‘deterritorialized mediascape’ (Appadurai, 1991). 
All nation-states now seek to govern populations whose identities are multilayered and 
complex. This does not mean the waning significance of identification with the nation 
because they are not mutually exclusive. It suggests that national identity is experienced 
in multiple ways in the era of globalization (Tomlinson, 2003).  
On the other hand, Marxist-inspired scholars view globalization as the spread of 
the capitalist world market. This perspective looks at ‘society’ as the unit of analysis 
(Nederveen Pieterse, 1987), equating globalization with Western modernization. 
Nederveen Pieterse (1994) understands globalization as hybridization: Emergence of new 
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mixed forms and structures. Globalization is inherently fluid, indeterminate and open-
ended. One of the problems of associating globalization with Western modernization—a 
powerful ideology—lies in its implication that the history of globalization begins with the 
history of the West. This replicates all the problems associated with Euro-centrism, and 
casts a narrow window on the world historically and culturally. Schiller (1989)’s notion 
of global synchronization overlooks the countercurrents; the impact non-Western cultures 
have been making on the West; ignores the reality of the local reception of Western 
culture; fails to see the influence non-Western cultures have been exercising on one 
another; overlooks the fact that many of the exports by the West and its cultural 
industries themselves are hybridized and have been strongly influenced by the Oriental 
cultures (Wong, 2010). If we examine their cultural lineages, they are hybridized forms 
of various cultural mixtures. European and Western culture are part of this global 
mélange (Nederveen Pieterse, 2015); this is obvious if we recognize that Europe was 
frequently the recipient of cultural influences from the Orient until the 14
th
 century. The 
hegemony of the West traces back to only a very recent time from 1800 to 
industrialization (Nederveen Pieterse, 2015; Said, 1978).  
 The term transnational is commonly used to describe a condition “by which 
people, commodities and ideas literally cross and transgress national boundaries and are 
not identified with a single place of origin” (Watson, 2006, p. 11), which is facilitated by 
globalization processes. Transnational media culture engenders an unpredictable, fluid 
and creative form of hybridization (Shim, 2006). Most forms of culture in the world 
today are, to varying extents, hybrid in which different values, beliefs and practices have 
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become deeply entwined.“Globalization essentially is hybridity” (Straubhaar, 2007, p. 32) 
and “It is clear that hybridization is an inevitable course for all cultures” (Kraidy, 1999, p. 
459). In The Location of Culture, Bhabha (1994) argues that, “the inherent originality or 
‘purity’ of cultures are untenable” (p. 55). Claiming pure authenticity in modern popular 
culture is problematic because it justifies a certain group’s appropriation of other culture 
as guaranteed and legitimizes those who get to define one’s cultural authenticity. Global 
capitalism infused with white imperialism has naturalized its cultural dominance and 
privilege under the disguise of authenticity (Manning 2004; Oh, 2014). U.S. popular 
culture has been highly influenced by Oriental cultures, yet their authenticities are rarely 
criticized (Wong, 2010). Oh (2014; 2015b) argued that it is the whitened industry of US 
popular culture that preserves white authenticity regardless of their own hybridity, while 
stigmatizing others’ appropriation as simply bad mimicry. Although the colonizer’s 
imperial gaze does not simply deny the Others, they always believe in only one culture 
(Savigliano, 1995). 
 Some U.S. viewers perceive K-pop and its performers’ hybridity as a “bad copy” 
of U.S. pop (Poole, 2013; Yang, 2012b). This perspective is problematic because of the 
ways they claim an authenticity to U.S. culture, and it leads us to consider who defines 
one’s cultural authenticity. Considering the whitened U.S. pop industry that freely 
appropriates other ethnic cultures, the success of Korean singer Psy and his song 
“Gangnam Style” in 2012 is worth looking at, given his stereotypical bodily 
representation as an Asian male. Despite the fact that Psy’s chubby body and round face 
do not look like any of the other extremely well-groomed, aesthetically pleasing K-pop 
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idols, some U.S. viewers cheered him because of his “authentic” Korean-ness (Pan, 2012).  
The U.S. viewers’ accusation of K-pop and its performers’ hybridity as mimicry 
unveils how the hierarchical racial politics of a country like the US has constructed one’s 
cultural in/authenticity. According to Oh (2014; 2015b), hybridity in K-pop is neither a 
postcolonial mimicry nor a bad imitation because for one reason, Korea, with its more 
than 5,000-year-long history, does not share the racial politics constructed in the United 
States. If the origin—White authenticity—is construed to disguise the hegemony of 
White supremacy, then mimicry cannot exist because the term “mimicry” assumes there 
is an absolute authentic origin. K-pop’s hybridity is not a postcolonial mimicry as that 
mimicry is only made possible in opposition to the existence of true authenticity. 
Authenticity is culturally and racially created and constructed to justify the racial 
hierarchy that has been historically embedded in various sectors of our society since the 
colonial era (Oh, 2014). The notion of cultural authenticity has been a constructed myth 
that exclusively legitimizes the racially “unmarked” privilege of White people and their 
appropriation of others (Phelan, 1993).According to Dyer (1997), the cultural 
construction of whiteness is the unmarked category (marking others), the unexamined 
category (subjecting others to examination), and the norm (making others insufficient), 
the cumulative effect of which is privilege (and disadvantage for others). Chambers (1997, 
p. 189) adds that although “there are plenty of unmarked categories (male-ness, 
heterosexuality, and middle class-ness being obvious ones),” it can be argued that 
“whiteness is perhaps the primary unmarked and so unexamined—let’s say ‘blank’—
category.” 
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On the other aspect of this debate, there is the notion of cultural appropriation. 
Some of the K-pop performers selectively appropriate Hip Hop and Black culture from 
the US in their musical production and styles. The way they appropriate and present Hip 
Hop and Black culture sometimes prompts a great level of outrage among international, 
especially Black/African American, audiences and K-pop fans (Seoulbeats, 2013). 
Whether a certain cultural form—in this case, K-pop—is postcolonial mimicry or cultural 
hybridity lies in the eye of the beholder, which is un/consciously and in/evitably political 
(Phelan, 1993). Understanding cultural appropriation as well as the perception of 
ethnicity surrounding the practice (Lipstiz, 1998) is bound to have differences based on 
sociohistorical context. When popular culture is circulated transnationally, the local 
context of its origin is often erased and instead projected through the lens of a receiving 
local context. The discourse around K-pop’s appropriation of Hip Hop and Black culture 
has two sides. On one hand, the fact that K-pop performers have U.S. influenced music 
styles does not necessarily mean that they are knowledgeable about the history of African 
American slavery, racial politics, or representational issues in the US. On the other hand, 
given the rising global cultural influence of K-pop around the world, the K-pop 
performers may need to consider the increasingly diverse communities on the receiving 
end: the international audiences and fans. As I analyze later in the Findings Chapter, 
racialized perception often limits the readability of hybridity embedded in K-pop. I 
attempt to suggest a different discourse to both sides of the arguments, which emphasizes 
a practice of mutual responsibility and reciprocal sensitivity to other cultures in this 
global era. 
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 The transnational circulation of other cultures such as hybridized K-pop 
challenges the long-held binary representation system in the United States. By 
systematically denying agency and stigmatizing others as being inauthentic which 
eventually facilitated imperialism, white imperialists have secured its own “pure” 
authenticity and “neutral” normativity while freely appropriating the sources of all 
Otherness. Claiming pure cultural authenticity, whether of White or Black U.S. 
authenticity, as if it is an inherently fixed term is asserting imagined superiority and 
reinforcing exoticization of “Others” (Said, 1978).The logic of this argument grants one 
to have a right to claim authorship over popular cultures that should be considered as 
fluid elements, reflecting the inevitably multidirectional flows of hybridized cultural 
contexts in contemporary society. Cultural signifiers or symbols can be interpreted 
differently depending on the varying contexts of culture, history, and society (Ang, 1996; 
Fiske, 2011; Hall, 1998; Oh, 2015b).Viewing the hybridized images and representations 
of K-pop and Korean popular culture as “honorary White” is likely—not always—
derived from projecting America’s own histories and perspectives onto the Korean 
identity and bodily representation, conflating them with Asian American or their identity 
as Korean is invisible from the gaze of American mindset. 
Few analyses have focused on texts produced outside but consumed inside the 
United States, except for some that focus on U.S. fans of Japanese anime (Jenkins, 2006; 
Napier, 2016). Even fewer have considered the significance of fan culture on an 
increasingly global scene, fostered particularly by the advent of the Internet as a tool for 
intercultural, and potentially global fan activity (Darling-Wolf, 2004). Border-crossing—
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transcultural—fan studies have often been relegated to the periphery of fandom studies 
because scholars have tended to prioritize the nation when understanding fan 
appropriation and engagement and/or effectively exoticising transcultural fandoms. In 
this way, the unique insights they offer about the ways that transcultural fans interpret and 
interact with both media and one another in an ever-intensifying global media market is 
limited (Chin & Morimoto, 2013). Questions of both how and why different transcultural 
media capture the imaginations of fans, as well as how fans incorporate transcultural 
media into their own popular cultural contexts and what meanings they attribute to them, 
have the potential to contribute nuance to a discipline that has remained firmly White 
American in orientation.  
Thus, I advocate a broad framework for the exploration and interrogation of 
transcultural and transnational fandoms in which the nation is a one facet of contexts that 
influence their rise and spread. I argue that while national identity and transnational 
historical and sociopolitical contexts may inform fans’ pursuits, this is neither necessarily 
the case nor the only possible mode of transcultural fan engagement. As Chin and 
Morimoto (2013) argued, I prefer the term ‘transcultural’ instead of ‘transnational’ as the 
latter implicitly prioritizes a national orientation over other subject positions that are 
arguably more salient. The term ‘transcultural’ on the other hand is more flexible enough 
to allow for a national orientation, yet leaves open the possibility of other orientations 
such as gender, sexual, popular, and fan cultural contexts within the ecology of media 
fandom. My contention is that this approach provides a better conduit to comprehend 
how and why fandoms arise almost regardless of national borders both geographical and 
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cultural.  
1.3. Hybridity 
Among numerous theories and frameworks in globalization research, cultural 
hybridity or hybridization has been most frequently associated with explaining the 
Korean Wave phenomenon (Ryoo, 2009; Shim, 2006). It investigates power relations 
between the center and the periphery from the postcolonial perspective, and scholars have 
employed hybridity in postcolonial contexts to explicate various phenomena of 
transnational media culture, both in the non-West and the West (Appadurai, 1996; 
Bhabha, 1994; Kraidy, 2002; Ryoo, 2009; Shim, 2006; Shome & Hedge, 2002; Young, 
1995). According to dependency theory, media play an ideological role as part of the 
cultural superstructure that results from the economic relations of dependency. In this 
pattern, the peripheral or Third World countries depend on the central or First World 
countries for capital, technology and most manufactured goods (Hamelink, 1983; 
Straubhaar, 1991).  
While this center-periphery binary relation can be influential, this logic is limited 
when explaining the Korean Wave phenomenon in a global/international context for its 
reductionist approach to view Korea as a producer that is neither part of the traditional 
world centers nor peripheral, and also individual fans’ participatory practices. Bhabha 
(1994) argues that hybridity should not be understood as the denial or contradiction of 
identity, but rather that its core function is always mixed, relational, inventive and 
negotiable. Hybridized media culture invites people into a distinctive location that is 
neither an authentic locality nor power-neutral. Therefore, hybridization is neither merely 
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imitating different elements that ultimately form a culture-less identity, nor simply 
aggregating differences. Rather, the hybridized media culture marks the continuous 
negotiation of various discourses and identity among producers and individual audience 
members.  
In a political perspective, Kraidy (2002) considers hybridity as a space where 
practices are continuously negotiated and resistant to domination. However, hybridity and 
domination are not mutually exclusive. In other words, there is power inequality and 
struggle within hybridity. We need to understand hybridity not as a descriptive tool but as 
a practice for it allows us to recognize the complex and stratified hierarchy of 
transnational media culture. In order to move beyond cultural imperialism’s analyses of 
economic determinism and provide a needed correction to post-imperialists’ work that 
ignores power and inequality, Kraidy’s (2002) intercontextual theory of hybridity 
provides a useful framework. It explicates transnational cultural dynamics by articulating 
hybridity and hegemony in a global context. It allows us to understand under what 
conditions ideological elements become consolidated by emphasizing the discursive 
processes of making something to appear as norms, such as good/bad opposites (Bhabha, 
1994), white people’s tendency to position themselves as “unmarked” race (Phelan, 
1993), high culture/low (popular) culture opposites (Fiske, 2011) and 
dominant/subordinate opposites (Hall, 1998). Thus, hybridity should not be used to 
simply justify a transnational phenomenon of media culture, but as a communicative 
practice and a mode in which identity is practiced, reinforced, negotiated and reproduced.  
 24 
 Theoretically recognizing hybridization as an inevitable phase for all 
contemporary cultures in the era of globalization (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994) is necessary 
in order to understand the politics of global and local relations, especially when it comes 
to popular culture. In the midst of the dynamic flow of hybridized media culture, the 
Korean Wave provides a unique case study. Scholars have attempted to study this 
unexpected worldwide popularity from this hitherto sub-imperial, sub-central nation. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that the non-threatening, clean-cut and visually 
pleasing aesthetic of Korean media texts appeal to Asian audiences because they are less 
violent, less aggressive and sexually less explicit than American media (Anderson & 
Shim, 2015; Jin, 2016; Shim, 2006). For example, the popularity of K-drama in Asia has 
been cited as presenting ‘Asian-ness’ with a modern image by skillfully repositioning and 
repackaging traditions into cultural products of highly modernized quality now, as Japan 
did 15-20 years ago (Iwabuchi, 2002; Larsen, 2008). As Boyd-Barrett (2013) stated, the 
Korean Wave illustrates a good example of precisely the phenomenon that led Tunstall to 
reverse his argument from “The Media are American” in 1977 to “The Media were 
American” in 2007. It also illustrates the increase of multiple modernities—which differs 
from the Western modernity—within globalization.  
 An extremely high level of hybridity is manifested in K-pop. The origin of a 
musical style (e.g., Hip Hop) loses significance within reciprocal processes of cultural 
interchange (Kim, 2013). Choi (2006) stresses the variety of times and places from which 
K-pop comes, claiming that Korean Wave texts encompass dimensions from traditional, 
modern and postmodern times from Korea, the United States, Europe, Africa, Japan, and 
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many other countries. To put it simply, the Korean Wave is an exemplar of contemporary 
global hybridity, just as Western culture itself is hybrid. Hall (1991) in his discussion of 
modernity, said, “Modern nations are all cultural hybrids,” (p. 617) pointing out that even 
the West, which is commonly understood within historical Eurocentrism and modernity, 
is also radically hybrid. 
Kraidy (1999) focuses on the ‘transformative practices’ that define the 
intersection of globality and locality, and narrows down on the unavoidable issue of 
identity. Hybridity helps us to understand the local not merely as a location, but as a 
crossroads of transnational receptions (Murphy & Kraidy, 2003). Therefore, instead of 
simply looking at how global media impacts locality, I find it more meaningful to seek 
out how cultural identities are reconstructed at the intersection of global and local 
discourses about the Korean Wave. 
2. SOFT POWER AND TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA CULTURE 
2.1. Multifaceted Soft Power of the Korean Wave 
The Korean Wave phenomenon has proven to be more than a pop cultural craze 
as it penetrates into the world politics and international relations (Chua & Iwabuchi, 
2008; Kim, 2015a).The globalization paradigm, in terms of international relations, relates 
to an overarching concept called ‘soft power’ which looks at the power relations in world 
politics and international relations. In the Western context, the term was first coined in 
1990 by Joseph Nye. It was then critiqued by an American communication scholar, 
Schiller (1991), who considered it a new form of U.S. cultural imperialism. Nye (2004) 
refined and promoted the idea in an attempt to recover the international image of the 
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United States after 9/11. More than a simple persuasion, soft power is the ability to 
entice, allure and attract others from outside of the country to think of the country 
favorably (Nye, 2004). Soft power has been challenged for not being a thorough 
theoretical concept for its illusive features (Brown, 2008; Fan, 2008; Frum & Perle, 2004; 
Murphy, 2010), and as just another implicit form of imperialism (Schiller 1991; 
McClory, 2015). However, this approach oversimplifies the multiple layers and facets of 
soft power in international relations and communication.  
Nye further elaborated his argument over soft power in his 2011 book “The 
Future of Power” in which he explores the nature and shift in global power structures—
from state to non-state actors. In a mediatized world (Couldry & Hepp, 2013) where 
public diplomacy is done more by the public, governments and state have to use “smart 
power” (a combination of soft and hard power), making dexterous use of formal and 
informal networks and increasingly drawing on “cyber power.”It creates unpredictable 
and volatile phenomena. Therefore, a more recent definition of soft power by Nye states 
it as the “ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, 
persuasion and attraction” (Nye, 2011, p. 16). In this process of persuading foreign 
audiences to become attracted to a country’s own interests, a large number of non-state 
actors—transnational corporations, universities, think tanks, nongovernmental 
organizations, celebrities associated with creative and cultural industries—increasingly 
participate (Thussu, 2013). Nevertheless, the role of the state remains imperative.   
It is important not to lose one’s footing on addressing the very real sociopolitical 
issues that undergird state and corporate deployment of ‘soft power’ to advance their own 
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interests both domestically and abroad ‘as we are now entering the age when states are 
getting deeply involved in the neoliberal circulation of media and popular culture by 
collaborating with media culture industries, nothing will be politically neutral’ (Iwabuchi, 
2010, p. 92), dating back to U.S. promotion of Hollywood during and after World War 2. 
Yet, this approach replicates the very dichotomy of good/bad that has plagued fandom 
studies for decades, contrasting ‘good’ scholarship of the sociopolitical implications of 
fandom with ‘bad’ scholarship of its affective meanings and pleasures for fans. The 
sociopolitical framework of this discussion precludes their consideration of the pleasure 
fans derive from, which would enhance a critical opportunity to examine the complex 
intersection of affective investment and national subjectivity.  
The way the Korean Wave creates soft power is distinct from the way 
historically powerful colonizers and imperialists—such as the United States, Britain, 
France, Germany or Japan—utilize their soft power in global/international contexts. 
Within the Asian sphere, it is true that Japan’s strong political, economic, and cultural 
power has influenced many Asian countries, which traces back to its colonial period. 
However, the colonial past prevents Japanese popular culture from deeply penetrating 
into some parts of Asia (Hong, 2014; Ryoo, 2009). Given this situation, the unique 
historical legacy leaves room for Korean popular culture and its products to find a niche 
in its neighboring markets because Korea doesn’t carry the burden of ‘colonial legacy’ 
that was present in Japanese media (Park, 1996; Ter Molen, 2014). There is a lingering 
anti-colonial sentiment lurking in the memories of people in many Asian countries. 
However, the Korean Wave appears to benefit from the sense of solidarity and sympathy 
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more than resentment in which people have toward a country that shared a similar 
colonial past and continues to struggle in a current postcolonial situation.  
For example, Korea’s sentiment of han (deep sorrow) is seen to be a less 
problematic source of power and ideological threat than Japanese cultural odor, which 
may remind of Japanese brutality during the colonial era (Hong, 2014; Iwabuchi, 2002). 
Whereas the Japanese popular culture industry consciously made it culturally odorless in 
an effort to universalize products and underplay associations with Japanese imperial 
history (Iwabuchi, 2002), the Korean Wave emphasizes hybridity of formats with 
localized content and appeal (Kim, 2009a; Ryoo, 2009; Shim, 2006). Unlike Japanese 
audiovisual products, K-pop and K-drama possess explicit cultural odor in terms of the 
agents who are associated with the country’s bodily, racial and ethnic characteristics. In 
other words, the people in Korean audiovisual products represent physical features of a 
country of origin, as well as images of its nation, and these agents with Korean ethnicity 
physically appeal to international fans. 
Geopolitically, other countries that have had a pan-Asian influence have been 
unpleasant political actors. China and Japan were imperial powers in the past and were 
perceived as colonialist across Asia (Hong, 2014). Unlike China and Japan, Korea has 
followed a different path by exerting power through its popular culture, not through 
coercive military and political power. Korea, which Chen (2000) called a ‘sub-Empire’ in 
part due to the historical confluence of media liberalizations occurred in the 1990s, has 
relatively smaller size of a land with limited natural resources. However, all these 
limitations and historical contexts ironically work together to exert its unique aspect of 
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soft power that differs from the ones exerted by historical imperial powers. I suggest we 
need a more flexible understanding of soft power, that does not build on hard power—
economic and military—the way the power of the US or Japan does. The way the Korean 
Wave creates soft power by appealing to global audiences, including diverse races and 
ethnicities, elicits a different sense of attraction and ideological twists. Soft power is 
deeply interrelated with identity formation (Kim, 2009b), and this unique layer of soft 
power in the Korean Wave interrelates with fans’ identity negotiations in 
global/international contexts. 
2.2. Emotional Proximity 
Allowing for idiosyncratic differences among individual fandoms, I contend that 
transcultural fandoms have their genesis in affinities of industrial and/or semiotic practice 
between two or more popular cultural contexts. In studies of transcultural media, 
‘affinity’ typically has been understood in terms of geographical proximities that as 
Straubhaar (1991) argues, foster ‘distinct regional cultural patterns’ (p. 55). Yet, it is in 
Straubhaar’s own (2007) acknowledgement of the increasingly dispersed flow of 
transcultural media outside of regional zones that the limitations of this perspective are 
pointed out, asking the question of how we might account for such phenomena.  
How American fans find Korean popular culture attractive and pleasurable lies in 
their previous experience. Korean popular culture provides highly modernized looks that 
are fresh and polished enough. The carefully structured way of touching and arousing 
nostalgic emotion with high-quality products can be understood as emotional proximity, 
which I posit as another layer of Straubhaar (1991)’s cultural proximity theory. The 
 30 
skillfully hybridized Korean media texts provoke certain nostalgia among American fans, 
which also ironically encourages them to rediscover their own identity and culture. 
Proximity theory (Straubhaar, 1991), preferring local to global for perceived cultural 
proximity, needs to be understood in more fluid terms. What one perceives as more 
culturally proximate does not necessarily equate with their nationality, linguistic or 
geographical proximity, but sometimes more closely related to emotional proximity.  
As I noted earlier, there are multiple layers and varying facets of soft power. The 
way the Korean Wave exerts soft power in international contexts differs from the way 
historically imperialist countries and colonizers do; Korean popular culture is seen as less 
threatening in the eye of the beholder because socio-historically Korea has never invaded 
or colonized any other countries (Hong, 2014). Ryoo (2009) argues that because Korea 
has been considered as in-between ‘semi-periphery’ in international settings, the Korean 
Wave can find a niche and reposition itself as a cultural mediator in the midst of global 
cultural transformation. What is interesting is that the Korean Wave works as a mediator 
not only in Asia, but also within the Western context as I found in my study, which will 
be addressed later in the Findings Chapter. In other words, the Korean Wave brings 
American people with different racial/ethnic/social/cultural backgrounds together by 
creating shared emotional proximity.  
In the realm of global popular culture and especially in Hollywood, the major 
players have been Caucasian with some African American/Black figures. Asian 
performers have seldom become major players with very few exceptions (Hogarth, 
2013). In this vein, the Korean Wave can be viewed as a reaction and a challenge to 
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Western-dominated popular culture. K-pop and K-drama have distinct Asian physical 
features no matter how hybridized they are; the dramas reflect the traditional Asian 
values and ethos, which makes Asian audiences feel culturally proximate and some 
Western fans feel emotionally proximate. The Korean Wave fills a large demand (Jin, 
2016) for audiences of both the East and the West that were desperately waiting for 
clean-cut performers and non-violent, non-aggressive and less promiscuous contents.  
The popularity of Korean popular culture among Americans is bound to have social, 
cultural, and political ramifications.  
As I found in my study, which will be addressed later in the Findings Chapter, 
the U.S. fans—both non-White and White—find this very complex layer of hybridity in 
Korean popular culture comfortably appealing in which I argue is not the same as the 
notion of “exotic Orient” from Said (1978)’s Orientalism. Said (1978) has carefully 
articulated the mechanism of exoticizing the Orient in his oft-cited book, “Orientalism”; 
framing the Orient as exotic in the eyes of the Westerners as to position the West (the 
Occident) as superior. The identities and self-conceptions of the West are centrally 
implicated in their media coverage by portraying themselves as rational and thus having 
the White man’s burden and obligations toward backward non-Western regions and 
peoples (Barkawi, 2009).Said (1978) argued that the Occident Orientalizes—as the West 
having authority and authenticity over—the Orient culture as they face “a crisis in 
representation” in the transpersonal, transnational, and transcultural world infused with 
varying degrees of forces such as class, gender, race, and structure.  
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All cultures are hybrid, thus, hybridity cannot be the sole attribution of the 
Korean Wave’s popularity in the United States. However, the well-received Korean 
Wave’s hybridity may reflect Kraidy (2002)’s theory of intercontextual hybridity I 
mentioned earlier. The favorable reception of the Korean Wave shows what some 
American audiences have been missing in their own media. The complex and high level 
of hybridity in Korean popular culture reflects the argument that cultural hybridity 
ironically encourages local people to revisit and rediscover what they have neglected or 
forgotten (Kraidy, 2002; Ryoo, 2009). The great level of hybridity in Korean popular 
culture arouses emotional proximity among not only Asian audiences but also American 
audiences to realize what they have been missing out in the drive toward globalization 
and commercialization during the past decades.  
3. AUDIENCES AND FANS OF TRANSCULTURAL MEDIA 
3.1. Fandom Studies 
 Culture is inherently political because it is a constant succession, distribution, and 
redistribution of social practices and power (Fiske, 2011). The media convergence and 
the development of information communication technologies have enabled audiences to 
shape their media engagements and participatory culture in a greater variety of contexts 
on their own. This has been particularly prevalent in the study of fans and fan 
communities (Jenkins, 2004; 2006; Kim, 2015; Nightingale, 2011; Oh, 2015). Culture, 
which is comprised of meanings, discourses and texts, are always in relation to the social 
system, and in the case of today’s society, that of white heterosexual male in patriarchal 
capitalism (Ang, 1996; Jung, 2011b). The resources of popular culture carry the interests 
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of the economically and ideologically dominant groups to sustain their status quo: The 
hegemony (Ang, 1996; Fiske, 2011). However, hegemonic power is necessary or possible 
only because of resistance. Therefore, these resources must carry contradictory meanings 
(Ang, 1985; Fiske, 1992; Hall, 1980; 1998) that cultural meaning is semiotic excess and 
does not carry only the dominant ideology.  
 Popular culture is always inevitably related to power structure in society. 
Bourdieu (1984) argued that social factors affect different modes of discrimination 
because of differential relationships to the structures of power. Thus, individual’s cultural 
tastes (or habitus) are shaped by social structures to power rather than by individual’s 
natural differences. A habitus involves not only the cultural dimension (taste, preference, 
and attitude) toward the cultural objects, but also the social dimension (economics and 
education) upon which those tastes are mapped. Thus, the differences in habitus are 
socio-economic. The ruling groups cultivated high or bourgeois culture in the fine arts 
both for their own enjoyment and as an invaluable ideological feature of monopoly 
capitalism as opposed to low or popular culture. Liberal notions about leisure to which a 
substantial amount of effort by bourgeois sociologists has been devoted perpetuate the 
mystification of popular culture, treating it as distasteful and apolitically. What is 
considered as popular culture, thus demarcated from “high” culture, is socially 
constructed (Bourdieu, 1984) 
 Fandom is a heightened form of popular culture in industrial societies. A fan is an 
‘excessive reader’ who differs from the ordinary audience in degree rather than kind 
(Fiske, 1992). Fandom is typically associated with cultural forms that the dominant value 
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system denigrates. It is thus associated with the cultural tastes of subordinated formations 
of the people in terms of gender, race, age and class. Fiske (1992) analyzed three main 
characteristics of fandom: 1) discrimination and distinction (for example, Freud’s 
narcissism of minor difference), 2) productivity and participation, and 3) capital 
accumulation.  
As Henry Jenkins (1992) explains in his book, Textual Poachers, “Fandom blurs 
any clear-cut distinction between media producer and media spectator since any spectator 
may potentially participate in the creation of new artworks” (p. 246-247). Fans have been 
early adopters of the practices that characterize participatory culture. For many scholars, 
fans are interesting precisely because of these participatory and creative practices. 
However, scholars have often paid more attention to fans as spectators than to fans as 
producers as pointed out by few scholars (Busse & Hellekson, 2006; Coppa, 2008). The 
ecology of fandom, a concept similarly drawn from Marilyn Cooper (1986), allows us to 
examine both the production and reception as activities “through which a person is 
continually engaged with a variety of socially constituted systems” (p. 367). K-pop’s 
reaction videos on YouTube provide a good example in this vein. K-pop reaction videos 
on YouTube, a kind of vids, is an individual’s or small group’s argument about a text, but 
it is formed by, and interpreted in terms of, other fans’ ideas about that text, and those 
arguments and ideas are worked out within the multiple overlapping discourse 
communities that constitute fandom.  
The term ecology encompasses much more than the individual producer and 
immediate context; it allows us to explore how producers interact to form systems and to 
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consider how all the characteristics of any individual producer both determine and are 
determined by the characteristics of all the other producers and pieces of work in the 
systems (Cooper, 1986). It also implies the inevitability of change: “An important 
characteristic of ecological systems in that they are inherently dynamic” (p. 368). 
Thinking of fandom as ecology will encourage scholars to articulate how fandom’s 
“individual voices, creative works, philosophies, resistances, and cultures” (Cupitt, 2008, 
p. 4.4) not only coexist but interact. The ecology metaphor helps us to think of fandom as 
a system or series of systems within which all fans participate in various ways, such as 
readers, writers, vidders, vid watchers, posters, commenters, lurkers, essayists, artists, 
icon makers, recommenders, coders, compilers of images and links, users and 
maintainers of archives and other infrastructures, and so on (Turk & Johnson, 2012).  
 The structural relationship between popular culture and dominance (such as 
official industry) can take two main forms: resistance or evasion (Fiske, 2011; Hall, 
1980). The politics of fantasy and pleasure refer to the interior resistance of fantasy as the 
desire of the subordinate to exert control over the meanings of their lives, promoting their 
own interests more effectively in their everyday lives, producing a sense of 
empowerment (Fiske, 2011). Evasive and semiotic resistances can maintain a popular 
consciousness that can fertilize the growth of those conditions. The resistances of popular 
culture are not just evasive or semiotic; they may act as a constant erosive force upon the 
macro, weakening the system so that it is amenable to change at the structural level.  
 Evasive or interior resistance at the micro level has to be the base for progressive 
social change because only through this micro level, the greater organized collective 
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movement and revolutionary change can occur at the macro level. Popular culture evokes 
participation whereas a completed art-object of high culture does not. Hence, 
social/radical change (interior resistance at the individual level has to be a necessary base 
of macro-collective social action) is possible via popular culture, not high culture. This is 
why we need to take the politics of popular culture (Fiske, 2011), the politics of everyday 
life and the politics of pleasure (Ang, 1996) seriously.  
 Fandom culture is made by subgroup/subordinated peoples in their own interests 
out of resources that also contradictorily serve the economic interests of the dominant 
capitalist system (Fiske, 1992). However, there is always an element of popular culture 
that lies outside social control and opposes hegemonic forces; always a culture of conflict 
and struggle to make social meanings that are in their interests, not the official powerful. 
What is important to recognize is that the victories in this struggle and conflict produce 
popular pleasure (Fiske, 1992).  
 Media texts of popular culture are never self-sufficient structures of meanings 
themselves as some will argue highbrow high culture texts to be. They are provokers of 
meanings and pleasure and are full of humor, like puns (Ang, 1985; Fiske, 1992). They 
are completed only when taken up by people and applied into their everyday culture; 
hence, dominant (industry) needs the subordinate (fans). The aim of producer is to 
produce meanings that are relevant to everyday life as the principal product of the 
commercial mass media in monopoly capitalism is audience power (Smythe, 2001). 
Relevance is central to popular culture, such as eliminating cultural odor/specificity 
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(Iwabuchi, 2002), increasing proximity (Straubhaar, 1991) and minimizing cultural 
discount (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988), in order to appeal to the widest audiences possible.  
 The dominant industry works hard to maximize the consumption of its products 
and its profitability in ways that has some relevance to subordinate fans. In this regard, 
Marxist-inspired critical scholars’ reductionist analyses of power structure and capitalism 
are greatly challenged by the communities of fandom who constitute the crucial part of 
popular culture. This unstable power of the dominant industrial culture is frequently 
illustrated by fan activities that even greatly influence on international politics (Chua & 
Iwabuchi, 2008; Kim, 2015a), and the Korean Wave provides an interesting case study in 
this regard.   
 New media technologies shape new media environments as they derive various 
media outlets to converge. A theory of media convergence states that major shifts of 
technology and patterns of media ownership shape the balance of power within the new 
media era (Jenkins, 2004). Jenkins (2004) argued that convergence is both a top-down 
corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process. Consumers are using 
different media technologies to bring the flow of media more fully under their control, to 
increase their interactivity with others and to participate more fully. The proliferation of 
technologies for reproduction and distribution of media texts allowed people to enjoy 
them in situations of their own choosing rather than at the hands of the broadcaster or 
producer. The convergence of old and new media has blurred the line of what a medium 
is. YouTube, for instance, as one of the user-generated social media channels has been a 
harbinger of changing the way audiences consume information beyond physical and 
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national boundaries. Its widely distributable characteristic is one of the most important 
implications that traditional one-way mainstream corporate media can no longer exert 
total control over the distribution and reproduction of their own media content (Ha & 
James, 1998; Hanson & Haridakis, 2008). As we shall see, YouTube as a new digital 
television technology has been crucial to the spreadable Korean Wave across cultures. 
 In this dynamically shifting process, fans have been among the first to create 
opportunities to meet, talk and share ideas, information, images and do creative work: 
creating what Appadurai (1991, 1996) called the ‘shared collective experiences in 
mediascape’ on a global scale. Jenkins (2006) examines the activities of online fan 
communities and convergence of media culture, which encourage participation and 
collaboration that will eventually lead to a fairer and more democratic society. In the face 
of new media era, Jenkins (2006) argued that we need to avoid the either-or logic of 
traditional approaches to audience research, and refuse to see media consumers as either 
totally autonomous from or totally vulnerable to the cultural industries.  
 Some scholars assert that the idea of contra-flow—the claim that the U.S. 
dominance of the global media market is seriously challenged by other countries’ media 
products and the importance of emerging markets—should be examined with cautions 
(Kang, 2015; Lie, 2012; Thussu, 2006). However, I find this political-economic-driven 
argument problematic because it neglects the non-negligible “intellectual craftsmen” 
(Choi & Maliankay, 2015): the fans. There are myriad ways of studying the Korean 
Wave within the globalization paradigm. One crucial element, however, is the study of 
fans. The Korean Wave and its fandom, which has the largest size of recent fandom 
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worldwide according to the Guinness Book of World Records (Anderson, 2014), provide 
a good example when studying global media culture. There are two governance systems 
in the Korean Wave: 1) a transnational cultural phenomenon, ascribing influence to 
overseas fans, and 2) a national institutional campaign, ascribing influence to the state’s 
national policy (Choi, 2015). Of course, the Korean creative industry, once known as 
cultural industry, indeed remains to place a strong foot. When exporting cultural 
products, they not only export the media content, but also symbols. Thus, it is true that 
the Korean Wave can be understood as a political movement fueled by the unexpected 
popularity of its popular culture overseas. 
Nevertheless, one should be careful when understanding the Korean Wave as a 
national-institutional campaign because its phenomenon is profoundly dependent on 
overseas fans (even the term Korean Wave was coined by Chinese media and fans in the 
1990s). Thanks to the nation’s ubiquitous high technologies and international users’ easy 
accessibility to social media, it was hitherto geographically scattered fans across the 
globe who first created the Korean Wave phenomenon, not the state. The new media such 
as social media is a vital element creating unfathomable spread of information in both 
speed and scope, known as spreadable media (Jenkins, 2006; Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 
2013; Jin & Yoon, 2014) and causing disjunctures in the deterritorialized global 
mediasphere (Appadurai, 1996). Seen in this vein, media technologies should not be seen 
as merely instruments but as living organisms of our lives. Because it is, after all, the 
people who create, circulate, and receive media texts embedded in technological devices. 
In spite of the lack of organizational hubs, overseas fans shape interactive “circuit of 
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culture” (Hall, 1980) through various fan-generated social media, such as YouTube, 
Tumblr, Twitter, Instagram, etc. It is the active participatory culture and “collective 
intelligence” (Levy, 1997) of fans and new media users of both local and international in 
the deterritorialized mediascape who effectively initiated circulation of media texts of 
the Korean Wave, making it transnational or even global in the 21
st
 century.  
3.2. Identity and Cultural Capital 
One of the interesting distinctions between official and fan-produced culture is 
economic rather than quality. In other words, fans do not re/produce texts of their object 
of fandom for money; their products are not for profit. Jenkins (1992) has pointed out that 
there is a strong distrust of making a profit in fandom. Their textual productivity is in the 
name of expanding their fan cultural capital, not in making profit out of their labor 
(Fiske, 1992). Fans’ resistance against making profit can be seen as both internal and 
communal resistance against the dominant hegemony although there are exceptions. This 
resonates with the work of fan studies scholars (Jenkins & Shresthova, 2012; Sandvoss, 
2005; Hills, 2002) about how fandoms and fans constantly negotiate between 
consumerism and resistance.  
Jenkins himself, along with other mainstream fandom scholars, have moved 
away from his initial concept of fans as ‘poachers’ to fans as ‘activists.’ Social 
organizations such as the ‘Harry Potter Alliance and Racebending’ mobilize young 
people—fans—by deploying the same strategies fans use in letter-writing and ‘Save the 
Show’ campaigns, thus inspiring their supporters to move from engagement within 
participatory culture to involvement in political life (Jenkins & Shresthova, 2012). This 
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goes beyond simply acknowledging that fans are active producers who collaboratively 
produce transformative works, be they fan fiction, YouTube reaction videos, or providing 
subtitles to foreign languages. Fans, like social activists, are mobilized as active 
participants in social and political movements because they are united by a common 
factor: their inevitable interaction with popular culture, resulting in the “curious 
coexistence within fan cultures of both anti-commercial ideologies and commodity-
completist practices” (Hills, 2002, p. 28) that has come to characterize contemporary fan 
cultures.  
 Fans are, to a great degree, the manifestation of the encoding/decoding model 
(Hall, 1980) because when the commercial texts meet fans, the moment of reception 
becomes the moment of production in fan culture. Accumulation of knowledge is 
fundamental to the accumulation of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). At the same time, 
they are among the most discriminating and selective of all categories of people and the 
cultural capital they produce is the most actively circulated, shared, distributed, and 
visible. In capitalist societies, popular culture is necessarily related to the products of 
capitalism. However, popular culture does not always work in the preferences of culture 
industries, rejecting many more than adopting because the very nature of people, culture, 
and society is unpredictable and fluid.  
3.3. Fans of the Korean Wave in the United States 
As the world becomes ever more heavily mediated, the audience researchers’ 
task expands further to explain how often contradictory assumptions of audiences—
citizens versus consumers, individuals versus crowds, participants versus couch 
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potatoes—can all be part of the same population (Livingstone, 2015). Audience research 
is still worthwhile to pursue, for researchers will have something to contribute and 
require more empirical investigation. In other words, audience studies must be continued 
for each generation in relation to each new phase of socio-technological change and 
reflexively rearticulated as the very conditions of modernity persist to be reconfigured 
globally as ordinary people experience their every life in a “digital world” (Couldry, 
2014).   
There is no linear starting and ending point as the famous linear process of 
communication model suggests (Lasswell, 1948), but rather Hall (1980)’s model of the 
“circuit of culture” provides a fruitful framework to articulate today’s highly mediatized 
global world of media flow. The model recognizes audiences as vital agents in the 
completion of the “circuit of culture” in which all elements—production, text, institution, 
representation, interpretation, symbol and identity—of the whole process are mutually 
articulated in the mediation of culture (Mayer, 2005). The struggles over meaning are not 
dependent upon a single independent moment, but at the interfaces between the distinct 
yet mutually dependent moments in the overall circuit (Livingstone & Das, 2013). The 
circuit is not a matter of linking among autonomous spheres of activity, but rather, 
recognizing that each moment in the circuit is constituted dynamically through its 
interface with the others.  
 K-pop fandom is multifaceted and polycentric, and K-pop has become a conduit 
through which political objectives are communicated through which heterogeneous 
interests of international fans are negotiated (Choi & Maliangkay, 2015). One of the 
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reasons why this cultural phenomenon creates particularly flurry discussions is that it 
creates ideological twists in the traditional hegemony. For example, Western female fans’ 
play with the kkonminam (soft masculinity) image of K-pop male idols defy earlier ideas 
of what ideal masculinity, set by Western White males, should mean (Jung, 2010; Oh, 
2015a). K-pop fandom among Caucasian fans shows the covert pleasure of soft racism in 
the image of them cheering and admiring K-pop male idols.  
 What I mean by soft racism is that K-pop male idols’ popularity among Whites 
“messes with” (Choi & Maliangkay, 2015) the deeply saturated social structure of racial 
and cultural superiority. This soft racism, according to Choi and Maliangkay (2015), is 
neither ethnocentrism nor cultural essentialism, which has consistently been the case in 
global popular culture (e.g., Hollywood films). Rather, this soft racism is forms of 
continuous negotiation and soft retribution toward racism that has spawned by the violent 
enforcement of colonialism, ensuing disparities in human values and self-esteem between 
the Cultural North and South, colonizer and colonized, and the Occident and the Orient 
(Said, 1978). This, I argue, is one of the multifaceted layers of Korea’s soft power, 
unintentionally and unconsciously generated from its international (mostly female) fans 
in world politics, which differs from historical colonizers’ soft power in great degree.  
3.4. The Need for a Local, Ethnographic Perspective and Method 
Ethnography unravels the nature of locality as a lived experience in a globalized, 
deterritorialized world (Appadurai, 1991). Many people living in late modernity 
experience the global in their local life. Since the 1990s, international communication 
studies moved away from bullet magic and cultural imperialism theories and into cultural 
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globalization and more fragmented eclecticism. In this environment, an ethnographic 
approach to the global-local nexus provides fruitful understandings as it radically 
intercontextualizes different forms of hybridity (Kraidy, 2002) and moves toward a more 
necessarily context-sensitive approach to understand the structure of power in a lived 
experience of culture.  
Geertz (1973) once asserted that “we do not study research sites, we study in 
them” (Murphy & Kraidy, 2003, p. 14). The situatedness of the local is not a site, but 
rather a point of reference through which to engage the emergent dimensions of 
globalization. This global interrogation through the lens of the local requires us not to 
rely on ‘canned’ visions of what the world historical system is like, but to take an 
appropriate ethnographic view that macro system terms of analysis should be radically 
reconsidered from the ground up (Marcus, 1998). It needs to take the micro-knowledge 
about places, spaces, sites, and performance derived from ethnographic inquiry and at the 
same time challenge macro-level theoretical framework of media.  Globalization and 
culture demand that we risk making some broader claims about the relationship between 
micro ideology and micro experience. Carey (1975) encouraged communication 
researchers to make macro claims from micro matters by studying media use as particular 
rituals. Combination of micro and macro-levels of inquiry of power and culture is needed 
in media ethnography in the realm of global media studies. In other words, ethnographic 
inquiry with its base in local practices and the lived performative features of culture 
offers rich materials to bridge the gap between meaning and structure without losing sight 
of the complexity and power imbalances of cultural consumption. Inquiring 
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transformative power of globalization through local cultural practice without neglecting 
the global structural concerns is what media ethnography is positioned to address. 
If global media studies is to establish a more grounded theoretical orientation 
toward globalization, then that theorizing essentially has to be informed by the materials 
produced through fieldwork (Geertz, 1973; Murphy & Kraidy, 2003). Then a question 
arises, how can one develop more contextually grounded ethnographies while expanding 
the notion of the field to address the unique dilemmas of localized research in relation to 
the global issues raised by transnational media processes? Martin-Barbero (1993) 
suggests that we can address the interplay between ideology and experience by seeking 
out the hegemony within popular culture. The convergence of popular culture and media 
reception studies has been successfully attempted by cultural scholars (Ang, 1985; 
Livingstone, 1998; Morley, 1980; Nardi, 2010; Radway, 1984; Silverstone,1990), 
stressing the necessary importance of interpretive approach to audience reception studies, 
the politics of everyday life, and audience as not only decoder but also encoder, without 
neglecting the power inequities.  
Understanding globalization in ethnographic depth necessitates new deployments 
of ethnography; that is locally based but globally engaged (Murphy & Kraidy, 2003). The 
process of globalization is best understood from a local perspective, one that takes into 
account particular contexts and the lived experience of local people (Ryoo, 2004). Media 
ethnography in critical cultural studies tends to take particular groups of people, such as 
audiences in specific subcultures or fandom, as an empirical starting point. Culture 
cannot be considered as a transparent object of empirical inquiry, a finished entity that 
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can be discovered and quantitatively documented by the ethnographer. Studying and 
writing about culture is a discursive construction (Lindlof & Taylor, 2010), which 
embeds a researcher’s personal point of view no matter how accurate the researcher is in 
data gathering and inference process. Clifford (1986) once said “‘cultures’ do not hold 
still for their portraits” (p. 10).  
The goal of the ethnographer, therefore, is an intellectual and transparent 
commitment to talk about the necessarily complex relationships among multiple entities 
of communication—media, culture, audiences, and society—as compelling and 
persuasive as possible in the context of specific problems which arise from particular 
realm of cultural politics. Media ethnography has been the method par excellence for 
scholars whose interests lie in context-bound media cultural studies. However, 
globalization demands new ethnographic methods if we are to understand the articulation 
of local matrices with global processes. This direction of the ethnographic lens was 
advocated by Appadurai (1991) who invited ethnographers to investigate the 
“micropolitics of locality.” The task of ethnography now becomes the unraveling of the 
following conundrum: What is the nature of locality as a lived experience in a globalized 
and the so-called deterritorialized—the idea of seemingly borderless flows of culture, 
economy, and people—world? How can we understand the complex process and 
mediation of the nexus of global and local?  
Fans understand and deploy the objects or texts of another culture through the 
means they have at their disposal within their own popular cultural contexts. Yet, as 
media increasingly become implicated in intensifying patterns of distribution and 
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dissemination through mainly the Internet-based platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, or 
Tumblr, I find that these convergent transnational contexts are becoming increasingly 
global in scope: for example, oppa4, maknae5, hwaiting6, etc. The call for greater local 
contextualization of studies of transnationally circulating media is a valuable contribution 
to our attempts to grasp the complexity of such media flows and fandoms. Yet, I would 
argue that any consideration of the ways in which globalization plays out in fandom 
should proceed from both contexts and our informed understanding of fan behaviors, 
motivations, and processes of meaning-making as driven by affective pleasures and 
investments.  
The theoretical approach of cultural hybridity to the Korean Wave phenomenon 
has de-emphasized the multiple process and practices international fans generate. Most of 
the previous studies of the Korean Wave addressed the whats, hows, and whys of 
international fans and audiences enjoyment of Korean popular culture and dealt with 
various potential implications and meanings of the phenomenon both within and outside 
of the Korean territory. While these studies conducted various methods such as surveys, 
interviews, textual and discourse analysis to examine the phenomenon, very few provides 
first-hand ethnographic empirical explorations and interpretations of media reception that 
are always context-bound (Geertz, 1973). 
Based on previous studies, we already know that some international audiences or 
                                                 
4Oppa is a respectful Korean word used by females to call older males. 
5Maknae refers to the youngest member in a K-pop group. 
6Hwaitingis used as a cheer or word of encouragement like “let’s go” or “do your best.” It can also mean 
“good luck.”  
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fans enjoy interacting with Korean popular culture. However, what has been ignored so 
far in the realm of the Korean Wave studies are the mechanisms in which interaction 
occurs, continues, and intensifies. Any form of interaction and reception is constructed 
and functions in a specific social and historical context. The media ethnographic 
approach in my dissertation—a relatively long period of immersion in the scene where 
the actual reception of the Korean Wave among American fans occurs—provides 
appropriate tools to know these mechanisms as a living organism.  
Hence, I do not attempt to provide generalizations about how American fans 
mediatize with Korean popular culture, but rather, by providing an in-depth, if necessary, 
fragmented moment of the whole ecology of transcultural media and fandom, I attempt to 
uncover detailed analyses and possible conceptualizations based on connecting recurring 
patterns. I use the term mediatize in a sense that the broad consequences of media, media 
texts, and media platforms are embedded in the everyday life, context, and practice 
(Couldry & Hepp, 2013) of the U.S. fans of Korean popular culture I have interacted over 
the past two years as, I argue later in the Findings Chapter, the Korean Wave and its fans 
form ecology of transcultural media and fandom. Moreover, the past century of the 
Western-centered scholarship talking to itself about audiences has permitted it to take 
contextual factors for granted. My work is a reversed ethnographic approach, which is 
not necessarily the same as the often so-called de-Westernized approach (Livingstone, 
2015). In other words, I perceive my work to be not only a de-Westernized approach, but 
more “reversed” in that the fans being studied are Westerners and the point of departure 
and the gaze placed upon them is from a non-Westerner’s perspective. The reception of 
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their media culture is non-Western—the globality, albeit arguable, of Korean popular 
culture—in their Western locality. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Various qualitative methods are employed throughout this study to observe 
American fans’ reception of Korean popular culture, mostly but not limited to K-pop, K-
drama, films, Korean language, history, and food. With an overarching approach of what 
I call “reversed media ethnography,” my study employs participant observation and 
qualitative interviews to examine the nature of the transcultural media and fans of the 
Korean Wave in the United States. My research revolves around the realms of 
globalization theories, hybridity, soft power, and fan studies in an attempt to address the 
following inquiries: What motivates Americans to interact with Korean popular culture? 
How do they consume, interpret, and reproduce with Korean popular culture? What are 
the cross-cultural similarities and differences they see in Korean popular culture versus 
American popular culture? What aspects of soft power can be found within Americans’ 
reception of Korean popular culture? What implications does Korean Wave’s soft power 
have on American fans’ identity? How does cultural hybridity of Korean popular culture 
un/consciously facilitate sociocultural implications of soft power in the United States, 
arguably one of the strongest cultural industries in the world? And what cultural, social, 
and political implications does the Korean Wave yield in global/international contexts? 
1. REVERSED MEDIA ETHNOGRAPHY 
Whereas traditional ethnography conducted by anthropologists is extremely 
local, media ethnographic approach to global media studies attempts to move radically 
from local to global—interlocked with reception studies—in the much more complex and 
dynamic realm of globalization (Murphy & Kraidy, 2003). One critical view of 
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ethnography was that the ethnographic practice was seen as a product of colonial and thus 
Western-philic discourses, a charge that focused mainly on how ethnographies inscribed 
ethnocentric perspectives (Murphy & Kraidy, 2003). Traditional ethnographic research 
was conducted by Western researchers into the so-called non-Western cultures and 
people as exotic “Other,” and thus the point of departure inevitably reflected the Western 
perspectives (Weiss, 1994). Seen in this vein, I consider my study to be a reversed media 
ethnographic approach because a) instead of studying and asking people about their 
culture, I am studying their understanding of my native culture, which is somewhat like 
studies that have been done in places like Israel about their reactions to U.S. culture on 
television (Katriel, 2012), but again, reversing the focus to examine impacts in the US; 
and b) I am observing Westerners through a non-Westerner’s gaze.  
This study employed a reversed media ethnography over a period of two years, 
which includes participant observation recorded in field notes and various structures and 
types of interview methods, such as ethnographic—also known as the informal 
conversational interview (Patton, 1990)—occurring in the midst of my social interactions 
with them, respondent—aiming at disclosing their subjective standpoints, views, actions 
and less concerned with the “facts” (Lindolf & Taylor, 2011), and discursive interviews. I 
regularly engaged in participatory observation of the meetings, events, and activities 
related to Korean popular culture between early 2015 and early 2017. I used a semi-
structured interview to allow for more flexible and organic expressions, opinions, and 
experiences of interviewees outside of structured questions. The structure of interviews is 
more flexible, often leading to new topics and inviting interviewees to freely express and 
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talk about their thoughts, opinions, and feelings so that richly expressive inter-views 
would emerge that neither an interviewer nor an interviewee could have produced alone. 
The followings are the basic set of interview questions I asked for all informants:  
“Could you tell me a little bit about yourself?” 
“What culture do you identify with the most? What ethnicity?” 
“How did you get to know about Korean popular culture?” 
“What motivates you to interact with Korean popular culture?” 
“What aspects of Korean popular culture are attractive/appealing to you?” 
“How do you consume Korean popular culture? What media platforms/outlets do 
you use for Korean popular culture?” 
“Where do you get news about Korean popular culture? How do you get 
updated?” 
“What are the similarities and differences between Korean popular culture and 
American popular culture?” 
“Do you consider language barrier as a hindrance to your interaction with Korean 
popular culture? If so, what do you do to resolve that problem?” 
“What aspects of Korean popular culture do you find difficult to understand?” 
“What do you do when you don’t understand certain media text/content of 
Korean popular culture?” 
“What are some of the pros and cons of Korean popular culture?” 
“Have you ever participated either online or offline fan activities regarding 
Korean popular culture?” 
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“How do you perceive Korean fandom vs. international fandom of K-pop?” 
“Why do you like Korean popular culture in particular? Why not other East 
Asian popular culture, like J-pop or Chinese drama?” 
“Does your interest in Korean popular culture expand further to other aspects of 
Korea, such as history or contemporary politics?” 
“Now that you regularly consume and interact with Korean popular culture, has 
it changed your pre-perceptions of Korea?” 
“How does Korean popular culture relate to your life now?” 
2. PARTICIPANTS AND INFORMANTS  
There is an online social media site of local groups where people sharing similar 
interests gather together to improve themselves and their local communities. Within this 
site, there is a Korean Interest Group (a pseudonym, hereafter KIG), which is a non-
profit and non-governmental organization founded in the 2010s. Most members in this 
group live in Texas and share a similar interest: Korean popular culture. There are about 
400 members registered in KIG. Among them, about 30 members regularly gather once 
or twice a week and participate in various activities related to Korean popular culture; 
learning Korean language, watching K-dramas, discussing and sharing information about 
Korean popular culture and Korean celebrities, eating Korean cuisine, attending K-pop 
concerts, practicing K-pop choreography, etc.  
KIG is comprised of people with the U.S. nationality except a couple of native 
Koreans (including myself), and the group consists of multiple races and ethnicities: 
Caucasian American, African American, Hispanic American, Asian American and a few 
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others. None of them previously knew each other before joining the group. Among the 
regular 30 members of the group, females outnumber males approximately by three to 
one. The ages range from teens to 50s with most participants clustered in the 20s and 30s. 
Some of them are self-claimed dedicated K-pop and/or K-drama fans, while others are 
perceived to be general audiences who have genuine interests in Korean popular 
cultures—such as Korean language, cuisine, films, etc.  
There are about 14 key informants whom I have closely interacted on a regular 
basis and conducted in-depth interviewees periodically for the past two years. I 
considered my 14 key informants as a large enough number because that is when I started 
to see recurring patterns during the interview process. Qualitative interview scholars, 
such as Spradley (1979), consistently note that one has enough interviews when one 
begins to see consistent and recurring patterns. They are all from varying backgrounds; 
they were born and raised in the United States for a significant amount of time, lived in 
Texas for the most part of their lives, are not native Korean, speak English as their first 
language, and primarily identify themselves as American. My informants voluntarily took 
part in my research mainly because I had been establishing close rapport with them by 
regularly attending their events and hanging out with them. All of that ethnographic 
interaction before and after the actual interviews also provides data for this study. 
Although they are from different cultural and social backgrounds, they share a common 
identity: Fans of the Korean popular culture and a stronger desire to build their cultural 
capital of Korea than general audiences. 
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Number Pseudonym Age Gender Nationality 
Native 
Language 
Race 
1 Angie Early 30s Female USA English Caucasian 
2 Anya Late 40s Female USA English Caucasian 
3 Binzy Late 30s Female USA English South Asian 
4 Greyson Late 20s Male USA English Caucasian 
5 Iliana Late 10s Female USA English South Asian 
6 J.C. Mid 20s Female USA English Black 
7 Joseph Early 30s Male USA English Hispanic 
8 Leoy Late 20s Female USA English Caucasian 
9 Miranda Late 10s Female USA English Hispanic 
10 Rosalie Late 20s Female USA English Half-Black, 
Half-Asian     
11 Sean Late 20s Male USA English 
Caucasian 
12 Tiffany Late 20s Female USA English 
Half-
Caucasian, 
Half-Asian 
13 TinTin Mid 20s Female USA English 
Black 
14 Theia Mid 30s Female USA English 
Black 
Table 2: Major Informants 
The rich corpus of data I have collected over a two-year period illustrates cultural 
practices and relationships that cannot be found in quantified numbers. During my 
participant observation, I frequently took field notes using my digital devices (mostly 
smartphone and laptop) when interacting with the members of KIG. At first, I took field 
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notes in more extensive details including both verbal and non-verbal communication: 
observing the ways they interact with K-drama, Korean film, K-pop-related media texts, 
and the ways they talk about the issues related to Korean culture. As time passed and as I 
started to see recurring patterns, however, I realized I took field notes less frequently. The 
more I immersed myself in building relationships with my major informants and the more 
I built closer rapport with them, I felt that my participant observation is more than a mere 
ethnographic observation. But rather, somewhat a complete participation in ways that my 
interaction with them inevitably has affected the formation of their identities and their 
reception of Korean popular culture and vice versa, which may lead to the Hall (1980)’s 
notion of a “circuit of cultures” that the complicated webs of cultures are always 
multidirectional, not unilateral.  
I consider my interview types to be “respondent interviews” (Tracy, 2013), 
“friendship model of interviews” (Tracey, 2013), and “ethnographic interviews” 
(Spradley, 1979). I thought respondent interviews are an appropriate type to employ 
because my informants have appropriate experiences that attend to my main research 
goal: examining the reception of the Korean Wave in the United States. According to this 
interview type, an interviewee speaks primarily of and for herself/himself—about her/his 
own motivations, experiences, and behaviors. Respondent interviews are particularly 
worthwhile when attempting to understand similarities and differences within a certain 
cultural group (Tracy, 2013). The following instance illustrates how my interview with 
one of my primary informants initiated in the earlier stage of my ethnographic work. One 
day, Angie emailed me asking me if I would be interested in going to a yoga class with 
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her. By that time, I was considering her as my primary informant among the KIG 
members. I thought it would be a great chance to ask her for an interview. In my reply to 
her email, I said I would love to go to the yoga class with her and asked her whether she 
would be willing to be interviewed about her interest in Korean popular culture. Upon 
each other’s approval, we set the date and time via emails. The interview took place in 
one of the cafes in Texas. A reasonable expectation of the interview is for an hour and a 
half or 2 hours (Weiss, 1994). However, my interview with her lasted about 3 and a half 
hours because not only me but also she wanted to ask me a lot of questions about what it 
is really like to live in a Korean society and about Korean culture in general. She seemed 
extremely curious about many layers and aspects of my native culture in which she 
confessed later that it is all because she has been largely influenced by K-dramas. 
All of my major informants told me that the main reason they joined KIG is 
because they wanted to talk about Korean popular culture with similar-minded others. As 
time passed, my informants and I have become close friends to an extent that we felt 
comfortable and at ease enough to frankly talk about almost everything, even sensitive 
issues. Because of the close rapport between my informants and I, it seemed appropriate 
to approach interview stances as a “friendship model of interviewing” in which the 
interviewer and the interviewee treat each other as intimate friends rather than as objects 
(Tracy, 2013). I also consider the interview type I employed for my dissertation to be an 
ethnographic interview, which is more informal, conversational, and emergent. I would 
ask them what kinds of K-dramas they have been watching lately over casual lunch, or I 
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would ask them what they think about their latest favorite K-pop idol groups’ 
performance on our way to a K-pop concert together.  
To meet my research goals, I preset a list of interview questions based on 
previous studies and with the help of my academic advisors. On the interview scenes, I 
provided them a copy of a consent form to ensure them that their names will be kept 
anonymous and every information and voice recording will be stored in a safe place. 
Interviews took place in various locations, sometimes at coffee shops, restaurants, my 
house, informant’s house, in the park, or at the locations right after KIG events/activities. 
After writing a transcript of my first interview, I realized that just reading a transcript 
gives a different feeling and vibe from physically being on the interview scene. This is 
because interpreting nonverbal expressions such as facial expressions and body language 
is a crucial part of interviewing (Tracy, 2013). Interviews provide various emotional 
phases (Kvale, 1996), and therefore, readers would interpret my interviewee’s thoughts 
and opinions differently from mine. For example, my interviewee’s nonverbal 
expressions were more vibrant and dramatic when she, who identified herself as a 
feminist, was talking about gender inequality embedded in both American and Korean 
culture. Having more vivid nonverbal expressions transferred a stronger sense of 
struggles, which one has to physically be there in order to recognize and appreciate it.  
As I depart from stacks of books and classroom discussion and got immersed into 
the real field and culture of my informants, I gradually realized that ethnography and 
qualitative interviews require careful skills and judgment to digest even the subtle and 
nuanced meanings people provide to the full potential: artifacts lie in the eye of the 
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beholder. After conducting a series of interviews with my primary informants, I was 
befuddled by having a large corpus of data waiting to be analyzed. Analyzing data, which 
I refer to as an “unraveling process,” enabled me to discover questions to ask in future 
interviews, and also led me to find out what things mean to my informants. Analysis of 
qualitative data involves a careful way of thinking; it refers to the systematic examination 
of something to determine its parts, the relationship among parts, and their relationship to 
the whole (Spradley, 1979).  
It is important to address the idea of self-reflexivity in my reversed ethnographic 
approach. My multiple layers of identities—one in which a native Korean who has lived 
in the US trying to understand how Americans interact with Korean popular culture—and 
my participation in the field may have affected the reception and expression of my 
participants and primary informants. Ethnographers, as an instrument, not only 
participate in the field, but also in their data as they analyze it (Gray, 2002), and that is 
what I did. I flexibly moved in and out of my data, which enabled me to provide more 
than the objective, positivist perspective. I carried a “burden of authorship” (Ang, 1996) 
throughout all stages of my project. My ethnographic authorship is a form of cultural 
inscription that reveals the politics of our intellectual work. My ultimate political 
responsibility as an ethnographer is an honest and transparent self-reflexivity in my 
identity and research process and a show of sincere respect toward my participants and 
informants.  
Throughout my entire ethnographic work, I tried to be honest and transparent 
when immersed with the KIG and my informants. From very early on when I joined KIG, 
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I identified myself as a transnational researcher from a university and an acafan of 
Korean popular culture. I was sometimes outspoken about my particular research 
interests in transnational media culture, Korean Wave, and fandom culture. The more I 
immersed myself in building a close rapport with my key informants, I felt that my 
participant observation was more than an ethnographic observation. Rather, it was a 
somewhat a complete participation in ways that my interaction with them inevitably has 
affected the formation of their identities and their reception of Korean popular culture 
and vice versa. Hall (1980) once said that the complicated webs of cultures are not 
unilateral but always multidirectional, a “circuit of cultures.”  
Grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) provides strong framework to argue 
against a criticism that ethnographic research is ‘unscientific.’ It combines an analytic 
procedure of constant comparison of the explicit coding procedure—data into 
quantifiable form—and the style of theory development. Grounded theory generates and 
produces concepts from recurring patterns found in data. Researchers use grounded 
theory as a reference to derive theoretical concepts from the qualitative analysis of data in 
addition to substantiating the interpretation based on participants’ use of words and 
meanings (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It rests on qualitative data and methods and is 
specifically focused on the inductive development of theory from data. Ethnographers 
collect data and code, analyze, and pull out elements that have patterns; dissecting data to 
find recurring patterns is the key of grounded theory. Ethnographers, making frequent 
comparisons across the data, as they are free and flexible to move ‘in and out’ of the data, 
are able to develop, modify, and extend theoretical propositions. The nature of global 
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media culture directs us to focus on complex processes, requires us to rely on field 
observation and qualitative interviews, and develop explanations rather than 
experimentation and prediction. This interpretive approach reflects that the immense 
complexity of what I study—communication comprised of people, culture, society, and 
media—has consciousness as fluid living organisms. 
My ethnographic records and data consist of textual, aural, and visual records of 
the 14 informants, other members of KIG, objects, events, and processes under study. I 
employ various qualitative and interpretive techniques including grounded theory (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) to analyze the rich corpus of data: process of labeling and breaking 
down raw data, known as data management and data reduction, and then reconstituting 
them into categories, patterns, themes, concepts and propositions, known as conceptual 
development (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Analysis and interpretation are joined together in 
explicating meaning. I attempt to reconstitute data into conceptual development—such as 
patterns, themes, and concepts—to support my arguments and that my evidence is both 
citations from my field notes about what I have observed and quotes from interviews. I 
reiterate that I do not attempt to provide generalizations about how American fans 
mediatize—in a sense that the broad consequences of media, media texts, and media 
platforms are embedded in the everyday life, context, and practice (Couldry & Hepp, 
2013)—with Korean popular culture. But rather, by providing an in-depth, fragmented 
moment of whole ecology, I attempt to uncover detailed analyses and possible 
conceptualizations by connecting recurring patterns and themes.  
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A major strength of qualitative media ethnographic research remains its 
wonderful blend of strategic mindfulness and unexpected discovery (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2011). The findings are based on the data I observed, collected, and studied over the two 
years, which I reconstituted into conceptual development: recurring patterns and themes. 
Grounded theory is based on constant comparative analysis of observations and 
interviews over time, so that theoretical patterns gradually emerge and are then confirmed 
by subsequent observations and interviews. The following analyses in the next chapter 
explicate multiple aspects of the transcultural Korean Wave and its fans in the United 
States.   
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Chapter 4: Findings 
1. INTRODUCTION TO MAIN THEMES 
The following is a brief delineation of the findings I categorized in accordance 
with the research questions addressed above: 
First, hybridity of Korean popular culture creates complicated webs of 
transcultural media. I find that American fans perceive Korean popular culture as similar 
to their own in terms of both cultures being capitalist-driven, industrialized economic 
societies, but different in the cultural plane. There is a distinct scent or perception of a 
specific Korean modernity in the cultural plane, such as alternative forms of gender 
representation, cute culture, and honorific culture. The notion of cultural appropriation 
demands mutual understanding of each other’s histories. Global social media, as a main 
conduit of interaction with Korean popular culture, facilitates the spread and popularity 
of Korean popular culture, yet simultaneously creates cross-cultural misunderstanding 
and disjunctures.  
Second, U.S. fans find a certain emotional proximity in Korean popular culture. 
Korean popular culture seems to be particularly good at carefully structuring and 
skillfully formulating media content and texts with polished and modernized looks to 
arouse a certain feeling of affinity: what I call emotional proximity, another layer of 
Straubhaar’s (1991) cultural proximity theory. Korean popular culture reflects the 
traditional Asian values and ethos, which makes Asian audiences feel culturally 
proximate, while comfortably appealing to Western audiences with its wholesome 
content. This may be an example of what La Pastina and Straubhaar (2005) call value 
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proximity across different cultures. It works as a mediator not only within the East, but 
also in the West by filling a large demand and void (Jin, 2016) for audiences who were 
looking for clean-cut, non-aggressive, and less sexualized content. U.S. fans find the very 
complex layers of hybridity in Korean popular culture comfortably appealing, associated 
with a notion of appreciation, not exoticization. 
Third, the notion of woori-ness (we-ness in English) embedded in Korean 
popular culture and its fandom culture is an appealing form of group or cultural 
solidarity. It had a strong appeal to my informants and works as one of the multifaceted 
soft power in the eyes of U.S. fans that leads to an alternative post-Western soft power. 
Fourth, U.S. fans, as transcultural regions of Korean Wave in the global sphere, 
have a certain determination to build cultural capital, especially Korean language, and 
yearn for validity. The transcultural Korean Wave becomes a whole ecology to U.S. fans.  
2. HYBRIDITY OF TRANSCULTURAL KOREAN POPULAR CULTURE 
2.1 Similar yet Different  
Transnational media engenders an unpredictable, fluid, and creative form of 
hybridization when crossing borders (Shim, 2006). By looking at how Korean popular 
culture hybridizes various cultural forms by incorporating their local sentiment and 
creating new forms, we can come closer to understanding what aspects of hybridity in 
Korean popular culture appeal to Americans beyond Asia. One of my inquiries was to see 
how my informants perceived Korean popular culture and their own popular culture in 
terms of similarities and differences. Speaking from economic and political perspectives, 
both are industrialized, capitalist, democratic, and wired societies. Yet, the cultural plane 
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differs. Although both countries are capitalist societies, when it comes to pop culture, 
their media content is different. For example, two of the main informants, Leoy and 
Greyson, note that specifically, but also note that some of the key forms of cultural 
industry seem to be quite different, resulting in different impressions of how genuine the 
artists are: 
 
Leoy: Both cultures are media-driven; both industrialized, modernized in a way 
that’s not true for other countries.  
 
Greyson: Both cultures being very capitalist-driven… But in the entertainment 
industry, the major difference to me, it seems like a lot of Western musical acts, 
they get this ‘holier than thou’ mentality that ‘Oh my CD sold 2 million albums.’ 
They think they are the best thing that’s ever created on the planet whereas [in 
Korean artists], it doesn’t seem, they seem more genuine of a person. 
 
The honorific culture7—placing value on being respectful, polite, and humble—
embedded in Korean popular culture was seen as one of the major appealing aspects that 
differ from their own American culture. Three of my main informants—Angie in her 
early 30s, Sean in his late 20s, and Greyson in his late 20s—compare and contrast U.S. 
                                                 
7Mainly derived from Confucianism, Korea’s honorific culture—placing value on harmony, politeness, and 
humbleness—is well manifested in its language. Korean language uses an extensive system of honorifics—
such as unni (a respectful word that females use to call other females who are older), noona (a respectful 
word that males use to call females who are older), and oppa (a respectful word that females use to call 
males who are older)—that are considered very important features of the language and are used to indicate 
the relative ages and social positions of the speakers.  
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and Korean popular culture in addition to sharing their perceptions about the honorific 
culture embedded in Korean popular culture: 
 
Angie: There is something about Korean media… kind of speaks to me in a way 
that American media don’t… I read a little article on the difference between 
banmal (informal way of speaking) and jondemal (formal way of speaking). To 
hear there’s completely different ways of speaking depending on how you relate 
to someone, and how in jondemal, you can’t even say ‘you’ directly to a person, 
is fascinating. 
 
Sean: Isn’t there a Korean word jeong (unselfish giving)? The whole culture of 
noona (older sister), hyung (older brother)… Once I got used to it [the jeong 
culture based on honorific culture and age difference], I kind of liked it… 
Friends who are a year or two older than me really took that seriously like we go 
out to lunch, dinner, or coffee, and they always pay for it. Whereas in the US, it 
doesn’t really happen. I think US is a lot more individualistic than in Korea… 
When I was in Korea, I definitely felt like people are trying to take care of each 
other. Sometimes it could be a little frustrating just how strict stuff can be with 
age. That whole hierarchy and politeness... There needs to be a larger age 
difference in the US for that respect to kick in whereas in Korea, it’s so 
immediate. 
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Greyson: The US doesn’t have the same depth of traditions like for example, we 
don’t have the formal and informal level of speaking. We have traditions here but 
honorific is something like so far beyond the way that we, most people, probably 
wouldn’t be able to contemplate applying that... With the most recent Park 
Geun-hye scandal8, they have like millions of people would go on protest, and it 
doesn’t get violent… I find that to be very admirable... I think a lot of it goes 
back to the honorific system.  
 
 One of the strengths about grounded theory is that ethnographers, based on 
participatory observation and interviews, get to uncover the specificities and nuances of 
what is below the surface of the expressed behaviors and interpretations that other 
researchers have not found. The wholesomeness of Korean popular culture frequently 
emerged from my observation of the KIG members when they talk about why they like 
Korean popular culture and how it differs from their popular culture. For example, I 
observed in our interactions that those KIG members who are younger than me would 
sometimes use some of the honorific Korean words, such as unni or noona, when 
speaking to me. They would also occasionally bow down to me politely as a means to 
exercise the honorific culture. Rosalie, a devoted fan of Korean culture, shares her 
thoughts:  
                                                 
8Park Geun-hye, a former President of South Korea, was impeached on 9 December 2016 for being 
involved in a political scandal. Her aide, Choi Soon-sil, who did not have an official position in the 
government, intervened to the presidency, exploited Park’s power to seek donations of money from several 
business conglomerates, and accessed to Park’s personal and work life to have directly influenced, and 
interfered with the policy of, the state council. 
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Rosalie: American pop culture seems a big mess to me. I’m not interested in 
“real housewives in New Jersey,” whatever is on reality television... [There’s] 
too much unnecessary drama [whereas] Korean culture is different. It seems 
more wholesome, honest. American pop culture, for these TV shows, I feel like 
the producers are trying to create conflict where there isn’t any. It doesn’t seem 
authentic. It’s just too much violence. It’s less humble at least as of right now. 
The way that Korean culture, there’s definitely formality... When you talk to 
interviewers, you talk politely. In America, we don’t really have formality levels. 
 
The clean-cut image and content of Korean popular culture—K-pop, K-drama, 
TV shows, etc.—with a polished, modernized look motivates and appeals to fans in the 
US who are looking for something that may seem a little more innocent and naïve in the 
eyes of the general American public. I argue that the relatively clean-cut and innocent 
content of Korean popular culture can be categorized as wholesome. Anya, a K-pop 
enthusiast and music lover in her late 40s and a mother of two children, shares her 
thoughts: 
 
Anya: One thing I really like about it [K-pop] is that American Hip Hop, rap, and 
pop, to some degree, the content has gotten more graphic, ugly, obscene, and 
female objectifying, and I feel like that K-pop, that’s another appeal for me, 
because it’s something I can also share with my kids. I don’t let them listen to a 
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lot of American rap and Hip Hop because of all the content, sexually objectifying 
and defaming women. I find it much more appealing that in Korean culture, it 
doesn’t seem to be accepted. I know that was a big part of why I found it 
interesting because I was finding it difficult as for someone who loves dance and 
music, and it’s also good for my children. [K-drama] is not going to resolute with 
American because it’s too naïve. But I think it’s also nice to not have what has 
become reality in America. It’s just too exhausting.  
 
One of the examples of the clean-cut and innocent content comprising the 
wholesomeness of Korean popular culture is that K-dramas have a different tone and 
portrayal of affection. Almost all of my major informants said that, whereas it is a social 
norm to have sexualized and aggressive content in American TV shows, K-dramas focus 
more on non-sexualized and emotional relationships. 
 
Rosalie: I can notice the big difference between American TV shows and Korean 
ones in the way they portray affection between the characters. Whereas in 
American television shows, there’s a lot more skin, it’s more sexualized, in 
Korean television shows, even just holding hands makes my heart racing. In K-
drama, it’s more about building relationships more than getting physical with the 
other. 
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TinTin: There’s a show called Game of Thrones. Some people say it’s a little too 
much because it gets very graphic. It’s a very intense TV show. It’s very violent. 
Also, it’s very sexually promiscuous… [Also, American TV drama] never ends. 
I’d start losing interest after season 6. That’s what I like about K-dramas. There 
is a beginning, and there is an end9. They don’t keep dragging on and on and on.  
 
Variety shows, which often get left out of analyses of Korean popular culture, 
especially the reception of Korean variety shows in non-Asian regions, are another 
appealing facet of Korean Wave for fans in the United States. The notion of 
wholesomeness is embedded in almost all forms of Korean TV shows and U.S. fans find 
that comfortably appealing as the shows seem less aggressive, more child-friendly, and 
somewhat naïve. In this regard, Iliana and J.C. share their thoughts: 
 
Iliana: Variety shows in Korea are child-friendly. Growing up, I don’t like 
inappropriate stuff. Sometimes it’s too much. I just want to watch something 
nice.  
 
J.C.: We don’t even have variety shows here. We don’t have that kind of culture 
where they pull the artists and do all these kinds of different things because I 
think our artists think it’s really cheesy. Only a very handful of artists here would 
make fool of themselves on reality shows like SNL. As far as our culture has 
                                                 
9 Most K-dramas have about 16-20 episodes in total, and each episode runs about 60 minutes. 
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been, [violence and aggressiveness] has been our norm for a very long time. I 
think American culture is just very very sexualized from early age. It must be 
underlying cultural things. Here in America, sex has been normalized. It’s not 
huge and taboo.  
 
As I stated earlier, the Korean Wave fans in the United States find the content of 
Korean popular culture to be more innocent, clean, and child-friendly to an extent that 
they perceive it to be more wholesome. They appreciate Korean popular culture as they 
feel comfortable consuming it. For example, Anya shared her experience of attending K-
pop concerts and how it differed from America in terms of alcohol and drug consumption 
at concerts.  
 
Anya: Alcohol is served in American concerts. It’s a very big thing too to also 
take their drugs. It’s extremely rude. It was one of the biggest differences. 
Everyone was completely focused on the concert. I was so impressed that Big 
Bang [one of the K-pop groups] did all of their songs during the two and half 
hours. It was worth every penny. 
 
Another significant cultural difference between U.S. and Korean popular culture 
is the notion of “cute culture” and different perceptions of the word “cute.” Cuteness is an 
appeal to others; it invites others to engage in social behaviors including companionship, 
cooperative action, and communication (Dale, 2017). In the East Asian region, cute 
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culture has an overarching mainstream presence far more than in other regions of the 
world. For example, Japan’s kawaii (literal meaning, “cute” in English) culture, Botz-
Bornstein (2016) argued, can turn into a decentered form of soft power. Although the 
success of commercial products from Mickey Mouse to Hello Kitty shows that cuteness 
can easily cross national and cultural boundaries, there are key differences in specific 
linguistic usages (Dale, 2016). The English word “cute” is derived from a word “acute,” 
which has negative connotations such as “cunning” and “shrewd” that are not found in 
Asian languages (Dale, 2016). In the US, some disdain the idea of “cute,” such as “the 
creepy world of too cute” (Schoemer & Chang, 1995), cuteness imbued with aggression 
and violence meant to deceive (Ngai, 2012), and cute objects as sadistic (Harris, 2001). 
The cute culture in Korea, on the other hand, is much more mainstream and widely 
embedded in many facets of society to an extent that it has the connotation of happiness.  
 
Greyson: Cute culture. I think for the most part it is a positive thing. It [aegyo10] 
is very much part of the culture that you don’t even think about it. In Korean 
people, there’s natural aegyo. That’s part of the reason I like the language too. 
It’s very prevalent in speaking too.  
 
The boy group format used to be popular in the U.S. music industry in the 1990s 
and started to die out rapidly in the early 2000s (Anderson, 2014). On the other hand, the 
boy group/girl group format in Korea has had continuous appeal for several decades. One 
                                                 
10Aegyo refers to talking and behaving in extremely cute ways. 
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of the reasons that it was a passing fad in the US can be explained by the culture being 
individual-centric. The collective mentality of ‘we are not just members of a group, but a 
family’ in K-pop boy/girl groups is seen as attractive in the eyes of American fans.  
 
Tiffany: It’s going to go up and down when it comes to the pop thing. In the US, 
boy bands come and go. But in K-pop, it’s been just continuous flow [for 
decades]. And they have been so successful that you don’t see it as a huge off 
and on like the US because the fan base just keeps growing internationally. 
 
The hybridity seen in K-pop, for example, represents a great example of the fluid 
nature of popular culture in the era of globalization. Thanks to new information 
communication technological developments, such as YouTube and other social media 
platforms, the transnational success and expansion of K-pop has been boosted beyond 
Asia. The extremely clean-cut image and aesthetically pleasing K-pop performers and 
performances are appropriate for the digital age and the social media generation. K-pop 
distinctly appeals to fans in the US by exemplifying the world of pop culture as a total 
package: catchy tunes, good singing, attractive appearance of performers, mesmerizing 
performances, and well-thought-out merchandise.  
 
Tiffany: I love the choreography in K-pop. In Korea, they have weekly music 
shows. Instead of just showing music videos, they have the actual groups 
perform on stage. In America, we have nothing like that [anymore].  
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Binzy: It was totally different feeling, different sound, different look. There’s 
never a dull moment. There is always fresh music, which is so hard in America. 
There might be one good song in at least six months.  
 
Iliana: They repeat the song over and over until you’re tired of it. Unless you buy 
the album, you don’t hear the rest of the music. But in K-pop, it’s much easier to 
listen to all the music because they’ll be on like weekly idol11, inkigayo12.  
 
Leoy: [K-pop] Music videos, the production value of quality alone is just 
fascinating. They [K-pop content] have this story, character, and you can tell 
they put so much effort in everything. The styling, the set dressing, the clothes, 
the camera angles, and everything. It is an art, and I appreciate a hell out of that. 
 
 Cultural elements travel, get reinterpreted, and repackaged in a way that is more 
appealing and better received internationally. The way the Korean cultural industry 
creates and repackages various cultural elements is skillfully and carefully done. By 
strategically incorporating a wide range of music and choreographic genres, K-pop 
creates its unique mode of hybridity with extremely polished looks in non-threatening 
and pleasant packages.  
                                                 
11A Korean variety show, varying from episode to episode, that features idol groups as invited guests and 
consists of several corners. 
12One of the weekly music TV shows in Korea. 
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Rosalie: In America, we don’t buy physical albums anymore. They just put it in 
the plastic case and that’s it. It’s a different story in K-pop. Although everything 
is digital in K-pop too, people still buy physical albums because they put more 
thoughts into its design and everything from the packaging of the albums to all 
the extra stuff [like photo cards and season’s greetings (see figure 1)]. Fans are 
getting something they can’t get digitally. It helps the whole fandom 
communities get larger and larger.  
 
At one of the KIG gatherings, I casually mentioned the word “hybridity” when talking 
about K-pop. Anya seemed appreciative of the term devoid of the two notions—
postcolonial mimicry and contemporary minstrelsy—that haunt Westernized notion of 
cultural appropriation (Oh, 2015b). She felt the word “hybridity” well explains and 
verbalizes how she views K-pop. 
  
Anya: I like the word hybrid. There is a difference between exploiting culture 
and absorbing it. I think it’s kind of an arrogant attitude to take that any 
particular type of music would not appeal to potentially every cultural type of 
person. Not everybody in that culture, but to deny the people in this group, ethnic 
group, racial group, gender group would not be interested in that music or 
shouldn’t be because they are not the original is really counter to what I think 
music is. It should be something that brings everybody together and that connects 
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us in a way that we don’t even always understand. I like the hybridization of K-
pop because I also like that they [K-pop] wiped out the things [from American 
culture] that I consider negative. 
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Figure 1: Example of K-pop Album Package 
(Photo Credit: JYP Entertainment) 
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The theoretical approaches to the Korean Wave phenomenon tend to revolve 
around the notion of cultural hybridity that de-emphasizes the multiple subcultures of 
individual audiences and fandom (Anderson & Shim, 2015), which in fact, I argue, create 
complex power dynamics. One must not look at the notion of hybridity simply as a binary 
model—such as resistance/domination and center/periphery—or a descriptive tool to 
explain certain transcultural phenomena of media culture. Hybridity is never a power-
neutral space; it is a space where different power relations are continuously struggled and 
negotiated. The theoretical challenge, according to Kraidy (2002), thus resides in the 
following conundrum: In what context do social agents revert to a hegemonic deployment 
of hybridity? In what context does transnational hybridity un/consciously create 
ideological twists in global contexts? Under what conditions does transnational hybridity 
fulfill or not fulfill its progressive potential in a local context? I attempted to unravel 
transcultural dynamics in line with hybridity in a complex global context—in which 
Kraidy (2002) terms the ‘intercontextual theory of hybridity’—in regard to the Korean 
Wave phenomenon, particularly K-pop in relation to gender representation. 
2.2 Gender Representation 
The core distinctive characteristic of globalization theories from earlier 
imperialism paradigm lies in the “necessary complexity” (Sparks, 2007, p. 130) in which 
both local and global audiences play a pivotal role. The circulation and distribution of 
media texts via diverse audiences take place in the discursive form (Hall, 1980). In order 
for media texts to have meanings among diverse audiences, the discourse must be 
translated and transformed into social practices. The process of these practices creates 
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shared collective experiences in what Appadurai (1996) once termed the 
“deterritorialized mediasphere.”  
Some cultural forms of media texts appear to be natural or universal rather than 
constructed. However, what seem to be global cultural meanings do not just become 
naturalized and universalized in the vacuum of power struggles. The process and 
operation of globalizing certain cultural meanings always take ideological effect and 
power hierarchy: hegemony. There is a pattern of ‘preferred readings’ or ‘dominant 
readings’ in the realm of hegemonic ideology; the domains of ‘preferred readings’ have 
the whole social order embedded in them as a preordained set of values, practices, and 
beliefs (Hall, 1980). However, this hegemonic ‘preferred readings’ is constantly 
confronted with oppositional struggles for hegemonic power is only made possible when 
there is resistance (Fiske, 2011).  
These constant struggles and various forms of resistance between domination and 
subordination always happen in popular culture (Ang, 1985, 1996; Fiske, 1992; Hall, 
1998). The cultural meaning of popular culture is semiotic excess (Hall, 1980) and does 
not carry only the dominant ideology. Therefore, texts of popular culture should be 
understood as an example of a moment of ongoing cultural negotiation and 
reinterpretation over meaning, symbol, and pleasure, which is at the center of everyday 
life and lived experiences. Hybridity occurs as local cultural agents interact and negotiate 
with global/international forms, using them as resources through which local people 
construct their own cultural meanings (Bhabha, 1994). It helps us to understand how 
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‘preferred readings’ or dominant ideology is reinforced or twisted by looking at the local 
audience’s reception of transcultural media texts. 
Since the early 2010s, the contraflow popularity of K-pop in the US—especially 
among the digital native generation fueled by social media—demonstrates its much more 
hybridized form as ‘spreadable media’ (Jin & Yoon, 2014). A modern form of K-pop, 
with its rigorous idol training system13, which can be traced back to the 1980s-1990s, 
now has its own distinguishable cultural aesthetics and traits that international fans are 
familiar with, such as kkonminam14 or soft masculinity (Jung, 2011b), the K-pop training 
system, aegyo, certain styles of makeup, and outfits, just to name a few. One of the 
theoretical concepts to explicate the transcultural popularity and appeal of Korean 
popular culture has been male celebrities’ fluid gender representation and multiple layers 
of masculinity (Jung, 2011b). Despite a long history of patriarchy in most parts of the 
world, women (and men) have produced and maintained feminist movements in their 
everyday lives, as well as in public (Ang, 1996). One of the recent examples is fans’ 
active and pleasurable reception of the multi-versatile masculinity found in K-pop male 
idols. 
K-pop uses skillfully hybridized concepts that reflect various layers of 
masculinity. When talking about K-pop male idol groups and their masculinity, 
mainstream media and casual observers in the West often make mistakes by looking at 
                                                 
13The K-pop training system is notoriously known for being intensely competitive and rigorous. K-pop 
entertainment companies hold auditions regularly and select only a few trainees. For often more than five 
years, they undergo rigorous training processes in singing, dancing, learning foreign languages, 
mannerismm, etc. Only 20-30 out of 1,000 trainees ever get to debut (Lie, 2012), and only a couple of 
groups out of the 20-30 become popular. 
14Kkonminam refers to males who are flower-like pretty. 
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them as a simple imitation of American male groups, such as the Backstreet Boys and ‘N 
Sync (Anderson, 2014; Caramanica, 2011). They use binary logic to describe K-pop male 
idols as either cute or tough, pretty or handsome, feminine or masculine, gay or straight, 
etc.; they often judge them as appearing too feminine and therefore appearing too 
homosexual, at least by interpretive standards in the United States. However, K-pop male 
idols do not manifest binary either/or masculinity, but a range of fluid multi-versatile 
masculinity that occurs simultaneously (Anderson, 2014; Jung, 2011b; Oh, 2014, 2015a, 
2015b). This fluid, versatile masculinity reflects not only feminine masculinity, but also 
beast-like15 masculinity, cute masculinity, pretty masculinity, boyfriend-like masculinity, 
unni16-like masculinity, or oppa17-like masculinity. This strategically and skillfully 
hybridized multi-versatile masculinity can be seen in the K-pop male idols’ musical 
production, choreography, music videos, fashion, makeup, photo shoots, way of talking 
and acting, interactions with other male idols, or off-stage portrayals.   
 This multi-versatile masculinity of K-pop male idols is simultaneously hybrid, 
fluid, and transnational in which Jung (2010) explains as a renegotiated transnational 
identity and communicative process among diverse audiences. The multi-versatile 
masculinity represents an important aspect of the popularity of K-pop as transcultural 
fans identify it as part of the appeal of K-pop. Fans are attracted to and find pleasure in 
the multi-versatile ways K-pop male idols portray their masculinity; some focus on their 
                                                 
15Beast-like (jimseung in Korean) refers to male K-pop idol groups, which are portrayed as hunky, strong, 
and “manly.” 
16Unni is a respectful Korean word used by females to call older females. 
17Oppa is a respectful Korean word used by females to call older males. 
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Figure 2: Example of Kkonminam  
(flower boy) K-pop Male Idol 
 
talent and politeness while others focus on tough, wild, and beast-like images of 
masculinity portrayed throughout their music, choreography, fashion, and behavior. 
Others link K-pop’s masculinity to their exceptionally beautiful kkonminam images (see 
figure 2). 
 
Miranda: K-pop male idols wear makeup, and they always look like the most 
beautiful people in the world.  
 
Binzy: They [K-pop male idols] look so good. So much is going on with the 
makeup and hair, and I just love that. I didn’t feel like they were too feminine.  
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According to Appadurai (1996), the collective experience of popular media 
culture creates solidarities of cultural taste among audiences from different countries and 
enables them to participate in a shared imagination regardless of nation-states. The 
transcultural traits of multi-versatile masculinity embedded in K-pop male idols enable 
their images, or media texts, to easily travel beyond national/cultural boundaries, 
especially via social media. The notion of soft masculinity is becoming more global as 
international audiences familiarize themselves with it. The pan-East Asian identity of 
kkonminamhas crossed cultural borders not only because they are aesthetically pleasing 
enough to attract global audiences of popular culture, but also because its media text is 
increasingly spreading in the global “social mediascape” (Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013; 
Jin & Yoon, 2014).  
Jung’s (2011b) theoretical concept of soft masculinity as a cultural form has gone 
beyond the transnational and has started to become a semi-global identity. There is less 
and less cultural discount found in K-pop as its characteristic of soft masculinity is 
becoming more transcultural and global. Interestingly though, it was not the Western 
societies, but East Asian societies that first commodified multiple masculinity, including 
soft masculinity, not just as a subculture but as part of the popular mainstream.  
 
Leoy: [More fluid gender representation in K-pop is what] I really appreciate 
about in Korean pop culture that’s different from American pop. You take any 
American male group, they will not participate in half of the stuff the male group 
in Korea would do [such as] the aegyo, all of the Korean male pop groups that 
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dress up in girl group outfits in performances like that. There are so few 
American artists I can think of doing that or it would be less tastefully done. In 
Korea, it’s done because they know it makes the fans happy and they are just 
having a good time. In America, I feel like if somebody in pop culture, who is a 
male dressed up like a girl, it would be more teasing. It’d seem like they’re 
making fun of females.  
 
The notion of soft masculinity is less prevalent and welcomed in the United 
States perhaps because of U.S. heterosexual males’ fear of their constructed ideal 
masculinity being emasculated by such alternatives or because of the different 
perceptions U.S. society in general has toward cute culture (Dale, 2016). Multi-versatile 
masculinity well aligns with the reality of today’s era passing from information age 
toward “a dream society of icons and aesthetic experience” (Dator & Seo, 2004). In this 
emerging era, hypermasculinity faces a considerable lack of legitimacy as delicate, 
sophisticated, and fluid soft masculinity increasingly gains prominence in everyday life. 
Therefore, many, mostly females, fans’ fanatical craze for K-pop male idols is not 
something about which men should feel threatened or emasculated; rather, they should 
feel welcomed. What is disappearing is not masculinity per se but hypermasculinity as 
the only ideal masculinity. I see soft masculinity as liberating men—for example, men 
crying—rather than threatening or emasculating them. Greyson, a male K-pop fan in his 
late 20s, shared his thoughts: 
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Greyson: There is something that I very much hate about American culture and it 
is the ‘I have to be hypermasculine’ thing. I feel like that’s [men wearing 
makeup, dressing up, doing aegyo] very much more acceptable in Asian culture 
in general. I think it’s great… So we, we meaning Western men, have had it 
beaten to our heads since birth that you have to be this stone booth of statue of no 
emotion. If you show an emotion, you are weak and saying stuff like ‘Don’t be 
like a girl.’ Showing any sort of vulnerability is seen as weak. I’ve had a 
depression issue for a long time. It’s a part of my personality. I was self-
medicating watching K-dramas because a lot of it was an identity issue revolving 
around Western—you have to be a robot—type, you can’t feel things as a man. 
 
J.C.: [Men crying] is not off putting at all because it shows there is emotion. 
That’s definitely American thing—hypermasculinity, not showing emotions. 
 
This notion of fluid soft masculinity can be found not only in K-pop male idol groups, 
but also in K-dramas.  
 
Leoy: Emotion is not innately feminine. It’s innately humane. That’s one thing 
that’s very different in K-pop and K-drama... I do not think that they [male 
celebrities in Korea] look feminine. They might be pretty, but I don’t think that it 
makes them feminine.  
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Anya: I feel like Korean dramas are very innovative in a way. I think they allow 
both men and women to be more vulnerable in different ways and even more 
completely as characters in American movies and cultures are. The men don’t 
have to be macho masculine. There is a clear distinction. There is definitely 
different vulnerability portrayed. 
 
The transcultural identity of kkonminam has been referred to as the pan-East 
Asian identity (Miller, 2006). This is because the transnational images of kkonminam are 
highly popular among non-Korean-Asian audiences by transcending national and cultural 
boundaries and reflecting the hybridized cultural form of soft masculinity. However, 
these unique transcultural images of K-pop in East Asia are becoming more and more 
recognized beyond Asia. The kkonminam image of K-pop as spreadable media texts has 
clearly influenced the contemporary constructions of an ideal masculinity in East Asia 
and is starting to influence the West (Jung, 2010; 2011b). The global K-pop phenomenon 
shows that global fans—mostly females—recognize, accept, and enjoy different images 
of masculinity exhibited by K-pop male idols. Women deconstruct the dominant 
hegemony of masculinity and defy what ideal masculinity—which was set by 
heterosexual White male power in patriarchal society—should be. Those who are tired of 
hypermasculinity prevalent in American pop culture get to decide and reconstruct what 
ideal masculinity means on their own terms, for example, by considering kkonminam or 
soft masculinity as another attractive masculinity instead of perceiving Asian men as too 
feminine, and therefore homosexual, to be sexually attractive.  
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A distinctive difference between K-pop male idols and Western pop artists is 
that, unlike Western male musicians, men are not hesitant to dress up, do aegyo, or dance 
in extremely “feminine” and gender-bending ways while being extremely humble and 
modest. Kkonminam masculinity of K-pop male idols is particularly interesting for its 
consequential ideological twists in the Western sphere. This soft masculinity has 
developed not because males have become feminized, but as a consequence of the 
deconstruction and the hybridization of female/male sexual identities (Kim, 2003). 
Female K-pop fans find ways to express, define, and enjoy their desire for their own 
measures of masculinity through K-pop male idols. Although soft masculinity is a 
context-bound perception and is only a partial picture of the whole ecology of 
transcultural Korean popular culture, it nevertheless provides women an alternative and 
fluid way to choose what ideal masculinity means to them.  
 
J.C.: They look softer than the men we have here. Soft masculinity [the term I 
once used and explained to J.C.] was something you [referring to me] were 
exposed at an early age. But now that I’ve been into K-pop, I expand the idea of 
what attractiveness can be. I think now my idea of ideal masculinity has changed 
because before I’d have said ‘tall dude, muscles, being huge and bulky.’ But now 
it’s changed. Now I think I don’t have a single ideal masculinity. It can be fluid.  
 
Binzy: The way I talked about humbleness. That kind of act [soft behavior, not 
about the physique] would be interpreted as ‘man up!’ 
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In addition, the economic power of single women in their twenties and thirties 
who demonstrate a high propensity to consume entertainment and cultural products has 
drastically increased in some parts of the world since the late 1990s. Soft masculinity in 
K-pop male idols closely relates to the changing reality of a capitalist society as women 
are gaining more economic, social, political, and cultural power. Soft masculinity in K-
pop represents how capitalism can work with feminism, and how capitalism works 
through feminization of mass culture by taking women’s pleasure of fantasy seriously. 
Fantasy is created within reality and reflected on reality. The proliferation of multi-
versatile masculinity in the American sphere is an actualization of one of the multifaceted 
political pleasures of women (and men to some extent). The ethnographic data I collected 
and analyzed for more than two years provide a pattern. I frequently noticed that the U.S. 
K-pop fans find pleasure in their fluid encoding/decoding of K-pop male idols’ soft 
masculinity. Some members of KIG—mostly my major informants—and I would 
frequently ask one another which K-pop idols we find attractive, handsome, pretty, etc. 
We would compare and contrast our beauty standards and talk about our perceptions. 
Sometimes there was overlap and sometimes there was not. Seen in this vein, “the 
politics of pleasure”—a main theme that started with romance reading and soap opera 
reception in the West (Ang, 1985; Radway, 1984)—provides ideological twists to the 
hegemonic-imposed masculinity in the context of American fans’ reception of K-pop 
male idols and their multi-versatile masculinity.  
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Leoy, not only a K-pop enthusiast but also a lover of Korean language and 
history, once told me that it is true that K-pop male idols seem to be crossing gender 
boundaries more freely and seem to present a wider range of masculinities than the 
seemingly more rigid boundaries of masculinity in the United States. However, Leoy and 
other informants often emphasized that there are distinctions in terms of beauty standards 
between the two cultures. Korean popular culture seems to have a more rigid idea of what 
is not attractive. One of the reasons, I argue, is because Korea, one of the most racially 
homogenous countries, lacks diversity and multiculturalism in many facets of its society 
and culture for its unique historical reasons. Its understanding of diversity is different 
from that in the United States, one of the most racially diverse countries. Because Korea 
and the United States do not share some particular historical contexts, I found 
disjunctures in the realm of cultural appropriation as I explored the oft-contentious topic.  
2.3 Cultural Appropriation  
 
On a global level, liminal masculinity of K-pop male idols and Korean male 
celebrities provides fans in the United States a space where they can negotiate an 
alternative to normative White masculinity in the West. However, American fans’ 
reception of K-pop male idols does not necessarily lead to breaking the status quo of 
racial power relations. Increased visibility of K-pop does not necessarily lead to increased 
understanding of Korean-ness on the global stage, just as increased visibility of Hip Hop 
does not lead to an increased understanding of Blackness/African American-ness on a 
global scale either.  
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K-pop male idols’ ethnic identity or racial status is often fused with that of Asian 
Americans in the US, and their non-Asian American Korean-ness is often made invisible 
(Oh, 2015b). One example can be found in the ways in which some Americans have 
certain expectations of K-pop idols who appropriate Hip Hop in their musical production 
and styles. Arguing whether a certain cultural form is purely authentic or hybridized 
should not be the primary focus because, to some degree, all cultures are hybrid in 
today’s contemporary society (Bhabha, 2004; Kraidy, 1999; Straubhaar, 2007). Viewing 
a certain cultural form as postcolonial mimicry (Poole, 2013; Yang, 2012b) or cultural 
hybridity (Oh, 2014; Ryoo, 2009) lies in the eye of the beholder, which is un/consciously 
and in/evitably political (Phelan, 1993). As I analyzed in Chapter Two, the postcolonial 
mimicry perspective implies that there is an original, authentic authorship one culture can 
claim over another culture (Manning, 2004; Oh, 2014, 2015b).  
Understanding cultural appropriation, as well as the perception of ethnicity 
surrounding the practice, is bound to have differences based on historical context 
(Lipstiz, 1998). This is well manifested in K-pop. The ways in which the K-pop industry 
and self-producing K-pop idols appropriate Hip Hop is sometimes not done in the way in 
which African Americans would expect foreign cultures to understand it. When popular 
culture is circulated transnationally, the local context of its origin is often erased and 
instead it is projected through the lens of the receiving local context.  
For example, Kwon Jiyong, who is more well-known by his stage name G-
Dragon (GD), is one of the members of K-pop boy group Big Bang. He is a popular 
mainstream K-pop artist who selectively appropriates and modifies Hip Hop in his 
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musical styles. In 2013, he painted his face with black, red, and white for a photo shoot to 
symbolically express the idea of revolution while promoting one of his albums, Coup 
D’etat (see figure 3).  
 
 
Some American audiences misunderstood and thought that he was using black 
face and making fun of the Trayvon Martin case. YG Entertainment, the company that 
represents GD, responded that their understanding was misleading and completely taken 
out of context (Seoulbeats, 2013). However, given the rising global cultural influence of 
K-pop around the world, K-pop artists may need to consider the increasingly diverse 
communities on its receiving end: the international audiences and fans. They also may 
need to anticipate that if they perform in what would culturally be considered blackface 
in the US, it will probably create controversy. This case leads to critical questions about 
cross-cultural misunderstanding of cultural appropriation and how bodily representations 
can be differently understood depending on cultural and historical context.  
Figure 3: A Photo of GD Allegedly Doing Black Face 
(Photo Credit: Seoulbeats.com) 
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Should we distinguish K-pop’s appropriation of Hip Hop from those of White 
Americans or Asian Americans? According to Oh (2015b), we should because we need to 
consider the different sociohistorical contexts that un/consciously inform our 
understanding of cultural appropriation. K-pop performers’ appropriation of Hip Hop 
sometimes prompts outrage and misunderstanding among American audiences who 
believe that Korean Hip Hop is a form of contemporary minstrelsy18. One may argue that 
if GD were an Asian American, he would be more knowledgeable about the American 
minstrelsy tradition, and he would likely avoid the black makeup. This perspective 
continues to project that because Koreans neither have had a tradition of minstrelsy like 
the US, nor been colonizers, they are not necessarily knowledgeable of the history of 
African American slavery, racial politics, or representational issues in the US. The fact 
that K-pop idols have U.S.-influenced musical styles does not necessarily mean that they 
are knowledgeable about the U.S. historical contexts that created minstrelsy. Some may 
argue that the U.S. audiences’ reading of K-pop as minstrelsy (Poole, 2013; Yang, 
2012b) demonstrates that they project their own colonial history and racial politics on K-
pop.  
However, I contend that the argument has two sides. Just because Korea was not 
a historical imperial power and does not share the historical context does not mean it 
cannot become a strong global cultural power now, one that needs to be aware of, and be 
responsible for, the consequences of its commercial industries. Another example is Kim 
                                                 
18Contemporary minstrelsy or modern-day minstrelsy is often embedded in popular cultural forms that 
perpetuate certain stereotypes toward Black/African Americans that are offensive to modern sensibilities. 
The essential premise is its portrayal of Black/African American life and culture through masquerade 
(Harbord, 2015).  
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Namjoon, a member of K-pop boy group BTS (BangTan Sonyeondan in Korean), who is 
better known by his stage name Rap Monster. During a performance in 2014, he used the 
N-word while rapping, which led to a great level of outrage among international 
audiences, especially Black/African American K-pop fans. J.C., an African American K-
pop fan, told me during an interview that she sees him as having appropriated African 
American culture with musical styles and other representational elements such as his 
hairstyle. She feels he should have done more research and been more aware: 
 
J.C.: Do I think he [Namjoon] has culturally appropriated? For sure, maybe in the 
beginning when he was appropriating Black culture, it was in a very stereotypical 
way [like] afro hair. I don’t give anybody a pass, I’d never give a single person in 
the entire world a pass for saying the N-word, especially somebody who is taking 
portions of [African] American culture and making it their own. If you’re going 
to take [African] American culture, and if you’re going to do that, you need to do 
a little of research.  
 
Also, the fact that Kim Namjoon, as well as other prominent K-pop artists, is 
fluent in English may also lead international audiences to believe that their grasp of 
American culture—African American history in particular—is on par with their language 
skills. Some members of KIG remarked that Namjoon knows English, and he seems to 
have caught up with Western trends. My informants’ reception of the issue is that the K-
pop performers, who appropriate Hip Hop and Black culture, should show more 
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sensitivity to Black/African Americans. As Phelan (1993) noted, increased visibility is 
not equal to increased power for those who are subordinated as visibility has dual 
functions. Increased visibility of K-pop does not necessarily signify the visibility of 
Korean-ness in the US. This is because ontologically, a Korean body cannot be fully 
understood through the gaze of Americans—mainly general audiences or casual 
onlookers—who conflate the Asian body and its subjectivity with Asian American 
stereotypes. The American audience’s expectation reveals that Korean identity is likely 
conflated with Asian American or their identity as Korean is invisible from the gaze of 
the American perspective (Oh, 2015b).  
Increased visibility of K-pop and Hip Hop in a global context does not provide a 
deepened understanding of each ethnic group, which is one of the limitations of the cross-
cultural exchange of popular culture at a superficial level. As I pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, when popular culture is circulated across borders, the local context of origin is 
often erased and instead projected through the lens of the receiving local context. As the 
two examples above suggest, people in the United States (both White and non-White) and 
Korea (K-pop idols, cultural industry, and the general public) project and see themselves 
through their own eyes, maintaining the status quo in their own territories rather than 
trying to understand each other’s culture.  
Racialized perception often limits the readability of hybridity embedded in 
Korean popular culture. Invisibility of cross-cultural readings occurs not just through the 
inability or disinterest of seeing other’s histories, but also through racial politics. K-pop is 
unreadable as long as the two ideologies are projected—postcolonial mimicry and 
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contemporary minstrelsy—that haunt Westernized notions of cultural appropriation (Oh, 
2015b). Both Korean and U.S. audiences exclusively engage in seeing themselves, 
projecting their own histories and perceptual lens onto the cultural products with which 
they engage. A lack of linguistic and historical knowledge and understanding results in 
the invisibility of others’ cultural practices. By not recognizing others’ particular 
contexts, both audiences project the mainstream ideology of their own society. I neither 
attempt to criticize Western-centrism nor claim authentic Korean-ness. Instead, through a 
critical reading of each audience group’s cultural assumptions and specificities, I suggest 
a different discourse for U.S. as well as Korean audiences, which would hopefully lead to 
a better understanding of each other’s culture and history in order to appreciate and 
respect the Otherness of each culture as well as subcultures. The goal is to contribute to a 
practice of mutual responsibility and reciprocal sensitivity to other cultures in this global 
era. 
 As I sought to unravel the highly complicated realm of cultural appropriation in 
conjunction with transcultural K-pop, as I observed and interacted with the members of 
KIG, and as I analyzed the data, a critical point emerged. Hip Hop, which originated with 
African Americans in the US, is different from the historically pervasive White popular 
culture in the US because it was a form of grassroots movement at its beginning. It did 
not start off as a form of capitalist-driven commercial popular culture as many modern 
commercial popular cultures have. “Popular culture is one of the sites where this struggle 
for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged” (Hall, 1998, p. 453). In the specific 
U.S. context, African American Hip Hop was more than a musical genre in the 
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beginning; it was a site for African Americans’ resistance against the oppressors and 
struggle for and against a culture of the powerful, the White Americans. J.C. and TinTin, 
both African American K-pop enthusiasts in their late 20s, share their thoughts:  
 
J.C.: I think there is a definite clear separation between being White American 
and being Black American. Being American in itself and being Black. Although 
Black people are American, for the most part, Black people have still maintained 
our own separate culture because we had to, because we were segregated. We 
were discriminated against, so you had to create your own thing that had nothing 
to do with White people. There was no massive intermingling of White people 
and Black people because of the segregation that was going on in the world from 
the time Black people have been here until you can even say right now. There is 
still that segregation, which influenced the way our [Black] culture is created 
versus the way that White culture was created in America. There’s all these 
things that Black people have created all the way from slavery time to here that 
have crossed over not Black to White but White to Black where White people 
have been like ‘Oh what is that. Let’s take it. Let’s appropriate it.’ Never like 
‘Let me share this with White people.’ Because I feel like in this time frame of 
history, we’ve already had so much taken away by White people, we need to 
have things that are just our own.  
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TinTin: When I first started watching K-drama, I did research myself. K-pop Hip 
Hop aspect, not necessarily all Korean people, but those who, idols, this is how I 
feel about idols, idols should know, should do some research, I feel, on the Black 
culture because I can tell a lot of them want to identify with it… If they do a little 
bit of research, they can figure out blackface is not a good thing to do… I believe 
that they should have someone there who can say ‘Okay. That’s not good. Don’t 
do that’… [In this regard] America is horrible when it comes to stuff like that. 
I’ve heard so many different racial slurs. Like on a TV show SNL [Saturday 
Night Live] here, they do the same things here because it’s a comedy… I used to 
watch SNL growing up. But when I became more culturally aware of things, I 
realized it’s blatantly racist right there.  
 
When I once unconsciously referred to jazz as Black music to Rosalie, she 
explained to me how music has been racialized in the US. In the U.S. context, Hip Hop 
has been categorized as Black music, rock as White music, and K-pop as Korean/Asian 
music. Although the racial politics constructed in the US do not apply to Korea, and 
Koreans do not share that particular history, it is still necessary to be careful and sensitive 
when appropriating a culture that is from a historically oppressed group of people. Black 
people have been oppressed and, to a great extent, still are, albeit not as blatantly as 
before the 1960s. They had to create their own culture to keep and protect them from the 
White oppressors because a lot of things have been stolen from African American 
culture—and other minority cultures—without being given credit. They are often made to 
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seem as though they are newly discovered when in fact they are being exploited. U.S. 
racial politics can be applied to media cultural context in Korea and work in a positive 
direction. One of the reasons for Koreans’ lack of understanding in the historical 
background and context of Hip Hop culture derives from the lack of diversity in Korean 
media.  
 
J.C.: Korean people do not have the same history with Black people that White 
people do. If you look at it from two different ways, one of them is kind of 
surface and another one is kind of deep. The way general [White] people feel 
about Black people is deeply rooted inside of them because it’s been something 
that has been passed on to them generation to generation. So the way that Korean 
people as a whole society feel about Black people is a little bit more surface 
because they’re getting it from media input, White media input, that portrays 
Black people as this sucky people... So I’d find it’s easier for them, the feelings 
about Black people to be flipped, changed, because they don’t have those same 
deep visceral feelings about. It’s the entitled. White people are very entitled 
because they’ve always had the upper-hand and so they don’t understand what 
it’s like to have lower-hand… They [Black people] may understand the underline 
context that this is the only media that they [Koreans] have been presented about 
Black people the same media White people perpetuate here in America and they 
export that out, so that’s all they [Koreans] are going to know. That’s why my 
offended-ness is not deep-seated offended-ness with Korean artists as it’d be 
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with White artists. The N-word is not part of Korean history. It’s not taught, and 
the true definition is not easily accessible in Korea.  
 
Claiming pure cultural authenticity legitimizes and reinforces certain global 
power hierarchies in postcolonial contexts. It bases its logic as if one has a right to claim 
authorship over cultures that should be considered fluid elements, reflecting the 
inevitably multidirectional flow of hybridized cultural contexts in contemporary society 
(Kraidy, 1999; Straubhaar, 2007). However, as I examined earlier in Chapter Two, 
hybridity is never a power-neutral space, but is a space where different power relations 
are continuously negotiated and struggled through. In the specific case of African 
American Hip Hop, it started off as a form of grassroots movement: a resistance and 
struggle against oppressors (Hall, 1998). Cultural appropriation can enhance diversity and 
multiculturalism derived by mutual understanding. However, one should be sensitive to a 
culture that has a history of being colonized or oppressed. To quite a few outsiders, K-pop 
looks like global mainstream culture, another well-off, neo-colonial, global export power 
appropriating African American culture. The increasing influential effect, the scope and 
scale, and the significant number of non-Korean international audience (both Black and 
non-Black) of K-pop around the world give K-pop other layers of reasons to be more 
sensitive and considerate when appropriating Hip Hop.  
Mutual understanding toward transcultural media texts and cultural appropriation 
as well as the perception of ethnicity surrounding the practice is bound to have 
differences and difficulties based on varying degrees of social, cultural, historical, and 
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political contexts. There can be a myriad of causes perpetuating certain cross-cultural 
misunderstandings and a lack of contextual adequacies. Online sites and global social 
media, such as Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, Netflix, etc., have initiated and facilitated the 
transcultural—and to some extent global—popularity and spreadability of Korean 
popular culture. Ironically though, the notion of immediacy—the unfathomable speed and 
spread of information—one of the traits of social media, sometimes causes a limitation 
that perpetuates cross-cultural misunderstanding.  
2.4 Global Social Media 
 Without a doubt, the Korean Wave phenomenon has been facilitated both in scope 
and speed due to the development of information communication technologies, especially 
social media and YouTube. To many K-pop fans in the United States, YouTube was the 
platform that first introduced the world of K-pop. Then other various platforms of social 
media such as Tumblr, Twitter, Instagram, Wikipedia, etc. have exponentially facilitated 
the spread of Korean popular culture. Social media is a vital conduit for American fans’ 
reception and understanding of and exposure to Korean popular culture. Fan/user-created 
online sites and social media platforms drive international fans to the world of K-pop and 
other facets of Korean popular culture that are foreign to them. These platforms are the 
core foundation of connection between Korean popular culture and international fans: 
 
Iliana: When I first got into K-pop, I didn’t know about companies and stuff [the 
mechanisms of K-pop industry] like that. So when I wanted to watch more 
SHINee’s [one of the famous K-pop groups] videos, it was under like SM Town 
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[one of the mega K-pop entertainment companies that manages a K-pop male 
group SHINee]. I was like who is this SM Town. I didn’t know about the concept 
of companies because in American pop, it doesn’t seem like they do that. They 
have their own YouTube accounts like Justin Bieber Vevo [Me: Then how did 
you get to know? Where do you get your information?] The internet. I started 
following a bunch of people on different social media like Tumblr. I have almost 
every social media, and I follow 1,800 different people on Instagram.  
 
J.C.: I think that’s what helps facilitate. YouTube wasn’t huge huge when I first 
got into K-pop [in 2007]. It was harder for me to get information [back then]. 
 
Tiffany: K-pop has kind of been around [before social media], but the access 
wasn’t as great. So you couldn’t communicate with everyone else to show that 
you have the same fandom. Right now, when you are on the Internet, ‘Oh, I’m in 
the same town. I love the same thing as you do.’ So social media brought up all 
the same interest people to gather and meet. Back in the day, I am like sending 
hand-written letters, asking friends in Korea ‘Send me more [K-pop stuff].’ 
Compared to now where we can totally have a free access to get to K-pop.  
 
 YouTube has been referred to as the most important platform for K-pop content to 
cross the borders and to be consumed by international fans (KOCIS, 2012). However, I 
argue that other social media platforms and online sites are equally as important as 
 102 
YouTube for the digitally connected transcultural fans in the US. They are not mutually 
exclusive, but symbiotic, and work for different purposes. KIG members, including my 
informants, seemed well equipped with digital devices such as smartphones, laptops, 
high-speed Internet, etc. My informants and I would sometimes visit each other’s homes 
to watch K-pop-related videos or the end-of-the-year performances on a big screen 
television. When watching K-pop music videos or other K-pop-related videos, my 
informants often use YouTube. When posting and sharing their fanart work, they often 
use Instagram or Tumblr. To follow and get updates of the most up-to-date photos taken 
by fansite masters19, they visit Twitter. When consuming daily news about K-pop, they 
use Facebook as well as other social media platforms and online sites. When looking for 
more in-depth information about the history of K-pop groups, to learn more about certain 
words and phrases K-pop idols use, and to know more about the companies their idol 
groups belong to, they go to Google and Wikipedia. 
 
J.C.: Wikipedia is huge. Most of the time, it’s Wikipedia. Even though people 
say Wikipedia is not reliable because other people can edit it but for the most 
part, it’s very accurate from what I’ve seen. That’s kind of a person I am. I am 
very knowledge-driven, knowledge-hungry. I want to know about things. I’d see 
                                                 
19Fansite masters (or homepage masters as known as homma in Korean) are one of the unique parts of the 
K-pop fandom culture. They are very well-known among the fandom and the idols themselves and are 
extremely dedicated to their idol group/member. They follow their idols’ official schedule and take 
extremely high quality photos, often even better than official merchandise. Fansite masters share their 
photos on their Twitter account, and they have as many as 400,000 followers. A lot of new fans are drawn 
to the idol group/member due to these images spread online.  
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them talking about this, or I’d hear them talking about this, and I’d be like ‘Oh, 
let me Google that’ because I want to know what it is. 
 
TinTin: Right now I’d say between Tumblr and Twitter [are the ones I use the 
most]. They are very informative. YouTube is where I go to for where I know 
what I’m looking for. YouTube is a final one [when I am like] ‘Okay, I want to 
watch this music video.’ 
 
Iliana: When I was into [Japanese] anime, I didn’t talk to anybody on the Internet 
at all about anime but then when I got into K-pop, there were so many people 
who would comment on my stuff [Iliana posts her fanart—drawings dedicated to 
K-pop idols—on her social media accounts and shares with other fans (see figure 
4)] and then we end up having a conversation. 
 
 
Figure 4: Example of Fanart      
(Photo Credit: Iliana) 
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Appadurai (1991) once predicted that the unprecedented flow of media, culture, 
economy, and people in the deterritorialized world would create certain disjunctures. 
Although global social media and its open access have facilitated unprecedented cultural 
exchange, they have simultaneously facilitated cross-cultural misunderstanding: the 
disjunctures. In the era of globalization, a disjunctive moment occurs in the transnational 
flow of culture. Culture, distributed by global social media, facilitates the invisible 
moment and thus creates superficial understanding because the Internet is limited in how 
it provides embodied experiences of each culture (Oh, 2015b). Complex modern histories 
and intricate layers of ethnic identity configurations in both Korea and the US are often 
made invisible—as I examined in the earlier section on cultural appropriation—by the 
incessant flow of information on the Internet and social media. In this vein, the fact that 
U.S. audiences can easily access K-pop anywhere and anytime via social media and 
search Korea on the Internet does not necessarily mean that they are aware of Korea’s 
complex modern history and the intricate configurations of racial, ethnic, and national 
identities since the colonial era (Oh, 2015b).  
 Although global social media potentially enables increased access to foreign 
cultures, its immediate nature creates limited—somewhat superficial—ways of knowing 
for international audiences (Ess, 2009). In the era of global social media, gathering 
information is easy. However, with the lack of embodied experiences to create direct 
context with another culture and with the lack of historical understanding of each other, 
embodying deeper knowledge demands a considerable investment of time and effort. 
 105 
Although social media opens a wide range of opportunities to access a foreign culture, 
the only thing it can offer is a mediated experience, the incomplete fracture of mediated 
pictures over a screen. Disjuncture and cross-cultural misunderstanding occur in a 
transcultural flow due to the lack of time and effort invested, including disembodied 
experiences, language barrier, and the dearth of understanding the sociohistorical 
specificities of foreign cultures.  
 Among the various layers of disjunctures, the language barrier—a lack of 
understanding of the Korean language—seems to be a substantial limitation to gain 
deeper knowledge. For instance, whereas agents in Japanese global popular culture, 
manga (comic books) and anime (animation), are not human, agents in Korean popular 
culture explicitly embody bodily, racial, and ethnic visibility as live humans. K-pop idols 
and actors in K-dramas are real humans, and therefore, their interaction on TV variety 
and reality shows is relatively less scripted and more interactive, demanding higher 
proficiency in the language. This gives U.S. fans of Korean popular culture a limited 
embodied knowledge, understanding, and experience. Although my informants seemed 
careful to not generalize and believe everything they see on social media, there were 
instances where misunderstandings occurred for their lack of understanding of the 
Korean language. When those disjunctive moments occurred, they often asked me via 
Kakao (a Korean messaging app) or in person. Leoy once shared her personal worry that 
her passion for Korean culture might look superficial because of her lack of 
understanding of the Korean language. 
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Leoy: I don’t feel like I get to experience the full intensity of Korean culture. I 
don’t feel like I get as authentic as experience without the language. You don’t 
get to experience unless you learn the language instead of having somebody 
telling me it’s this, this, and this. I’d like to experience fully so that I can come to 
my own conclusions. You find camaraderie when you find someone who speaks 
the same language as you and you are able to communicate. It’s more personal, 
it’s more real human interaction. I like that human interaction aspect of it.  
 
Anya, a mother of two children, and J.C. also shared similar feelings: 
 
Anya: The language barrier is a huge issue for me. It’s one of the many reasons 
we [she and her children] started taking Korean lessons to better understand the 
songs, lyrics. It [learning a foreign language] doesn’t come to me as easy as it 
used to. I hope they [translators] translate it decently... Even if it is not well 
subbed, at least it gives me the idea of what they are doing. Also, you can watch 
people’s body language, tone of the voice. It is too frustrating to not understand 
the bulk of it. But at the same time, I don’t want to be one of those Americans 
who expect everything to be in English.  
 
J.C.: I want to learn the language because it’d be nice to know exactly what 
they’re saying without having to Google. 
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Nevertheless, transcultural fans understand and deploy the objects or texts of 
another culture through the means they have at their disposal within their own contexts: 
the centrality of locality (Choi & Maliangkay, 2015). Even though Korean Wave is 
inextricably tied to the people, culture, economy, policy, and politics of Korea, the 
primary site of concern for non-Korean fans is their own locality and its cultural milieus 
(Choi & Maliankay, 2015). As media increasingly becomes implicated in intensifying 
patterns of distribution and dissemination through digital media, I find that these 
convergent transcultural contexts are becoming increasingly global in scope: for example, 
the use of K-pop vernacular words like oppa, maknae, hwaiting, etc. The need for greater 
local contextualization of the complexity of social media and transcultural media and fans 
is a valuable contribution to the existing literature of global media studies. I argue that 
any consideration of the ways in which the chaotic forces of globalization play out in a 
fandom should proceed from our informed understanding of fan behaviors, motivations, 
and meaning-making processes driven by affective pleasures and investments.  
3. EMOTIONAL PROXIMITY IN TRANSCULTURAL KOREAN POPULAR 
CULTRUE 
Korean entertainment industries indulge themselves in maximization of profit by 
exporting their products to the largest number of audiences possible, which is seen as a 
capitalistic strategy justified in the name of national interest. Some (Kang, 2015; Lie, 
2012) argue that Korean popular culture is mainly about profit-driven commodities and a 
national-institutional campaign. I see such an argument as problematic for it neglects a 
critical fact: Korean Wave is profoundly dependent on overseas fans. Also, the political-
 108 
economic-driven approach downplays deeper sociocultural and political implications that 
transcultural media and fans generate.  
The mechanisms of the pleasure (Ang, 1996) American fans find in Korean 
popular culture should be taken seriously. As commercial industrial products, producers 
have to have certain ideas of what the audience will find pleasurable, so that they can 
attract consumers and make profits. The strategy that producers of modern popular 
culture employ is directed at the elaboration of what they already know about popular 
pleasure. In the U.S. context, what Korean popular culture seems to be particularly good 
at is skillfully formulating and constructing this capitalist-driven strategy of hybridity to 
arouse a feeling of nostalgia: what I call emotional proximity.  
Hills (2002), borrowing Paul Willis’s (1978) theory of cultural homology as a 
means of discussing the symbolic fit between the values and lifestyles of a group, argued 
that the idea of this symbolic fit to analyze the transcultural affinities of self-identified 
Western and Japanese otaku (obsessive fan) who share a common devaluation as fans 
within their own popular cultural contexts that both operates through and exceeds nation-
states. Chin and Morimoto (2013) also argued that transnational fan orientation may at 
times supersede national, regional, and/or geographical boundaries. This concept frees 
fandoms from the constraints of national belonging, reinforcing our contention that fans 
become fans of transcultural texts or objects not necessarily because of where they are 
from, but because they may recognize a subjective moment of emotional proximity 
regardless of origin. This is not to say that the nation is unimportant; national identity is 
still an important layer of identity for most people. But it is one of a constellation of 
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possible points of emotional proximity upon which transcultural fandom may be 
predicated. Nation-based differences or similarities may well appeal to people across 
borders for being exotic, foreign, and new, but so might other affective investments in 
popular cultural texts such as characters, histories, language, and the presentation of 
interpersonal interaction (Chin & Morimoto, 2013).  
This analysis was also found in my study. Rosalie, a dearly devoted fan of all 
things Korean, once told me, “I’m shy to say I like K-pop because I’m afraid that other 
people might judge me.” Members of KIG have expressed how they have to explain their 
love and interest in Korean popular culture to earn justification from other people in the 
US. It is in this process that U.S. fans of Korean Wave constantly negotiate with their 
identity and form multiple identities that are always inherently dynamic in the realm of 
transcultural fandom. It is not an abandonment of their nation but an encouragement to 
revisit their nation in a new direction.  
Soft power, as a descriptive concept, encompasses multiple facets as discussed in 
theoretical terms in Chapter Two. The way Korean Wave exerts soft power in 
international contexts differs from the way historically imperialist countries do20; Korean 
popular culture is seen as less threatening in the eye of the beholder because Korea 
historically has never invaded or colonized any other countries (Hong, 2014). As I 
                                                 
20There is a growing literature on the soft power of emerging cultural, economic, and media powers—
known as BRICS—which consists of five countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(Straubhaar, 2015). However, my dissertation mainly focuses on the case of Korean popular culture. 
According to Jin (2016), Korea has become one of the top non-Western countries that meaningfully exports 
almost all forms of its culture, such as television programs, film, popular music, animation, digital 
technologies including online gaming and smartphones—not only as technology but also as culture—to 
both Western and non-Western countries. There have been several countries that have penetrated the global 
markets with their cultural products, but they primarily export limited cultural forms. 
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examined earlier in Chapter Two, because Korea has been considered an in-between 
‘semi-periphery’ (Ryoo, 2009) on the global sphere, Korean Wave can find a niche and 
reposition itself as a cultural mediator in the midst of global cultural transformation that 
leads it to a ‘sub-Empire’ (Chen, 2000) status. In the realm of global popular culture, 
especially in Hollywood, the major players have been Caucasian with some 
Black/African American figures. Asian performers have seldom become major players 
with very few exceptions. Hogarth (2013) views Korean Wave as a reaction and a 
challenge to Western-dominated global popular culture. K-pop and K-drama have distinct 
Asian physical features no matter how hybridized they are. Joseph, a fan of Korean food 
and K-drama in his early 30s, thinks that although Korean popular culture has American 
influences, it is still distinctively Korean in terms of having Asian physical features and 
dramas reflecting traditional Asian values and ethos. He states in this regard: 
 
Joseph: When I look at Korean popular culture, even though they have a lot of 
American influences to get it going, they made it their own. It’s theirs, it’s not 
ours. The way they do it and their passions come from their culture.  
 
K-dramas reflect traditional Asian values and ethos, which makes Asian 
audiences feel culturally proximate and some Western audiences feel emotionally 
proximate. The Korean Wave fills a large demand (Jin, 2016) and void (Anderson & 
Shim, 2015) for audiences of both the East and the West that were desperately waiting for 
clean-cut, non-aggressive, and less sexualized content. Binzy, a second-generation South 
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Asian American, expressed how she perceives herself as neither 100 percent South Asian 
nor American. She struggled as she sometimes found both American and Indian culture 
unrelatable. Then she found K-pop and other facets of Korean popular culture that are 
Asian but not too Asian, which made her feel more comfortable:  
 
Binzy: For me, it’s like the combination of being raised as South Asian and also 
American mentality. That’s why I say I’m more American because I’m very more 
toward open-minded, accepting, so for me, Korean culture is like a nice 
combination of both.   
 
The Korean Wave works as a mediator not only in Asia, but also in the West. In 
other words, the Korean Wave brings American people with different 
racial/ethnic/social/cultural backgrounds together by creating shared emotional 
proximity. As I explained in Chapter Two, the way fans—in this case, Americans—find 
certain foreign popular cultures—in this case, Korean—attractive and pleasurable lies in 
their previous experience (Ang, 1985, 1996; Hills, 2002). The carefully structured way of 
touching and arousing a certain feeling of affinity with highly modernized and hybridized 
looks can be understood as what I call emotional proximity, another layer of Straubhaar’s 
(1991) cultural proximity theory. It has been known that Korean popular culture reflects 
the traditional Asian values and ethos, which makes Asian audiences feel culturally 
proximate (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008; Hogarth, 2013; Shim, 2006). What is interesting is 
that its skillfully structured layers of hybridity comfortably appeal to Western audiences, 
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associated with a notion of appreciation, not exoticization. It works as a mediator not 
only within the East, but also in the West by filling a large demand and void (Jin, 2016) 
for audiences who were looking for clean-cut, non-aggressive, less sexualized, and 
wholesome content.  
The skillfully hybridized Korean media texts provoke a certain emotional 
proximity among Americans, which also ironically encourages them to rediscover their 
own identity and culture. What one perceives and feels as more culturally proximate does 
not necessarily relate to their linguistic or geographical proximity and nationality.  
 
Rosalie: [I prefer K-pop than American pop music because] I think it has 
different feel to it, and I can relate to their music more. The feeling is different. 
Korean culture is different [as opposed to American culture]... K-pop artists are 
great performers making audience feel what you’re trying to portray. Off stage, 
they are cute and polite, even the rappers. But here in the States, they’re just the 
same person on and off stage. They [Korean popular culture and K-pop artists] 
seem more authentic to me.   
 
The transcultural fans of Korean Wave in the US that I have interacted with for 
over two years have identified their interest, passion, support, and love for Korean 
popular culture not as exoticization—looking upon the East with a postcolonial gaze and 
constructing it as curious and bizarre—but as appreciation and as something their culture 
can learn from.  
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Leoy: If you are going to appreciate anything from any culture that’s not yours, 
please be at least slightly conscious of the culture from which it is coming from. 
You gain an appreciation for the culture not just the material. The lack of 
conscious—I don’t even know how to say it. People need to try a little bit harder 
to understand where the things they are consuming come from. This entitled 
mentality of ‘I get to consume your goods without any consideration’… It’s this 
level of entitlement like ‘I deserve to consume your goods but I don’t have to 
give anything back. I don’t have to put any effort to understand where you are 
coming from.’ There are a lot of people who might just go into listening to K-pop 
or whatever without trying at all to learn about where the music is coming from 
and that endangers cultural appropriation. It could be like fetishization. That has 
to be careful. It has nothing to do with culture or the people who are producing it. 
It’s just the fact that it’s exotic. It worries me that people who don’t bother to 
appreciate K-pop or whatever [K-culture] anymore than just surface level. 
 
Whereas the Japanese industry consciously made it “culturally odorless”—
making products that are not distinctively Japanese—in an effort to universalize products 
(Iwabuchi, 2002), the Korean Wave emphasizes a hybridity of formats with localized 
content and appeal (Jin, 2016; Ryoo, 2009), maintaining the cultural specificity or 
Korean-ness of the content. Unlike Japanese animations and comic books, K-pop and K-
drama possess explicit cultural odor in terms of the agents who are associated with the 
 114 
country’s bodily, racial, and ethnic characteristics. In other words, the people in Korean 
media represent physical human features of the people of the country of origin as well as 
images of its nation, and these agents with Korean ethnicity physically appeal to 
international audiences, which have come to appreciate them. The transcultural fans’ 
reception of Korean popular culture, not as exoticization but as appreciation, may help 
break certain stereotypes constructed toward East Asians, especially men. 
 
Rosalie: Asian men in K-pop and K-drama are portrayed as real people as 
opposed to how they are portrayed in American media. They are not type-casted 
into these roles that perpetrate false stereotypes. I hate how American media 
portray people with color in certain stereotypical ways. It’s hard for me to watch 
American TV sometimes because I know it’s not true. American mainstream 
media is so white-centric mindset. We’re still trying to keep people in this box 
because that’s who is filling the bill. Who has the money… That’s what content 
is getting served… Keeping people out of ignorance, reinforcing the stereotypes.  
 
Angie, a fan of K-drama, shares her thoughts in a similar vein. She thinks that watching 
K-drama has helped her break the stereotypes she had toward East Asian men, which 
were perpetuated by mainstream media in the US. In the mainstream U.S. media, the 
portrayals of non-Whites are structured in ways that support its dominant ideological 
power—heterosexual, White, middle-class men (Chambers, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Oh, 
2015b). 
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Angie: Before I watched Korean dramas, I did not tend to find Asian men super 
attractive. [Me: why?] I know exactly why that is: media exposure. We don’t 
have attractive Asian men in our media, and the ones we do have are typically 
nerdy and thin like a smart tech guy. I think that in American culture, it’s 
structured in such a way that it benefits White men. White men can make Asian 
men not as attractive by being like ‘Oh they are so feminine,’ and that bears out 
in our media. So when I started watching Korean dramas, I was like ‘hol* sh**.’ 
 
Leoy: Asian males are just not presented anything other than nerd, sidekick, or 
parody in America. We have no Asian male leads in films or TVs at all. That 
increases the lack of exposure people get because in our American, Western pop 
culture, there is so very little Asian portrayal as attractive. There is so very little 
Asian portrayal at all. Institutionalized soft racism. It’s not aggressive. It’s just 
there and nobody breaks the status quo.  
 
The popularity of Korean popular culture among Americans is bound to have 
social, cultural, and political ramifications. I contend that American fans—both non-
White and White—find this very complex layer of hybridity in conjunction with the 
polished and modernized look in Korean popular culture comfortably appealing, 
associating it with a notion of appreciation, not exoticization (Said, 1978), to an extent 
that they may consider the people in Korean popular culture as a third race. This debunks 
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the dichotomous logic of race and gender structured in the West and the prevalent 
stereotypes of Asians portrayed in American mainstream media. In this vein, the 
popularity of Korean Wave among White deeply “messes with” (Choi & Maliangkay, 
2015) long-held racial and colonial superiority and imperialism, theoretical concepts 
explicated earlier in Chapter Two, driven by Western modernization in the global sphere.  
All modern cultures are hybrid to some extent, thus, hybridity cannot be the sole 
attribution of Korean Wave’s popularity in the United States. Interestingly, the well-
received hybridity of Korean Wave may reflect Kraidy’s (2002) theory of intercontextual 
hybridity, examining the dynamics of transnational culture by articulating hybridity and 
hegemony at the nexus of global and local. The favorable reception of Korean Wave 
shows what Americans have been missing in their own media. One of my close 
informants, Anya who is a mother of two children, expresses her thoughts: 
  
Anya: What has become reality in America, especially with the aggressiveness 
and violence, is just too exhausting. It wasn’t like that when I was growing up, 
but that is everywhere now. It just gets worse and worse. And I find it much 
more appealing that in Korean culture, it doesn’t seem to be accepted. I 
appreciate that they make the effort to put this out as something to be emulated, 
encouraged, and followed. They are glorifying good behavior. I think that they 
are pretty genuine to who they are. They are not trying to be shocking, and they 
are very sweet. And that is more appealing.  
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TinTin: It’s very similar to Black/African American culture too. ‘Hey brother 
what’s up. Hey sister what’s up’ [to someone] we may not know. It’s very polite. 
I think it’s polite to me this is older woman you may not know but you call her 
ahjumma21. I like that. I like that a lot. It shows a very close culture, and I love 
that. That’s like what really highlights Korean culture for me—how close it is to 
African American culture. There is no rudeness. That’s one of the things that 
kept me there... The kindness is still there because there is not enough of that in 
the world. In the US, there is not enough of kindness really. Individualistic. Only 
care about myself, my family. I need this for me. I don’t see that in K-drama.  
 
The complex level of hybridity in Korean popular culture reflects the argument 
that hybridity ironically encourages local people to revisit and rediscover what they have 
neglected or forgotten (Kraidy, 2002; Ryoo, 2009). The high level of hybridity in Korean 
popular culture arouses emotional proximity among not only Asian audiences but also 
American audiences to help them realize what they have been missing in their relentless 
drive toward modernization and capitalization during the past several decades: the woori-
ness (we-ness in English). This simultaneously complex yet fluid hybridity and emotional 
proximity embedded in Korean popular culture, I argue, transforms into one of the 
multifaceted soft power, which appeals to U.S. fans.  
 
                                                 
21An intimate (sometimes, not always, depending on the context) Korean word to refer to a married or 
marriage-aged woman who is not actually related to a family. 
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4. SOFT POWER OF TRANSCULTURAL KOREAN POPULAR CULTURE 
4.1 Woori-ness as Alternative-Post-Western Soft Power 
It might be argued that soft power is just another implicit method of imperialism 
(Schiller, 1991) or propaganda because power relationships in globalization often remain 
highly unequal (Appadurai, 2016). While I agree with much of this assessment, it can 
also be seen as overly simplistic for neglecting sociohistorical factors that are always 
complex-and-context-bound. Soft power is not equivalent to propaganda, but it is related. 
It, however, differs from propaganda in that it puts human interaction up front and its 
core agent is the interactive public (Snow, 2012). Unlike propaganda, which retains a 
negative connotation in democratic societies, cultural diplomacy has elicited less 
controversy as it is perceived to be a more persuasive instrument of foreign policy, one 
that is not coercive but soft, and one which is conducted by states in conjunction with 
private actors as well as civil society groups (Nye, 2011).  
 I acknowledge that soft power is often overshadowed by hard power, such as 
military and economic power, in international relations and world politics. However, an 
important fact is that the public, not necessarily state-related agents, can be a source of 
soft power by allowing them to form their own resources distinct from or even against 
official policy in pursuit of the public good. There is a particular notion that can be 
associated with the Korean Wave phenomenon: the woori-ness (meaning we-ness in 
English), which signifies the unity of a collective mindset. I argue that this unique Korean 
notion of woori-ness, which is deeply embedded in Korean popular culture, can be traced 
back to the historical formation and building of the nation and the people of Korea. The 
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notion of imagined communities of nation-state (Anderson, 1983) may apply to both 
Korea and the United States. However, Korea followed a different path from the way 
America’s nation-state arose originally (Ryoo, 2004). Korea’s long history going back 
thousands of years, national unification, and relatively homogeneous ethnicity have been 
the fundamental means of survival throughout various historical phases—
industrialization, modernization, democratization, and globalization. Korean history from 
the Koryo Kingdom (918-1392) throughout the modern era, such as its geographical 
location surrounded by powerful nations, the Korean War, and military dictatorship, has 
created this mythical norm that only by being together as one can we survive (Ryoo, 
2004). Therefore, Korea’s woori-ness, at the expense of individualism, was a way of 
surviving and it brought Korea to its status as a semi-global power and sub-Empire 
(Chen, 2000) in the 21
st
 century.  
If people’s sense of collective identities and attachment to their communities are 
understood as real, historical, and widely shared and are combined with their collective 
memories and lived experience, then the community differs from being an invented or 
imagined political community as Anderson (1983) once theorized. Whereas Anderson’s 
main point focuses on the invented or imagined nation and nationalism through the 
enacted shared experiences of mass mediation, Schlesinger (1991) emphasizes the 
importance of history: “history actually works behind their backs as the real transformer 
of the world” (p. 163). This does not minimize the cultural or ideological aspects of the 
national experience, but rather, Schlesinger attempts to distinguish the view of ideology 
as a structure of lived experience from the view of ideology as mere false consciousness. 
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National identity, which is different from nationalism, may be in place once the political 
boundaries of the nation-state have been achieved and can be understood in its more 
affirmative and constructive sense without necessarily embracing nationalism. Imagined 
nation and community legitimizes oppressive state power and conceals structural social 
injustice in order to sustain the traditional national culture supported by cultural 
imperialism. In contrast, national identity must merge with democracy. Ignatieff (1994) 
supports this idea: 
The only reliable antidote to ethnic nationalism turns out to be civic nationalism, 
because the only guarantee that ethnic groups will live side by side in peace is 
shared loyalty to a state. The cure for the ills of nationalism is no longer the 
chimera of internationalism, therefore. It can only be a different sort of 
nationalism (pp. 100-102).  
Nationalism per se is not the problem; the real problem is the kind of nation 
(Ignatieff, 1994; Narin, 1995). The concept of an imagined community simply cannot be 
directly applied to the people of Korea and the case of Korean nationalism. The two 
Koreas—one ethnic populace but two states (South and North) on the same peninsula—
reflect a historical formation different from the one proposed by Anderson. According to 
Kang (1999), the Korean populace continued as a national unity, and even today’s 
political situation of divided Koreas is relatively insignificant from the perspective of 
Korea’s 5,000-year-long history. Korea has greatly suffered due to its geographical 
proximity to formidable countries.  
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Ryoo (2004) argues that what provided security to Korea was not the 
geographical location, but the idea of unified ethnicity. As a culturally homogenous 
population in a relatively small area surrounded by more powerful countries and 
societies, Koreans have managed to sustain their cultural and national identity. First, in 
the face of China, then the brutal Japanese colonial period, followed by the powerful 
influences of Americanization, Koreans have remained whole by preserving a distinctive 
Korean identity. In spite of continuous attacks from neighboring countries, factional 
politics of the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1909), and corrupted contemporary Korean 
politics, Korea as a culture and people survived a long history through shared lived 
experiences rather than just imagined (Steinberg, 2002). Choi (1996) contends that civic 
nationalism helps harmonize democratic and peaceful impulses and can be an alternative 
path to national unity for Koreans who suffered the most extreme violence of the Korean 
War. These notions of civil nation and nationalism offer an alternative path to sustain 
nation and nationalism while minimizing the dangerous risks of ethno-nationalism (Ryoo, 
2004).  
The formation and building of Korea’s nation-state followed a different path than 
the United States. First, the formation of the Korean nation and its collective identity is 
the result of a truly long history. The history of clear geographical and economic 
boundaries, homogeneous ethnicity, common language, and a dynastic system in place 
since the unification of Shilla (57 B.C.-A.D. 935), Koguryo (36 B.C.-A.D. 668), and 
Baekche (18 B.C.-A.D. 660) has formed a real, comprehensive identity, including the 
experience of inter-regional conflicts and foreign invasion (Park, 1996). Second, Korean 
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nationalism, unlike that in the U.S., is mainly characterized by anti-dictatorial movements 
that criticized military governments. Throughout the struggle for democracy, national 
unification—woori-ness, the one-ness—has been a symbol for democracy (Jang, 1999). 
The relatively unified picture of Korean-ness was formed in specific historical and 
geographical conditions; its unique notion of woori-ness was formed before specific 
national communities were imagined or modern forms of nation-states emerged (Ryoo, 
2004). 
Whereas the form of the Korean Wave is highly hybridized and transnational, the 
driving force behind it, ironically, is homogeneous and unified. Miranda, who is in her 
late teens, once told me that people are so divided in the US by race whereas in Korea, it 
is, seemingly, just one. Greyson, Joseph, and Rosalie share their thoughts: 
 
Greyson: On a grand scale, Korea as a whole, it is a tight knit country because 
[of Korea’s unique together woori-ness] whereas in the US, everything is 
extremely individualized.  
 
Joseph: In Korean popular culture, they have strong roots and they have pride in 
their culture. They are proud of who they are. We [Americans] are proud of 
ourselves but not so much at national level. We’ve got some [historical] roots but 
it’s relatively short compared to Korea.  
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Rosalie: This [woori-ness] is the driving force behind all the success and today’s 
global phenomenon of Korean pop culture. And they are not selfish about it 
either. I was watching Korean news one day and they are helping other countries. 
Korea is like the second country in the world sending out aids to other countries. 
Korean culture is very much about community and collective society as ‘we are 
one’… It’s not we, it’s I; it’s my house, it’s not woori [our] house as in Korean. 
And that mindset is one of the main reasons why Korea went from being one of 
the poorest countries in the world [during and after the Korean War] to what it is 
today in such a short time. There is no way that if we [America] had gone 
through something like that, we wouldn’t be there in the same amount of time 
because everyone is for themselves and not for each other.  
  
One of the unique K-pop traits American fans identify with and enjoy is what I 
term playful hierarchical relationships derived from Korea’s woori-ness; there is a 
specific position attributed to each member based on age in most K-pop idol groups, such 
as leader (usually the oldest member in a group) and maknae (the youngest member in a 
group). The notion of age difference is socio-culturally less important in the US where 
fundamental individualism dominates; in Korea, it is one of the most important aspects. 
Korea’s age-sensitive culture creates a rigid hierarchy yet also creates a feeling of 
collective integrity that it is we, not I. This top-down hierarchical relationship based on 
age becomes a playful and admirable element for American fans, working as a soft 
power. For example, some of the female informants and members of KIG, who are 
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younger than me, would sometimes call me unni (a respectful and intimate Korean word 
used by females to call older females) to play with the hierarchical relationship based on 
age while wanting to share a feeling of intimacy. When watching K-pop-related videos 
on YouTube or browsing K-pop-related media texts on social media, members of KIG 
would often say something like “maknae on top” to refer to the youngest member of a K-
pop group who dare to talk to his hyung (a respectful and intimate Korean word used by 
males to call older males) or her unni impolitely.  
American fans are drawn to the Korean Wave and find Korea’s unique cultural 
aspect of woori-ness as a path to globalization fascinating. Fans of the Korean Wave in 
the US find a strong sense of community and belonging—the woori-ness—in which they 
have been missing out in lieu of glorifying other things. They are not abandoning their 
American nationhood and national identity, but rather acknowledging and embracing the 
lost sense of community through their interaction with Korean popular culture. For 
example, Anya says:  
 
Anya: [What Americans are used to is] just the most horrible, sexually assaulting 
things. It makes me feel like I’m losing my country, and I’m looking for other 
cultures that are doing this better. They [K-pop artists] are championing the good 
behavior [that is] modest, kind, and considerate. People could say that K-pop and 
the K-culture is just sort of an escape from reality. But I think it’s also its own 
reality chosen to be promoted that’s more positive and modest. There is a 
different level of integrity that I don’t find in my American culture... That is what 
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I like about the behind the scenes [of K-pop reality shows]. They are not trying to 
be shocking, they are very sweet, and that is more appealing… As long as there 
is something that’s been released for the public, this is the image their company 
wants to portray, I totally know that. But I appreciate that they [Korean popular 
culture] make the effort to put this out as something to be emulated, encouraged, 
and followed. 
 
Glorifying good behavior of modest, humble kindness in conjunction with woori-
ness of communal mindset portrayed in Korean popular culture works as one of the 
multilayered facets of soft power in the Korean Wave. American fans of Korean popular 
culture appreciate this woori-ness in Korean culture because they feel that they are being 
acknowledged and respected by their beloved stars.  
 
Iliana: Also, idols [singers, artists] in America don’t have enough shame I think. 
In Korea, they are very—it seems like—they care a lot about honors, so there is 
not a lot about scandals. It’s usually dating scandals but that’s about it [which 
wouldn’t be a scandal here in America]. They are very respectful over there. 
They care about their actions to us fans, us looking up to them... I love the 
friendliness. 
 
TinTin: They’re just so humble, so talented. When it comes to American culture, 
you don’t see a lot of rappers realize the reason why you are there today is 
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because of your fans... Some people are like ‘why do you like K-pop so much?’ 
because they are so humble. They are still realizing ‘I’m not in this position 
today like if it wasn’t for you, I wouldn’t be here… Every single concert, every 
single V app22 they do, every single social event they do, they always say ‘we’re 
here for you guys. You guys are the reason why we are here.’ I am being 
acknowledged, and that’s what I love... The reason why [I like Korean culture] is 
because it’s a culture that seems so proud of everything. It’s on a level that I 
almost want to be a part of it. For my own culture, my own being here in 
America... We are not together. We don’t have that togetherness culture. But in 
the Korean culture, I can see that. I can see that people saying like ‘We will do 
this. We will fight this. We are going to stand together. We are going to do this 
together.’ [Me: like the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye?] Yeah, 
exactly. Everything that was going on with that was like wow, this country 
literally came together and just said ‘No, no, no, this is not right. This is not how 
we do things here’… I thought that was very refreshing, very refreshing to see 
that there’s still a place out there that does that. That’s why I’m like ‘I want to be 
a part of it.’ I want to be into that [the togetherness of it]. 
 
Rosalie expressed her fascination with woori-ness: 
 
                                                 
22A social media application that lets us watch the personal broadcasting videos of Korean stars. 
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Rosalie: The togetherness [woori-ness] of Korea and its [popular] culture is not 
ethnocentric because they are not saying this is better than yours. They are like 
‘We’re all together in building up a better future for all of us, not just some of us. 
[Korea’s woori-ness, its nationalism] is not ethnocentric because they are not 
saying ‘We’re better than you’ but ‘We work together to make something better.’ 
 
The Korean Wave is not reinforcing another facet of ethnocentric imperialism, 
but is suggesting a different kind of nationalism and modernity in the name of woori-ness 
as three actors collaborate together: state, market, and people. Even the artists and stars 
often claim themselves to be an “entertainment-diplomatic complex” (Kim, 2013) and are 
considered the most treasured national assets. Unlike the typically heterogeneous U.S. 
experience, the Korean nation-state and cultural/national identity are made tangible 
because they are negotiated, shared, and articulated by the more homogenous people as a 
means to survive for nearly 5,000 years (Ryoo, 2004). National unification—the woori-
ness—at the expense of silencing individuals’ freedom has been a symbol for democracy 
in Korea in contrast to the individuals’ freedom and diversity in the United States. This 
national and cultural feeling of woori-ness is infused throughout Korean popular culture.  
 
Leoy: So much of what makes K-pop great is its Korean-ness. Even if you took 
the same beat and tried to make the same songs in America, they wouldn’t be the 
same. There is something about the way that—this music is produced and the 
members of the groups how they interact with their fans and everything—carries 
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distinctively Korean feel. There is a lot of Western music taken at best 
inspiration and at worst copies. What turns into K-pop, I mean K-pop in and of 
itself is Korean. It comes from Korea.  
 
Theia: I honestly have to believe that the popularity of the Korean Wave in the 
world has a lot to do with their pride in their nation as a whole. There is a unity 
there. It definitely helps to promote the culture and the country. Korean people 
take pride in the Korean Wave phenomenon. That’s definitely the fantasy world 
you just have to believe. 
 
I argue that this relatively coherent woori-ness can be seen as one of the 
multifaceted layers of soft power in the eyes of non-Koreans, especially in Western 
societies where national unification and sacrifice have been relatively silenced for the 
sake of individual freedom. It is important to remark that although soft power can only be 
made possible with substantial hard economic power, it is not always guaranteed. This is 
where Korea’s woori-ness, derived from its historical position of in-between ‘semi-
periphery,’ comes in, working as an alternative post-Western soft power in international 
settings.  
4.2 Woori-ness in Transcultural Fandoms 
The woori-ness embedded in Korean popular culture spills over to the fans in the 
US who also get to experience the feeling of woori-ness through Korean popular culture, 
and most of all, through its unique fandom culture. The rise of idol culture in the Korean 
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cultural industry is closely bound with the construction of idol fandom, creating the needs 
for fans—the loyal customers—instead of satisfying and targeting the larger audience. 
Hence, the idol fandom is involved as a part of the idol group production system (Kim, 
2015b). The everyday involvement, participation, and communication between fans and 
idols is much more interactive and close than American celebrity/fandom culture (Kim, 
2015b).  
Fiske (1992) contended that “there is a constant struggle between fans and the 
industry, in which the industry attempts to incorporate the tastes of the fans, and the fans 
to ‘excorporate’ the products of the industry” (p. 47). Fiske’s idea does not apply to the 
case of K-pop (Kim, 2015a). There is more collaboration/negotiation than 
struggle/tension between the industry and fans, and the management companies make 
efforts to stay on good terms with K-pop fans, treating them as adjunct producers (Choi 
& Maliangkay, 2015). Fans’ collective participatory activities via online sites and social 
media have had important influences on the formation of the K-pop idol industry and the 
closer relationship between K-pop idols and their fans in Korean society (Jung, 2012; 
Kim, 2015b). For example, fans have significant power in choosing which K-pop idol 
trainees get to debut as a K-pop idol group via online voting, and they sometimes will 
remove a member from his/her group for being involved in a scandal. K-pop idol fans 
often construct their idols’ public image through donations and other philanthropic 
activities (Kim, 2015b). The interpersonal relationship between idol and fan is more 
interdependent and symbiotic than in the U.S. musical fandom scene.  
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Leoy: Honestly, I think that everybody would be happier if they lived their fan 
life the way Koreans, and fans of Korean music in particular, live theirs. I think it 
does have to do with the sort of “we culture” in Korea versus “me culture” in 
America. I think that not everybody in America needs other people to be a part of 
their enjoyment of something they enjoy. Especially with K-pop, I get so much 
more out of it when I get to enjoy it with other people, and I don’t feel like 
Americans have the same idea… Because I feel the K-pop artists make an effort 
to make us [fans] feel closer to them… The concept of being connected because 
they are more thankful. I think that’s a very genuine response. I think there is 
mutually beneficial nature to K-pop artists and fandoms.  
 
This woori-ness bears out in K-pop fandoms in the US as well. K-pop fans in the 
US are from different backgrounds, but they all come together. They exercise and 
experience the very notion of woori-ness of Korean culture on their own throughout their 
reception of K-pop. When talking about K-pop, the members of KIG often expressed 
how they feel much more connected to their idols, fandom culture, and the overall K-pop 
world. When my informants first got into K-pop, they were impressed and fascinated by 
how multicultural K-pop fans are in the US. 
 
Iliana: K-pop has opened so many different cultures, like you meet so many 
different people and cultures through K-pop... When I went to my first K-pop 
concert, after the concert I had this whole conversation with this girl from 
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Germany. And we talked more after that. I met so many people. Korea is very 
based on being with people. Americans are very independent, but Koreans seem 
to be a lot more like woori [we]. The friendliness of everyone in Korean culture 
like the idols are very friendly with the fans, the people are very friendly with 
each other. 
 
Tiffany: It feels so unified when I am at K-pop concerts vs. American concerts. 
That’s why I was saying before how age and ethnicity doesn’t matter. When you 
are at the show, you are all together, you’re all there to talking about your 
biases23, you’re all there to literally enjoy what you’re about to see... K-pop fans 
in Korea are really united. They come up with their fan group name, fan chants, 
fan group donation, and fan group color [see figure 5]… It’s just in K-pop. Fan 
chants are there in a specific spot in a particular song. In the US, it’s more like 
girls screaming, and there’s no on-point chant. There’s more unison in K-pop 
fandom.  
                                                 
23 “Bias” among English-speaking K-pop fans means a favorite member of a K-pop group 
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Figure 5: K-pop Fandoms’ Practice of Woori-ness: Each K-pop fandom has its own 
fandom color, fandom name, etc. to show a unified support for the idols. 
Shown here are different fandom colors for each K-pop group: white 
fandom color for a K-pop group Exo, pink color for SNSD, pearl aqua green 
color for SHINee, etc. (Photo Credit: Twitter user NheSica) 
The Korean Wave and its fandom culture, which has the largest fandom size 
worldwide according to the Guinness Book of World Records (Anderson, 2014), provide 
a good example when trying to explain why and how popular culture matters in larger 
social contexts. What makes Korean popular culture transcultural and global, and thus the 
term Korean Wave, are the often-neglected intellectual and collective crafts people: 
transcultural fans (Choi & Maliankay, 2015). The media convergence and the 
development of communication technologies have enabled audiences to shape their 
media engagement and participatory culture in a greater variety of contexts on their own. 
This has been particularly evident in the study of fans (Jenkins, 2006; Kim, 2015). Fans 
of the Korean Wave have been among the first to create opportunities to do participatory 
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and creative work that is centered around the notion of woori-ness, creating what 
Appadurai (1996) called the “shared collective experiences in mediascape” on a global 
level. 
K-pop fandoms’ participatory woori culture is transnational, and to some extent, 
global. They do not stop at just consuming and enjoying audiovisual media texts, but are 
increasingly participating in creating, distributing, and sharing forms of K-pop as 
spreadable media via social media (Jin & Yoon, 2014; Jung & Shim, 2014), from simply 
leaving a comment on social media to creating their own YouTube channels to post K-
pop reaction videos24 (Oh, 2017) and K-pop cover dance videos25 (Noh, 2015). The peer 
production of subtitles—fansubbing (Hong, 2013)—and translations for those fans who 
do not know the Korean language is another example of fandom culture that can be 
applied Korean fandom’s woori culture. While the mainstream media are unable to 
provide fans in the US with the prompt cultural and linguistic translation of Korean 
content, fans translate and circulate Korean media texts, especially via social media (Jin 
& Yoon, 2014). Some of them further participate in sociocultural events such as fund-
raising, donating to charity, volunteering in emergency situations, and even building 
schools for those in need under the name of their K-pop idols.  
Members of KIG partake in this shared participatory woori culture. TinTin and 
Iliana have been doing amazing fanart—drawings and paintings of K-pop artists—and 
have shared their work with other fans on social media, such as on Instagram, Facebook, 
                                                 
24 K-pop reaction videos are those in which people, mainly on YouTube, self-film their reactions to K-pop 
music videos.   
25 K-pop cover dance videos are those in which people, mainly on YouTube, film their dance to K-pop 
choreography.  
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and Tumblr. Anya, who is an excellent planner, has created and organized various events 
related to Korean culture, such as playing a Yut Nori (traditional board game in Korea) 
and a Korean food themed potluck party, just to name a few. My favorite regular KIG 
gathering has been K-pop dance class. J.C. and Leoy, K-pop choreography enthusiasts, 
have led K-pop dance class every other week for the members of KIG. We reserve a 
room at a public community building for about 2 hours. There are usually about 10 
members who regularly attend the K-pop dance class, including myself. Some of them 
would show up to the class and other KIG gatherings, such as going to K-pop concerts 
together, wearing K-pop costumes they bought online or made themselves. Binzy is 
particularly crafted in this field. She makes multiple K-pop or Korean popular culture 
themed T-shirts, wears them, and sells them to raise fund for KIG. I thought wearing K-
pop costumes was interesting. Whereas Korean K-pop fans in Korea do not really wear 
costumes, I often saw K-pop fans in the US, including KIG and my informants, wearing 
them to various events related to the Korean Wave, such as KCON26.  
5. TRANSCULTURAL LEGIONS OF THE KOREAN WAVE IN THE GLOBAL 
SPHERE 
5.1 Transcultural Fans’ Yearning for Cultural Capital and Validity 
In the earlier section on cultural appropriation, I argued that increased visibility 
of Korean popular culture does not necessarily lead to an increased understanding of 
Korean-ness in the eyes of American audiences. Also, increased visibility of K-pop in a 
global context does not provide a deepened understanding of the cultural, social, or 
                                                 
26 KCON is an annual Korean Wave convention held in different locations across the world. 
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historical intricacies of Korea. However, I argue this is not always so when it comes to 
individual fans rather than the general audience, and in this case, the fans of Korean 
popular culture in the United States. One of the traits that distinguish fans from general 
audiences is the level of investment—how much one is willing to invest. Bourdieu (1984) 
described culture as an economy in which people invest and accumulate capital. The 
cultural system distinguishes between the privileged and the deprived, and promotes 
certain cultural tastes and competencies, particularly through the educational system, but 
also through other institutions such as art galleries and museums. This socially and 
institutionally legitimized culture is referred to as official high culture (Fiske, 1992). 
Popular cultural capital, on the other hand, is not typically convertible into economic 
capital although there are cases where popular cultural capital overlaps with official high 
cultural capital. Acquiring popular cultural capital will not enhance one’s career nor will 
it produce upward class mobility as its investment payoff. Its payoff lies in the pleasures 
and esteem of one’s peers in a community of taste rather than that of one’s social betters.  
Fans, then, are a good example of Bourdieu’s (1984) “autodidacts,” a group of 
people who self-teach and often self-acquire knowledge and taste. Fandom is a peculiar 
mix of cultural determinations. It is an intensification of popular culture which often 
differs from official culture while expropriating and reworking certain values and 
characteristics of the official culture to which it is opposed. Fans are active producers and 
users of such cultural capital. Fandom offers ways of filling cultural deficiencies and 
provides the social prestige and self-esteem that accompany cultural capital. Earlier, I 
talked about how global social media can be a double-edged sword for its immediacy and 
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somewhat superficial embodied knowledge and experience. This is where the U.S. fans 
of Korean Wave differ from the general audience. The degree and depth of investment is 
not the same between those who casually prefer Korean food and those who seek out, 
actively participate in fandom culture, and endeavor to learn more about the culture. 
 
Leoy: There is a difference between their [audiences] casual enjoyment and my 
passion. I don’t know why and it throws me off. But I think they all kind of work 
together. I love Korean food, I love Korea music, Korean drama, films. 
 
J.C.: It’s confusing to Americans unless you do some research. You have to 
definitely learn the terminology so that you are able to understand. You have to 
have that will to keep investing and interested, liking it more than just a 
superficial level.  
 
Transcultural fans of Korean popular culture in the US have a certain yearning 
for building their cultural capital as a means of appreciation and validity. One of the 
significant attempts they partake in to build their cultural capital is seen in their endeavor 
to learn the Korean language. Similar to official culture, fans’ yearning for knowledge 
and information acquires an unofficial cultural capital that is a major source of self-
esteem within the peer group. What is interesting in the case of the U.S. fans of Korean 
popular culture is that their yearning for cultural capital is to attain validity among not 
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necessarily their peer group—in this case, other American fans—but in the eyes of the 
general Korean public and society.   
 
Leoy: I don’t want to put the all the owe-ness of the communication on the 
Korean person to have to only speak English to me. I want to be participant in 
our cultural exchange. I don’t want to feel like I am a burden to the culture that I 
respect greatly... I find it to be exceptionally selfish. [I want to learn the 
language] because I want to play a role and show that I am trying to give 
something back to the culture and community that I enjoy so much. I feel like 
there is a cultural insensitivity to this stuff that’s produced in [Korean popular 
culture] that’s not just being handed out for your pleasure without your 
understanding of where it’s coming from. I feel like people have to try, at least 
just a little bit. 
 
KIG has been holding Korean language lessons once or twice a week. For about 
three months, I taught them conversational Korean once a week; I perceived it as a great 
opportunity to help them bond with Korean culture more in depth. Almost all of the 14 
key informants are K-pop and/or K-drama fans except Sean who is mainly interested in 
non-pop-related Korean culture such as history, language, and politics. Out of the 14 key 
informants, five of them had lived or are currently living in Korea for three months to 
five years. Two of them speak somewhat fluent Korean, and the rest the informants know 
Hangeul, the Korean alphabet, basic grammar, and speak a few words and phrases. 
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Although no one has forced them, they have consistently showed me a certain 
determination and yearning to learn the language. 
 
TinTin: I have been so into the culture, ‘Okay you watch so many dramas, you 
are into the music, you do all the stuff about this culture. You need to learn this 
language because I’ve immersed myself into this culture so far you need to start 
learning this language because at this point, it’s being rude.’ I’m being arrogant, 
ignorant. I’m purposefully making myself naïve about it, ignorant about it… It 
has become a part of my identities. I need to learn the language. This is going to 
be a part of my life. 
 
J.C.: I want to learn the language because when you go to the country, you can 
communicate in their native language. It’s definitely about respecting the culture 
that you like so much.  
 
Miranda, who moved to Korea last year to attend a university and speaks fluent 
Korean, told me that one of her motivations to learn the Korean language was to enrich 
her experience and mutual understanding. In the winter of 2016, Rosalie visited Korea for 
a few weeks for the very first time. During her stay, she told me how she sometimes felt 
frustrated not knowing the language and because of that she yearns to go deeper by 
learning the language to have a more direct interpersonal experience with Koreans. By 
enriching her cultural capital, she feels like she is opening up her mind to the rest of a 
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world that completes her identity. Their yearning for validity from the general Korean 
public, in addition to their peer non-Korean fans, is one of the aspects where transcultural 
media and fandom turns into a whole ecology.   
5.2 Ecology of Korean Popular Culture to Transcultural Fans 
The way Korean popular culture, especially K-pop as a gateway, has boosted 
international fans to exercise and practice multiculturalism in global/international 
contexts is different from traditionally powerful countries because, for one thing, Korea 
does not carry the colonial burden as I explained earlier. Korean popular culture’s soft 
power in world politics differs from traditional First World countries because Korea as a 
nation has not been an oppressor and colonizer. Its unique role works as a mediator, 
comfortably appealing to people around the world to get to meet, experience, and enjoy 
diverse cultures.  
Korea has become the first non-Western country that meaningfully exports 
almost all of its cultural forms to both Western and non-Western countries (Jin, 2016). 
Since 2010s, K-pop has worked, especially for the young digital generation, as a gateway 
for international fans to open their cultural boundaries and be exposed to the Other 
culture. One trait of Korean Wave is its expansion. One may start being interested in K-
pop and then expand their interest to other segments of Korean culture, such as K-drama, 
TV shows, films, history, food, or language. TinTin, Rosalie, Greyson, and J.C., who are 
all considered part of the digital generation in their late 20s, share their thoughts.  
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TinTin: I listen to K-pop more [than music from other countries] because there 
are so much coming out. There is not a lot of J-pop going on. It’s kind of fizzing 
out a little bit. [I don’t participate in Japanese pop culture] as much as Korean 
culture because those who like Japanese culture are heavy anime-influenced 
ones. That’s not what I want to talk about [all the time]. I want to do other things. 
 
Rosalie: K-pop may segue into learning about the language, the country, its role 
in international politics, sending out aids. I hope a lot of people who get into K-
pop end up [expanding their interests and learning about other aspects]… 
Because here in America, we are just so easy to stay in our bubble in our own 
little world… We don’t know anything about other countries.  
 
Sean: From my perspective, as somebody who has a lot of interests in Korea but 
doesn’t have much interest in pop culture is that a lot of people, I think, all they 
know about Korea is K-pop and the Korean Wave and they don’t know about all 
the other history, politics. I’m a lot more interested in what’s going on with Park 
Geun-hye’s impeachment or North Korea than what’s the latest Big Bang album. 
And I think a lot of people get so focused on the pop culture and [TV] drama that 
they don’t know about the rest of the things in Korea and you know there’s a 
lot—not that Korean pop culture isn’t important—but there’s a lot more to Korea 
than just that... But I do think K-pop is a good way to open the door... I think K-
pop is the thing that kind of gets them in the door.  
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J.C.: I think that’s how most people that first started with K-pop would get into 
other areas of it because idols do branch out and do other things. And once they 
start doing other things like you’d be watching a drama and them eating this food 
and you’re like ‘Oh what is that?’ I think it helps a lot when idols sing for a 
drama and you hear it and wonder what the drama is like. And I think that’s how 
you really really get to see some of the cultures too.  
 
Global cultural studies demand that we risk making some broader claims about 
the relationship between micro ideology and micro experience. Carey (1975) encouraged 
communication researchers to make macro claims from micro matters by studying media 
use as particular rituals creating ecology. Global/transnational media ethnography, with 
its base in local practices, offers a rich and dynamic web of linkage from micro to micro. 
From liking K-pop or another cultural form (micro), my informants expand to other 
cultural forms, such as television shows, language, history, and politics (semi-macro). 
This expansion of their cultural boundaries and capital creates the whole ecology of 
Korean popular culture, which is facilitated by cultural content and forms being realistic 
and relatable to daily life.  
 
Rosalie: My interest in Korean pop culture is changing things to be more 
relevant in my life like putting Korea into consideration for different things like 
music, media, language, food, etc. Many aspects of my life have been relevant to 
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Korea because of the Korean Wave. It made me aware of how much I didn’t 
know about the world outside.  
 
Greyson: It has become so ingrained in my day to day. Like every morning, I 
wake up and the first thing I do is I check YouTube to see if there’s any new 
videos from any of the accounts that I follow. I go take shower. I put music on. 
Music has always been a huge part of my life because I am not really good on the 
social situation so that I can use it as an out… I’ve always listened to music 
because I found that could be used as an out for me to use to handle social 
situations. For me, Korea is an outlet. For me, it’s an escape in a lot of ways. I 
have a hope for a better place that seems to resonate as a better place in my mind. 
Korean culture in general [the humbleness, respectfulness, aegyo, cute culture].  
 
Anya, one of my primary informants, is passionate about various aspects of  
Korean culture, especially K-pop. As a mother of two children, she is often outspoken 
about political issues and pays keen attention to various aspects of sociopolitical systems. 
At first, she seemed to me as a person who would never cry. Anya’s and my favorite K-
pop groups and members often overlap. We often talk about our favorite scenes from K-
pop music videos or latest variety shows featuring our favorite groups or members. One 
day, we were talking about our latest interests in K-pop groups and songs at a downtown 
café in Texas. She took her smartphone out of her bag because she wanted to share with 
me one of the K-pop performances she really loved. We watched the video together on 
 143 
her smartphone, which was hard to listen to in the midst of a bustling café in the bright 
afternoon. But I felt like neither of us cared about it. We, both as K-pop fangirls, just 
appreciated the moment of watching and listening to our favorite K-pop song and video 
together. When we finished watching the performance, I asked her, without thinking a 
lot, what K-pop means to her. She suddenly burst into tears and shared her intimate 
stories about going through some depression and how K-pop “saved” her. I also got teary 
eyes because I sympathized with her feeling; she seemed sincere, and I was appreciative 
of her sharing the story. 
 
Anya: This may sound dramatic. Long story short, K-pop saved my life, really. 
It’s rejuvenated me. It gave me a reason to keep going. I had passion to get 
something and I really needed it. It just spoke to me on so many levels. The 
easiest way to say this is it just gave me passion for something and a sparkle of 
life that was missing. It saved me from some serious depression.  
 
U.S. fans’ reception of Korean popular culture in daily life creates a complex 
ecology of transcultural Korean Wave; it also encourages U.S. fans to renegotiate their 
previous identities into new layers of multiple identities, turning them into transcultural 
fans (macro). TinTin and Leoy share how their interaction with Korean popular culture 
has influenced the formation of their fluid, multiple identities. 
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TinTin: I think it’s become a part of my identities… It’s penetrated into my life. 
If I suddenly stop doing all things Korean cultures, I wouldn’t be doing anything. 
I never realized how much my life has evolved until recently... I’m constantly 
talking to these [fans of the Korean Wave] people [on social media]... The reason 
why I got this second job was to pay for my Korean stuff. Because I want to go 
to this concert and I want to do all this stuff and I need to pay money and it’s 
very pricey. I want to go to South Korea. We [some of KIG members] are 
planning to go this year. I got the second job, so I can afford to do all the stuff 
that I really want to do like concerts, buying merchandise. 
 
Leoy: It [Korean popular culture] has been such a big part of my life for so long 
now. My life wouldn’t be where it is right now, and also I wouldn’t want it to. So 
many people I’ve met because of my appreciation of Korean culture. I get a lot of 
personal growth. I feel like it’s good for my soul to try. It has given me a lot, 
which is why it’s important for me to try to give back. I feel like I am an active 
participant and has formulated my life.  
 
In order to learn and understand other cultures, embodied learning and 
experiences are significant. Cultural signifiers are different from context to context. 
When an individual confronts such differences in reality, however, one often forgets 
distinct origins and unconsciously projects her/his own cultural beliefs. Culture, however, 
is not a thing one can simply learn by just watching a one-minute video on YouTube. 
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Fully engaging in a different culture and understanding cultural differences require 
embodied learning situated within the culture. In early 2017, Leoy moved to Korea to 
pursue her long-awaited dream of living in Korea. She told me that she is humbled to 
experience being a minority in Korea as opposed to being part of the dominant White 
race in the US. According to Oh (2017), the important question is not so much about how 
to sustain the Korean Wave, but rather how the movement of Korean Wave across global 
circuits can contribute to the potentialities of hybridity in which Bhabha (1996) once 
theorized as an escape from fixed identities that helps to level global power.  
The world of transcultural media and fandom are about mutual understanding 
and learning. The people in KIG frequently ask me—someone who identifies as an 
acafan, native Korean, fluent in the language, and more familiar with the sociocultural 
and political background of Korean culture—questions regarding Korean and American 
(popular) culture in general such as certain Korean words and behaviors they see on 
social media. Also in reverse, I ask them questions about their perception, interpretation, 
and understanding of certain Korean and American (popular) culture. Our multilateral 
inquiries create a mutual understanding and learning, which deepens cultural capital and 
leads to a communal bonding of woori-ness. Therefore, the world of transcultural media 
of the Korean Wave and its fans are symbiotic and interdependent in a global sphere.  
America is made up of so many different cultures, and therefore, becoming a fan 
of another nation’s popular culture does not necessarily make Americans feel that they 
are a traitor, but rather that they are a more transcultural entity. They have expressed 
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aspects of Korean culture that Americans can learn from—such as integrity, respect, and 
the woori-ness culture. 
 
J.C.: [One thing America can learn from Korea is] Integrity. I’d definitely agree 
that the way our pop culture is going super sexualized and it gets presented to 
other nations, countries and cultures, and people are automatically going to think 
about American people that we’re all promiscuous, loud, wanna-go-get drugs, 
self-centered people. We are not all promiscuous, loud, self-centered people, 
which I’d say is probably why there are some of us like ‘Let’s learn this culture 
and language and we can change the minds of other people, other countries’… 
American culture can look at more positive light because I feel like people 
outside of the nation think of Americans as uncultured… At a personal level, it 
has affected my life like, ‘Oh there’s something like that out there. What can I do 
to bring some of those similarities to the people around me so that I can spread? 
What can I do to get more of that we culture around me?’ 
 
Binzy: We should bring back the respect. Not only for your own elders but for 
everyone.  
 
J.C.: It’d be nicer if we could be able to bring that kind of “we as a nation 
culture” back together. It’s fine to maintain your individuality but to realize that 
cheesy but “we’re all in this together as a country” [mindset]. [It’s very polarized 
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in America with] different cultures, classes [and races]... I don’t think we ever 
truly been “we’re all one” because there have been too many different kinds of 
people. I think more than any other countries, we’d need the “we culture” 
because we are so different. I think it’s more necessary here [than in Korea] 
because it’s easier for us to hate other people because we don’t look like that... 
Even though she doesn’t look like me, she still understands the struggle I’m 
going through... It’s hard to be proud of American when you have so much [hate] 
going on in your nation between different people.  
 
Although the Korean Wave is apolitical, its consequences can be political as 
evidenced in a number of previous studies (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008; Kim, 2009a; Kim, 
2009b; Kim, 2015). One should be careful not to simplify or dichotomize the cultural 
hybridity found in Korean popular culture as either the East or the West. Transcultural 
audiences enjoy what the Korean Wave has to offer, and in doing so they actively 
construct and negotiate cultural meanings and identities on their own. Even though the 
Korean Wave is apparently tied to the culture, economy, policy, and politics of Korea, the 
primary site of reception for international fans is their own locality (Choi & Maliankay, 
2015).  
I stated in Chapter Two about the political economic aspect—Korean 
government’s strong support and active involvement in the cultural sector—of the 
Korean Wave phenomenon. However, Shim (2013) argues that spread of and exposure to 
foreign popular culture, be it via social media or not, does not always guarantee its 
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popularity overseas because the cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 1984) of audiences is 
intrinsically complex, fluid, and unpredictable. The reception of products is neither fully 
controllable nor predictable by media producers and policymakers. Media texts are never 
self-sufficient structures of meanings themselves; they are provokers of meanings and 
pleasure and are full of humor, like puns (Fiske, 2011). The very act of fans’ interpreting, 
transforming, reproducing, and sharing the so-called hybridized Korean popular culture 
makes it transcultural and global, not necessarily the forms and content per se.  
A number of KIG members expressed their frustration about having to explain to 
other Americans why they like Korean popular culture. It is seen as taken-for-granted 
when Asians like Korean popular culture. However, when it comes to non-Asian 
Americans, they often face looks of surprise, curiosity, or even straightforward derision. 
They are the ones who constantly have to reflect upon why they like to listen to K-pop 
that is not in English, why they find so-called “too feminine” Asian guys attractive, and 
why they are interested in a language and history that have little relevance or proximity to 
theirs. Leoy, a devoted fan of not just K-pop but also Korean language and history, once 
told me that, “It’s mostly liberal people in the US who like K-pop.” This is where the 
globality of transcultural Korean Wave meets the locality of American fans, leading them 
to continuous negotiations of their cultural identities.  
 The purpose of studying the reception of Korean Wave among American fans 
should be directed at reconfiguring globalization theories that recognize the dynamic 
formations of identity and hybridity at the local level while not dismissing the power 
inequalities in international settings. As I have explored throughout this study, popular 
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culture is bound to have social, cultural, and political ramifications when circulated 
across borders: the effect of micro on macro (Fiske, 2011). We can better understand the 
complex webs of transnational media culture, albeit provisional, only when we start to 
take fans’ reception of transcultural popular culture more seriously. Closely interacting 
with transcultural fans—in this case, members of KIG—with a trans-local ethnographic 
approach—in this case, my identity as native Korean acafan with a reversed ethnographic 
approach—at the heart of globalization of media culture provides not only context-
sensitive but also cross-cultural accounts. 
One of the interesting traits of Korean Wave fandom in the United States is its 
immensely multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural communities. Korean Wave fans in 
the US acknowledge the diverse polycentric communities of the fandom. Those who 
interact with Korean popular culture in/voluntarily promote and reinforce diversity and 
multiculturalism by intersecting and transgressing beyond their national and cultural 
boundaries. TinTin once told me that even if Korean Wave just becomes a passing fad in 
the US, it still has significant social, cultural, and political ramifications in the future. The 
visibility of K-pop in the US signifies the exposure of Americans to non-US/Western 
culture with a significant degree of cultural and racial odor attached.  
 
Sean: I always think it’s good to exposure yourself to other cultures because I 
think it’s important to be able to see things from other people’s perspectives. I 
love the US, I love being an American, but the US isn’t the entire world. I think 
the US is like 5 percent of the world population or something. There’s a lot more 
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to the world than just here, so I think it’s important to understand other places in 
the world. And now the world is so globalized and interconnected. I think it’s 
important that you expose yourself to other places and ideas. 
 
The unexpected transcultural spread of Korean Wave has ironically challenged 
the people of one of the most racially homogenous countries in the world to be more 
aware of multicultural diversity: the reverse effect of the Korean Wave back to Korea.  
 
J.C.: I’d hope that Korean people, I’d just boil it down to Korean fans, I hope the 
Korean Wave would make Korean fans more open to other culture as well, 
realizing that ‘people enjoy our (Korean) culture so much that I’d open my eyes 
to know more about other cultures’… Maybe Korean people who are not so 
knowledgeable about other cultures would be able to understand discrimination 
and prejudices. Sam Okyere [a Ghanaian television personality in Korea] has 
been able to make influence and a change in pop culture in regard to Black 
people. It has changed a good portion of younger millennial that is going to be 
influencing the way that Koreans are going to see the outside of the world, not 
just Black people.  
 
Rosalie: Diversity is important because you just learn so much… The worldwide 
phenomenon of the Korean Wave is a good signifier of breaking stereotypes, 
particularly toward Asian people in the US. And even in the reverse though. I 
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hope that they [Koreans] become more aware of other people liking Korean 
culture. I know it’s very [racially] homogeneous in Asia. I hope the Korean 
Wave sends reverse wave back that it’s not only the White people in the West. I 
hope the Korean Wave would also help break some of the stereotypes Koreans 
have toward non-Koreans. I hope the Korean Wave brings diversity into Korea. 
 
The Korean Wave, as hybridized media culture, not only encourages 
transcultural American fans to rediscover their cultural identity, but it also works in a 
reversed way. The unexpected popularity of Korean popular culture outside of the 
Korean territory encourages the so-called homogeneous country to be aware of diversity 
and multiculturalism. The influence and effect of the Korean Wave as both transnational 
and transcultural is not unilateral but multidirectional. It is important, therefore, to not 
only look at content and forms of Korean popular culture, but also what sociocultural 
implications it might yield in global/international settings.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
1. BRIEF BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The globalization theories, as opposed to imperialist theses, provide more 
flexible and complex theoretical accounts, which help to explicate the dynamic 
consequences derived by technological developments and the prominent emergence of 
hitherto non-center and so-called non-dominant-Western countries as major cultural 
producers and exporters. In the midst of an increasingly complex interdependence among 
countries in international settings, the flow of media culture, particularly popular culture, 
has become more dynamic (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008; Straubhaar, 1991). The 
development and proliferation of digital technologies along with the rapid globalization 
process in the 1990s have facilitated the surge of transnational flow of Korean media 
content across the globe. With enough hard power of economic affluence, Korea has 
become a neo-colonial global cultural power (Chen, 2000), receiving worldwide attention 
and popularity for its popular culture, mainly K-drama and K-pop, but increasingly other 
cultural forms as well.  
For the past 10 years or so, scholars have examined and explored the realm of the 
Korean Wave, a successful reception of Korean popular culture—K-pop, K-drama, TV 
shows, language, food, history, etc.—outside of the Korean territory (Chua & Iwabuchi, 
2008; Hong, 2013; Jin, 2016; Jin & Yoon, 2014; Jung, 2011b; Jung & Shim, 2014; Kim, 
2013; Shim, 2006). However, very few researchers have explored it empirically with 
first-hand accounts in Western contexts, particularly the United States. The increasing 
prominence of the Korean Wave, especially K-pop among the young digital generation, 
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compels scholars to analyze the phenomenon much further from a new direction. It was 
in this vein that I attempted to explore beyond what has already been discovered and 
below the surface of the expressed interpretations.  
Employing various interdisciplinary theories from globalization, critical/cultural 
studies, media studies, fandom studies, and postcolonial studies and methods from a 
qualitative ethnographic approach and grounded theory, I conducted reversed media 
ethnography to look at fans’ complex and dynamic reception—to a larger extent, the 
ecology of transcultural media fandom—of Korean popular culture in the United States. 
Traditional ethnographic research has been conducted by Western researchers onto the 
so-called non-Western cultures and people perceived as exotic “Others,” and thus the 
point of departure inevitably reflected Western perspectives (Weiss, 1994). I used the 
term reversed in part to examine the contraflow of media culture. It also emphasizes my 
own identity as an outsider scholar—from a country that had been more peripheral to the 
power structure in the world—who is studying the impact of its cultural exports on 
people in one of the central countries like the United States. In other words, instead of 
being a Westerner studying another culture, this study involved a Korean researcher 
studying Korean popular culture through direct observation and interviews with 
American fans. This reverses the traditional ethnographic dynamic in which scholars 
from central countries study the peripheries, hence reversed media ethnography.  
My reversed media ethnography over a period of two years includes participant 
observations and various structures and types of interview methods with a local group, 
Korean Interest Group (KIG), in Texas, in the United States. Between early 2015 and 
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early 2017, I regularly engaged in qualitative interviews and participatory observation of 
meetings, events, and activities that are related to Korean popular culture. The rich corpus 
of data included both citations from my field notes on participatory observations and 
quotes from interviews. Most of all, my 14 key informants with whom I have closely 
interacted on a regular basis and conducted in-depth qualitative interviews periodically 
for the past two years illustrated cultural practices and relationships that cannot be found 
in quantified numbers. Based on grounded theory, I reconstituted data into conceptual 
development—patterns, themes, and concepts—to support my arguments.  
Because my dissertation is a qualitative project aimed at understanding audience 
interpretations, I did not attempt to provide generalizations about U.S. fans’ reception of 
Korean popular culture. Instead, I attempted to unravel detailed analyses and possible 
conceptualizations of their reception by connecting recurring patterns and themes. The 
purpose of studying the reception of Korean Wave among American fans is not to impose 
Korean imperialism, but to reexamine globalization theories that recognize the dynamic 
formations of identity and hybridity at the local level while not dismissing the power 
inequalities in international settings. I consider pertinent arguments—globalization, 
hybridity, soft power, popular culture, identity, fan studies—as pieces of a broader 
theoretical and practical picture and recognize the power of each in the hope that we can 
better understand the complex circuits of cultures in international, transnational, 
transcultural, and global contexts, albeit provisional. I believed one of the ways to do so 
was to start taking fans’ reception of transcultural popular culture more seriously, and 
 155 
closely interacting with them with a trans-local ethnographic approach at the heart of 
globalization. 
2. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
This section summarizes the key findings—recurring patterns and themes—of 
my dissertation based on reversed media ethnographic approach to KIG and my 14 key 
informants in the United States. I revisited relevant theoretical concepts and frameworks 
of globalization in light of the Korean Wave in order to address the following research 
questions. 
2.1. Korean Forms of Hybridity 
Two of the key questions addressed the cross-cultural similarities and differences 
U.S. fans see in Korean popular culture versus U.S. popular culture, and what motivates 
them to interact with Korean popular culture. The hybridity embedded in various forms 
of Korean popular culture— mostly but not limited to K-pop, K-drama, language, history, 
etc.—creates complicated webs of transcultural media. I find that U.S. fans perceive 
Korean popular culture as similar to their own in terms of both being capitalist-driven, 
industrialized, economic societies, but different in the cultural plane. There are distinct 
scents or perceptions of specific Korean modernity in the cultural plane that motivates 
these fans to interact with Korean popular culture. One of them is honorific culture—
harmony, politeness, and humbleness well manifested in Korean popular culture and also 
in the Korean language through the use of honorific titles. Greyson, one of the key 
informants, shared his thoughts on honorific culture: 
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Greyson: The US doesn’t have the same depth of traditions like, for example, we 
don’t have the formal and informal level of speaking. We have traditions here but 
honorific is something like so far beyond the way that we, most people, probably 
wouldn’t be able to contemplate applying that. 
 
Another recurring pattern I found is the notion of cute culture. Cuteness, as an 
appeal, invites others to engage in social behaviors including companionship, cooperative 
action, and communication (Dale, 2017). It can also turn into a decentered form of soft 
power (Botz-Bornstein, 2016). In the East Asian region, cute culture has an overarching 
mainstream presence far more than in other regions of the world. The cute culture in 
Korea is much more mainstream and widely embedded in various facets of media and 
society than in the US.  
 
Greyson: It [cute culture such as [aegyo27] is very much part of the [Korean] 
culture that you don’t even think about it. In Korean people, there’s natural aegyo. 
 
Although media forms might be similar in the US and Korea, U.S. fans perceived 
the media content to be greatly different. Almost all of the major informants said that 
whereas it is a social norm to have sexualized and aggressive content in American TV 
shows, K-dramas focus more on non-sexualized and emotional relationships. The Korean 
Wave fans in the United States find the content of Korean popular culture to be more 
                                                 
27Aegyo refers to talking and behaving in extremely cute ways. 
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innocent, clean, and child-friendly to an extent that they perceive it to be more 
wholesome. They appreciate Korean popular culture and they feel comfortable 
consuming it. The notion of wholesomeness is embedded in almost all forms of Korean 
TV shows and U.S. fans find it comfortably appealing as it seems less aggressive, more 
child-friendly, and somewhat naïve. Rosalie, who is in her late 20s and has been a fan of 
Korean popular culture for more than a decade, shared her thoughts on the different 
portrayal of media content: 
 
Rosalie: Whereas in American television shows, there’s a lot more skin, it’s more 
sexualized, in Korean television shows, even just holding hands makes my heart 
racing. In K-drama, it’s more about building relationships more than getting 
physical with the other. [There’s] too much unnecessary drama [in the U.S. pop 
cultural content whereas] Korean culture is different. It seems more wholesome, 
honest. 
 
Alternative forms of gender representation—such as a softer form of 
masculinity—are other layers of difference in the cultural plane that motivate some U.S. 
fans. K-pop uses skillfully hybridized concepts that reflect various layers of masculinity. 
What distinctively differentiates in K-pop male idols from Western pop artists is that, 
unlike Western male musicians, men are not hesitant to dress up, do aegyo, or dance in 
extremely “feminine” and gender-bending ways while being extremely humble and 
modest. Kkonminam (flower boy) masculinity of K-pop male idols is particularly 
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interesting for its consequential ideological twists in the Western sphere. According to 
Jung (2010), the kkonminam phenomenon is a realization and renegotiated transcultural 
identity among diverse audiences as a communicative process. Leoy, a K-pop enthusiast 
in her late 20s, shared her thoughts on gender representation: 
 
Leoy: In terms of pop culture, I agree [that America is more patriarchal in a way 
than Korea]. [More fluid gender representation in K-pop is what] I really 
appreciate about in Korean pop culture that’s different from American pop. You 
take any American male group, they will not participate in half of the stuff the 
male group in Korea would do [such as] the aegyo, all of the Korean male pop 
groups that dress up in girl group outfits in performances like that. 
 
These distinct scents or perceptions of a specific Korean modernity—honorific 
culture, cute culture, less-sexualized-wholesome content, and alternative forms of gender 
representation—in the cultural plane are some of the major motivations for U.S. fans to 
interact with Korean popular culture.  
2.2. Mutual Understanding in Cultural Appropriation 
Another key question addressed the ways in which Korean popular culture is 
consumed, interpreted, and reproduced: encode/decode. One of the areas where different 
understandings and interpretations of cultural elements and practices emerged was in the 
realm of cultural appropriation, to be more specific, K-pop’s appropriation of Hip Hop. 
Understanding cultural appropriation, particularly of Hip Hop culture by K-pop artists as 
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well as the perception of ethnicity surrounding the practice, revealed cultural differences 
based on historical context. When popular culture is circulated across borders, the local 
context of its origin is often erased and instead projected through the lens of the receiving 
local context. Several of my informants were somewhat upset by some of the ways K-pop 
artists appropriated Hip Hop and Black culture (such as blackface) and expressed that the 
artists should show more sympathy to the sensitivities to Black/African Americans. J.C., 
a Black/African American K-pop fan in her late 20s, shared her thoughts on appropriating 
Hip Hop and Black culture: 
 
J.C.: If you’re going to take [African] American culture, and if you’re going to do 
that, you need to do a little of research. I think there is a definite clear separation 
between being White American and being Black American. Being American in 
itself and being Black. Although Black people are American, for the most part, 
Black people have still maintained our own separate culture because we had to, 
because we were segregated. We were discriminated against, so you had to create 
your own thing that had nothing to do with White people. 
 
One may argue that the fact that even though some K-pop artists are influenced 
by Black/African American Hip Hop does not necessarily mean that they are 
knowledgeable about the history of African American slavery, racial politics, or 
representational issues in the US as meanings can become detached from practices as 
they are circulated internationally. However, just because Korea does not share this 
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particular U.S. history and was not a historical imperial power does not mean it cannot 
become a strong global cultural power now. Korea and Korean artists need to be aware 
of, and be responsible for, the consequences of their commercial industries. The 
misunderstanding of K-pop’s appropriation of Hip Hop often comes from the lack of 
linguistic and historical knowledge of each other’s culture. Both Korean and U.S. 
audiences engage in seeing themselves and projecting their own histories and perceptual 
lens onto the cultural products they engage with. I suggested a different discourse for 
U.S. as well as Korean audiences that emphasizes a better understanding of each other’s 
culture and history in order to achieve mutual responsibility and reciprocal sensitivity in 
this global era: the appreciation for and respect of the Otherness of each culture as well as 
subcultures like African Americans.  
The ways in which U.S. fans consume and reproduce Korean popular culture are 
particularly well manifested in the realm of K-pop fans and their use of social media. 
Since the 2010s, K-pop has worked, especially for the young digital generation, as a 
gateway for international fans to open their cultural boundaries. Fan/user-created online 
sites and social media platforms are the core foundation of connection between K-pop 
and international fans. Social media is a vital conduit for American fans’ consumption 
and reproduction of K-pop. Iliana, who is in her teens and produces amazing fanart, 
shared her thoughts:  
 
Iliana: When I was into [Japanese] anime, I didn’t talk to anybody on the Internet 
at all about anime. But then when I got into K-pop, there were so many people 
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who would comment on my stuff [Iliana posts her fanart—drawings dedicated to 
K-pop idols—on her social media accounts and shares with other fans] and then 
we end up having a conversation. 
 
K-pop fans do not stop at just consuming K-pop content, but increasingly 
participate in reproducing, sharing, and distributing it as spreadable media via social 
media (Jin & Yoon, 2014; Jung & Shim, 2014). Some fans leave comments on social 
media, and others create their own YouTube channels to post reaction videos (Oh, 2017) 
and cover dance videos (Noh, 2015). The peer production of subtitles—fansubbing 
(Hong, 2013)—and translations for those fans who do not know the Korean language is 
another example of the ways in which U.S. fans participate in the reproduction and 
distribution of spreadable media. Members of KIG partake in this shared participatory 
culture. For example, TinTin and Iliana have been producing fanart—drawings and 
paintings of K-pop artists—and have shared their work with other fans on social media, 
such as on Instagram, Facebook, and Tumblr. J.C. and Leoy are K-pop choreography 
enthusiasts. They have reproduced some of the K-pop choreography and led K-pop dance 
classes for the members of KIG.  
2.3. Emotional Proximity and Korean Wave 
The next key question addressed how Korean popular culture’s hybridity 
un/consciously facilitates sociocultural implications of soft power in the United States. 
Korean popular culture reflects the traditional Asian values and ethos, which makes 
Asian audiences feel culturally proximate. What is interesting is that its wholesome 
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content with highly modernized and polished looks comfortably appeals to U.S. fans who 
were looking for clean-cut, less aggressive, and less sexualized media content, and it 
creates a feeling of affinity for people not within Asian cultural proximity. TinTin, a 
Black/African American fan of Korean popular culture in her late 20s, shared her 
thoughts: 
 
TinTin: It (Korean popular culture) is very similar to Black/African American 
culture too. It’s very polite. It shows a very close culture, and I love that. That’s 
like what really highlights Korean culture for me—how close it is to African 
American culture. There is no rudeness. 
 
I argued that my informants’ emotional proximity, another layer of Straubhaar’s 
(1991) cultural proximity theory, to Korean popular culture is not associated with a 
notion of exoticization—looking upon the East from a postcolonial gaze and constructing 
it as curious and bizarre—but appreciation—something they respect and can learn from. 
Anya, a fan of all things Korean in her late 40s, agreed with the claim:  
 
Anya: What has become reality in America, especially with the aggressiveness 
and violence, is just too exhausting. It wasn’t like that when I was growing up, but 
that is everywhere now. And I find it much more appealing that in Korean culture, 
it doesn’t seem to be accepted. I appreciate that they make the effort to put this 
out as something to be emulated, encouraged, and followed. 
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The way the Korean Wave exerts soft power in international contexts differs 
from the way historically imperialist countries do so; it is seen as less threatening in the 
eye of the beholder because Korea, historically considered a ‘semi-periphery’ to the 
power structure on the global sphere, has never invaded or colonized any other countries. 
The skillfully hybridized Korean popular culture works as a mediator not only in Asia, 
but also in the West by filling a large demand and void for audiences who were looking 
for nonthreatening, wholesome content with polished looks. In other words, the Korean 
Wave brings U.S. audiences with different racial/ethnic/social/cultural backgrounds 
together by creating shared emotional proximity that is nonthreatening and comfortably 
appealing.  
2.4. Woori-ness and Korean Soft Power 
The next key question addressed what aspects of soft power—the ability to 
entice, allure, and attract others from outside of the country to think of the country 
favorably (Nye, 2004)—can be found within U.S. fans’ reception of Korean popular 
culture. I argued that the notion of woori-ness (we-ness in English, signifying unity and 
collective mindset) embedded in Korean popular culture and its fandom culture works as 
one aspect of the multifaceted soft power of Korea in the eyes of U.S. fans. Glorifying 
good behavior (such as humbleness and modesty) in conjunction with woori-ness—
derived from the historical formation and building of the nation and the people of Korea 
over 5,000 years—can be seen as an alternative post-Western soft power in international 
settings as it frequently emerged from my ethnographic data. Some of my informants and 
 164 
members of KIG expressed how they find the notion of woori-ness attractive and as 
something their culture can learn from.  
 
Anya: [K-pop artists] are championing the good behavior [that is] modest, kind, 
and considerate. There is a different level of integrity that I don’t find in my 
American culture. I appreciate that they [Korean popular culture] make the effort 
to put this out as something to be emulated, encouraged, and followed.  
 
Theia, who is in her mid 30s and likes to watch K-drama, shared her thoughts: 
 
Theia: I honestly have to believe that [the Korean Wave phenomenon] has a lot to 
do with their pride in their nation as a whole. There is a unity there.  
 
The woori-ness embedded in Korean popular culture spills over to the fans in the 
US, and they experience and practice the feeling of woori-ness through interacting with 
Korean popular culture and its fandom culture. For example, some of KIG members 
create and share fanart via social media, teach other members K-pop choreography, and 
organize Korean food themed potluck parties along with playing traditional Korean 
games. 
 
Leoy: I think that everybody would be happier if they lived their life the way 
Koreans, and fans of Korean music in particular, live theirs. I think it does have to 
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do with the sort of “we culture” in Korea versus “me culture” in America. [with 
K-pop] I get so much more out of it when I get to enjoy it with other people, and I 
don’t feel like Americans have the same idea.  
 
The national, historical, and cultural trait of woori-ness is embedded in several aspects of 
Korean culture, and this relatively coherent notion can be seen as one of the multifaceted 
layers of soft power for some fans in U.S. society where the importance of individual 
freedom and diversity has been prioritized over national unification and individual 
sacrifice.   
2.5. Ecology of Korean Wave: Cultural Capital and Multiculturalism 
The last two significant questions addressed what implications Korean Wave’s 
soft power has on U.S. fans’ identity (or identities), and what cultural, social, and 
political implications the Korean Wave yields in global/international contexts. One of the 
traits that distinguish fans from general audiences is the level of investment—how much 
one is willing to invest. Leoy, one of my informants, said that there is a difference 
between a general audience’s casual enjoyment and her passion. One of the significant 
attempts my informants partake in to build their cultural capital was seen in their 
endeavor to learn the Korean language. The KIG members, including my informants, 
have a yearning for building their cultural capital, especially through learning the Korean 
language, as a means of appreciation.  
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J.C.: I want to learn the language because I can communicate in their native 
language. It’s definitely about respecting the culture that I like so much.  
 
The KIG hold Korean language lessons once or twice a week. Out of all 14 major 
informants, two of them speak somewhat fluent Korean and the rest of them all know 
Hangeul (Korean alphabet), basic grammar, and speak a few words and phrases.    
One of the recurring patterns I found in the fans of Korean popular culture in the 
US is the expansion of their interest. My informants expanded their interest from simply 
liking K-pop or one cultural form (micro) to other forms, such as K-drama, TV shows, 
language, history, and politics (semi-macro). This expansion of their cultural boundaries 
and capital is applicable to Carey’s (1975) notion of making macro claims from micro 
matters when studying media use as particular rituals. Linking micro matters to macro 
claims helps understand how the fans’ expansion from one area of Korean popular 
culture to other areas creates the ecology of transcultural Korean Wave and fandoms 
(macro). The U.S. fans’ reception of Korean popular culture in daily life also encourages 
them to renegotiate their previous identities into new layers of multiple identities, turning 
them into transcultural fans. Leoy, one of my major informants in her late 20s, shared 
how her interaction with Korean popular culture has influenced the formation of her 
fluid, multiple identities: 
 
Leoy: It [Korean popular culture] has been such a big part of my life for so long 
now. My life wouldn’t be where it is right now, and also I wouldn’t want it to. So 
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many people I’ve met because of my appreciation of Korean culture. I get a lot of 
personal growth. It has given me a lot, which is why it’s important for me to try 
to give back. 
 
The U.S. fans receive Korean popular culture in their daily life, such as listening to K-
pop on YouTube in the morning, watching K-drama that features their favorite K-pop 
idols, and taking Korean classes on the weekends. Out of all 14 key informants, four of 
them even moved to Korea to either work or attend school. They are the participants in 
the whole ecology of transcultural media and fandom of the Korean Wave. 
One of the interesting traits of the Korean Wave fandom in the United States is 
its immensely multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural communities. Korean Wave fans 
in the US acknowledge the diverse polycentric communities of its fandom. KIG members 
and the informants I interacted with over the years come from diverse racial, ethnic, and 
cultural backgrounds: Caucasian American, African American, Hispanic American, 
Asian American and more. The ages range from teens to 50s with most participants 
clustered in the 20s and 30s. None of them knew each other before joining KIG, but they 
came together in the name of sharing a similar interest: Korean popular culture. Those 
who interact with Korean popular culture promote and reinforce diversity and 
multiculturalism by intersecting beyond their national and cultural boundaries. What is 
interesting is that the unexpected transcultural spread of the Korean Wave has ironically 
challenged the people of one of the most racially homogenous countries in the world to 
be more aware of multicultural diversity: the reverse effect of the Korean Wave flowing 
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back to Korea. Some of my informants felt that Koreans need to become more aware of 
cultural diversity and the impact of their popular culture beyond the country. In part that 
was my informants’ desire for Korean artists to become aware enough that they would 
not offend American fans by using practices like blackface. But informants also hoped 
that Korea itself would benefit by becoming more accepting of diversity.  
 
Rosalie: The worldwide phenomenon of the Korean Wave is a good signifier of 
breaking stereotypes, particularly toward Asian people in the US. And even in the 
reverse though. I hope that they [Koreans] become more aware of other people 
liking Korean culture. I know it’s very [racially] homogeneous in Asia. I hope the 
Korean Wave sends reverse wave back that it’s not only the White people in the 
West. I hope the Korean Wave would also help break some of the stereotypes 
Koreans have toward non-Koreans. I hope it brings diversity into Korea. 
 
The unexpected popularity of Korean popular culture outside of the Korean 
territory can be a good signifier to encourage Koreans, one of the most racially 
homogeneous countries, to be more aware of the diverse and multicultural Korean Wave 
fandom communities outside of Korea. The Korean Wave, as hybridized transnational 
media culture, can encourage Koreans to be more aware of diversity and 
multiculturalism. Seen in this vein, the influence and effect of transnational Korean Wave 
and its transcultural fandoms are not unilateral but multidirectional. This is one of the 
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cultural, social, and political implications the Korean Wave yields in a 
global/international context.  
3. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The following illustrate some of my theoretical and methodological contributions 
to the existing scholarship of global media culture and literature of the Korean Wave 
studies. First, I used a reversed media ethnographic approach, which still demands more 
attention and has not come to its fruition yet. Understanding globalization in 
ethnographic depth demands new deployments of ethnography that are locally based but 
globally engaged. The process of globalization is best understood from a local 
perspective, one that takes into account particular contexts and the lived experience of 
local people. Fans in the US understand and deploy the objects or texts of another 
culture—Korean popular culture—through the means they have at their disposal within 
their own cultural contexts. Yet, the media increasingly becomes implicated in 
intensifying patterns of distribution and dissemination through mainly Internet-based 
platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, or Tumblr. The call for greater local 
contextualization of studies of transnationally circulating media is a valuable contribution 
to our attempts to grasp the complexity of media flow and fandoms. Any consideration of 
the ways in which global media culture plays out in fandom should proceed both from the 
local context and our informed understanding of fan behaviors, motivations, and 
processes of meaning-making as driven by affective pleasures and investments.  
Most of the previous studies of the Korean Wave addressed the whats, hows, and 
whys of international fans’ and audiences’ enjoyment of Korean popular culture and dealt 
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with various potential implications and meanings of the phenomenon both within and 
outside of the Korean territory. While these studies employed various methods such as 
surveys, interviews, and textual and discourse analysis to examine the phenomenon, very 
few provide first-hand ethnographic empirical explorations and interpretations of media 
reception. Based on previous studies, we already know that some international audiences 
or fans enjoy interacting with Korean popular culture. However, what has been ignored 
so far in the realm of Korean Wave studies are the mechanisms in which interaction 
occurs, continues, and intensifies. Any form of interaction and reception is constructed 
and functions in a specific social and historical context. The media ethnographic 
approach in my dissertation—a relatively long period of immersion in the scene where 
the actual reception of the Korean Wave among American fans occurs—provided the 
appropriate tools to know these mechanisms as a living organism.  
Moreover, the past century of Western-centered scholarship talking to itself 
about audiences has permitted it to take contextual factors for granted. My work was a 
reversed ethnographic approach, which is not necessarily the same as the often so-called 
de-Westernized approach (Livingstone, 2015). I perceive my work to be not only a de-
Westernized approach, but more “reversed” in that the fans being studied are Westerners 
and the point of departure and the gaze placed upon them is from a non-Westerner’s 
perspective. In other words, the gaze is from a member of the Korean culture studying 
how Americans consume her native culture. The reception of my participants’ media 
culture is non-Western—Korean popular culture—in their Western locality. 
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Some of the theoretical contributions of my study are based on the recurring 
patterns I dissected from my ethnographic data. I coined two terms: emotional proximity 
as another layer of Straubhaar’s (1991) cultural proximity theory, and woori-ness as one 
of the multifaceted soft power of Korean popular culture in the US. I used grounded 
theory as a reference to derive theoretical concepts—emotional proximity and woori-
ness—from the qualitative analysis of my ethnographic data in addition to substantiating 
the interpretation based on participants’ expressions and use of words and meanings 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The theoretical approach of cultural hybridity to the Korean 
Wave phenomenon has de-emphasized the multiple processes and practices international 
fans generate (Anderson & Shim, 2015). One must not look at the notion of hybridity 
simply as a binary model—such as resistance/domination and center/periphery—or a 
descriptive tool to explain certain transcultural phenomena of media culture because 
hybridity is never a power-neutral space. It is a space where different power relations are 
continuously negotiated and struggled with. According to Kraidy (2002), the theoretical 
challenge of hybridity lies in context; transnational hybridity creates ideological twists in 
global contexts and fulfills (or does not) its progressive potential in a local context.  
I found that the Korean Wave works as a mediator not only within the East, but 
also in the West by filling a large demand and void for audiences who were looking for 
less-sexualized, non-aggressive, clean-cut, and wholesome content. At times, 
transcultural fans become fans of transnational texts not necessarily because of where 
they are from, but because they may recognize a subjective moment of emotional 
proximity regardless of origin. The high level of hybridity in Korean popular culture 
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arouses emotional proximity among not only Asian audiences but also American 
audiences to renegotiate their identities and to realize what they have been missing out 
on. I found that the simultaneously complex yet fluid hybridity and emotional proximity 
embedded in Korean popular culture appeals to U.S. fans and transforms into a 
multifaceted soft power: the woori-ness (we-ness in English), signifying the unity of a 
collective mindset. 
The notion of woori-ness works as a significant yet under-recognized facet of 
soft power when studying the implications of the Korean Wave in global/international 
contexts. This relatively unified notion of woori-ness is deeply embedded in various 
facets of Korean popular culture and can be traced back to the historical formation and 
building of the nation and the people of Korea as I analyzed in the Findings chapter. 
Whereas the form of Korean Wave is highly hybridized and transnational, the driving 
force behind it, ironically, is homogeneous and unified. Rosalie shared her thoughts on 
the notion of woori-ness: 
 
Rosalie: This [woori-ness] is the driving force behind all the success and today’s 
global phenomenon of Korean pop culture. And they are not selfish about it 
either. Korean culture is very much about community and collective society as 
‘we are one.’ In the US, it’s very much about the individual. It’s not we, it’s I; it’s 
my house, it’s not woori [our] house as in Korean.  
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Fans of the Korean Wave in the US find a strong sense of community and 
belongingness—woori-ness—embedded in Korean culture. They are drawn to Korean 
Wave and find Korea’s unique cultural aspect of woori-ness as a path to globalization 
fascinating. This relatively coherent woori-ness can be seen as one of the multifaceted 
layers of soft power in the eyes of non-Koreans, especially in the US where national 
unification and sacrifice have been relatively silenced for the sake of individual freedom. 
It is important to remark that although soft power can only be made possible with 
substantial hard economic power, it is not always guaranteed. This is where Korea’s 
woori-ness, derived from its historical position of in-between ‘semi-periphery’ to the 
power structure in the world, comes in, working as an alternative post-Western soft 
power in international settings.  
4. LIMITATIONS 
My study is not without limitations. My main ethnographic observations and 
interviews took place in one particular state in the US: Texas. Texas has its own unique 
culture, and therefore, readers should be careful not to generalize my findings as 
representative of the entire U.S. fan base of Korean Wave. However, as I stated several 
times throughout my dissertation, my goal was to provide an in-depth, but inevitably 
fragmented moment of the whole ecology of transcultural media and fandom as a 
qualitative project, not generalizations about globalization or Korean Wave. Ethnography 
unravels the nature of locality as a lived experience in a globalized, deterritorialized 
world—the idea of seemingly borderless flow of culture, economy, and people 
(Appadurai, 1991). For my specific research topic, I found it appropriate to conduct an 
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ethnographic approach to intersect global (Korean Wave) and local (Texas, US) fields as 
it provides detailed analyses and a deeper understanding of audience interpretations that 
cannot be found in quantified numbers. 
Another significant issue that needs to be addressed is the idea of self-reflexivity 
in my reversed ethnographic approach. I am a native Korean who has lived in the US 
trying to understand how Americans interact with Korean popular culture. There is 
always the danger that my participation in the field may have affected my participants’ 
reception and expression. As a native Korean interviewing Americans about my (Korean) 
culture, my ethnic, racial, gender, cultural, and national identities may have influenced 
some of their answers. I also may have misunderstood their reactions.  
Nevertheless, all cultures are interconnected to a greater or lesser degree, and 
people are simultaneously engaged in many cultural practices at once, constantly moving 
across multidimensional, transnational space (Ang, 1996). This contemporary cultural 
condition—postcolonial, postmodern, globalization, or whatever one names it—
engenders us to move away from positivist knowledge into the direction of storytelling 
and narrative. This does not mean that accurate data gathering and generalizable 
inference making is not important. It means that our deeply partial position as an 
ethnographer should be seriously confronted and considered, hence the importance of 
self-reflexivity. An ethnographer’s partial position is not to be eradicated, but to be 
acknowledged as an inevitable state of affairs, which implies the researcher has 
responsibility as a producer of descriptions and an interpreter of and during the meaning-
making process. Ang (1996) coined this as the “burden of authorship.” 
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 “There is no politically innocent methodology for intercultural interpretation” 
(Clifford, 1992, p. 97). Unlike positivist quantitative approach, qualitative ethnography 
takes the researcher as an instrument. Data is observed through the mind and body of the 
researcher in ethnography. Ethnographers, as an instrument, not only participate in the 
field, but also in their data as they analyze it (Gray, 2002). They flexibly move in and out 
of their data, which enables them to provide more than the objective, positivist 
perspective. Ethnographers carry a “burden of authorship” (Ang, 1996), and this burden 
has to do with how ethnographic authorship is a form of cultural inscription that reveals 
the politics of our intellectual work. Self-reflexivity is the ultimate political responsibility 
of the researcher. Ethnographer’s self-reflexivity should reflect an honest, authentic and 
transparent awareness of his/her own identity and research approach, and should show an 
attitude of respect toward participants, audiences, and other research stakeholders. It 
includes sharing one’s motivations in conducting a certain study and engaging in 
practices so that readers know that the researcher has considered her/his role and impact 
on the scene.  
Throughout all stages of a project, from the early stages of research design to later 
stages of writing, I carried this burden of authorship in considering how my intentions 
and physical presence at the scene impacted the data. Throughout my entire ethnographic 
work, I tried to be honest and transparent when immersed with the KIG and my 
informants. From very early on when I joined KIG, I identified myself as a transnational 
researcher from a university and an acafan of Korean popular culture. I was sometimes 
outspoken about my particular research interests in transnational media culture, Korean 
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Wave, and soft power. The more I immersed myself in building a close rapport with my 
key informants, I felt that my participant observation was more than an ethnographic 
observation. Rather, it was a somewhat a complete participation in ways that my 
interaction with them inevitably has affected the formation of their identities and their 
reception of Korean popular culture and vice versa. Hall (1980) once said that the 
complicated webs of cultures are not unilateral but always multidirectional, a “circuit of 
cultures.”  
5. FINAL REMARKS 
 More than two decades have passed since Appadurai (1991) theorized the global 
interactive system as complex, non-deterministic, and heterogeneous. Image, the 
imagined, and the imagination are central to all forms of agency, are themselves social 
facts, and are the key components of the new global order (Appadurai, 1991). 
Mediascapes provide large and complex products of images and narratives to viewers 
throughout the world in which the world of commodities are profoundly mixed. Global 
culture is shaped by the communication process of local reception (Hall, 1991). As some 
postcolonial scholars (Appadurai, 1996; Bhabha, 1994; Chatterjee, 1993) have 
emphasized, there really is no such entity as a single national culture, and to a larger 
extent, all contemporary cultures are hybrid. However, as I emphasized throughout my 
dissertation, hybridity should not be used as an easy tool to explain any national, 
regional, international, or global media culture because its complicated in-between space 
is never power-neutral but demands constant struggles and negotiations over cultural 
meanings and symbols. I argue these intricate layers of hybridity are well manifested in 
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Korean popular culture and its fandom. The carefully structured way of hybridity in 
Korean popular culture is not just a mere influence on the U.S. fans of the Korean Wave, 
but a part of the creation of the ecology of transcultural media and fandom.  
One of the purposes for studying the reception of the Korean Wave among fans 
in the United States is not to impose the idea of the great soft power of Korean-ness as a 
neo-colonial global cultural power, but to reconstitute globalization theories that 
recognize the dynamic formations of identity and hybridity at the local level while not 
dismissing the power hierarchy in international settings. As Oh (2017) contends, we 
should direct our attention not so much to how to preserve the Korean Wave, but how the 
movement of Korean Wave across global circuits can contribute to the hybridity that 
helps to level global power.  
The ecology of transcultural media and fandom is about mutual understanding, 
responsibility, respect, sensitivity, and learning. As much as the members of KIG—
especially my major informants—learned from me, it was me—who identifies herself as 
an acafan, a native person of the culture they love and respect—who learned more from 
them. Throughout our close interaction over the years, they have influenced me to know 
more about the intricacies of social, cultural, political, and historical differences and 
similarities as well as to continuously self-reflect on my native culture and identity. One 
of the most significant things they have shown me, someone from one of the most 
racially and culturally homogeneous countries, is the importance of diversity. My 
informants come from diverse racial, ethnic, cultural, and political backgrounds, and I did 
not have a chance to interact with people from such diverse backgrounds when I was in 
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Korea. Sometimes, my reception of Korean popular culture (such as K-pop’s 
appropriation of Hip Hop and aesthetic standards) as a native Korean is not the same as 
the ways in which Leoy, Rosalie, and Nicole perceive them. Yet, through building a close 
rapport with them, I learned how to value and respect the differences.  
My dissertation unraveled dynamic interactions between Korean popular culture 
and its fans in the US, how cultural hybridity of Korean Wave un/consciously facilitates 
soft power, and what sociocultural implications it might yield in global/international 
contexts. The Korean Wave exemplifies strategically well-balanced cultural hybridity, 
evokes continuous negotiations of identities, and generates nonthreatening emotional 
proximity that appeals to U.S. fans with varying ethnic, racial, social, and cultural 
backgrounds in the name of woori-ness. The political economic aspect of the Korean 
Wave should not be undermined. Yet, spread of and exposure to foreign popular culture 
does not guarantee its popularity overseas. The transnational and transcultural reception 
of media texts is neither fully controllable nor predictable by media producers and 
policymakers because media texts are never self-sufficient structures of meanings 
themselves. The hybridized Korean popular culture as transcultural media defies 
identification as a fixed, single nature. In the midst of this phenomenon, there are the 
often-neglected participatory transcultural fans as legions of craftspeople that 
enthusiastically and willingly consume, interpret, share, and reproduce the culture of the 
“Other,” actualizing the Korean Wave. 
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